














Moral Identity and Free Will
There is agency in all we do: thinking, doing, or making. We invent a tune, play, or 
use it to celebrate an occasion.  Or we make a conceptual leap and ask more ab-
stract ques� ons about the condi� ons for agency. They include autonomy and self-
appraisal, each contested by arguments immersing us in circumstances we don’t 
control.  But can it be true we that have no personal responsibility for all we think 
and do?    
Agency: Moral Identi ty and Free Will proposes that delibera� on, choice, and free 
will emerged within the evolu� onary history of animals with a physical advantage: 
organisms having cell walls or exoskeletons had an internal space within which to 
protect themselves from external threats or encounters.  This defense was both 
structural and ac� ve: such organisms could ignore intrusions or inhibit risky behav-
ior.  Their capaci� es evolved with � me: inhibi� on became the power to deliberate 
and choose the manner of one’s responses.  Hence the ability of humans and some 
other animals to determine their reac� ons to problema� c situa� ons or to informa-
� on that alters values and choices.  This is free will as a material power, not as the 
conclusion to a conceptual argument.  Having it makes us morally responsible for 
much we do. It prefi gures moral iden� ty.  
Closely argued but plainly wri� en, Agency: Moral Identi ty and Free Will speaks for 
autonomy and responsibility when both are eclipsed by ideas that embed us in his-
tory or tradi� on.  Our sense of moral choice and freedom is accurate. We are not 
altogether the creatures of our circumstances.
As with all Open Book publica� ons, this en� re book is available to read for free on 
the publisher’s website. Printed and digital edi� ons, together with supplementary 
digital material, can also be found at www.openbookpublishers.com
Cover Image: Photo by Carlos de Toro on Unsplash at h� ps://unsplash.com/pho-
tos/uVEVvDSYze8
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Introduction
Agency implies purpose, action, and autonomy. We are inventive, 
effective, and self-appraising. But there is an ambiguity. Does agency 
signify reality-testing in the near-world where the existence and character 
of other people and things are independent of our thinking? Or is 
agency the activity of a mind inspecting sensory data, ideas, and itself? 
These are alternative foundational claims: one material and existential; 
the other subjective and epistemological. Aristotle described agency in 
detail, but his formulation is obscured by the Cartesian tradition that 
elides thought with being. It supposes that we know reality when mind 
turns on itself, though agency is apparent to anyone taking a walk or 
calling a friend.
The difference between these views is suppressed rather than 
resolved when reality-testing is construed as the mere look of the data 
inspected: we only seem to be agents afoot in a world we haven’t made. 
These are sample passages from Heidegger’s Being and Time: 
[S]ciences have the manner of Being which this entity—man 
himself—possesses. This entity we denote by the term “Dasein.”1
Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical 
disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself 
with regard to its object and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is 
universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the 
hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast 
the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises 
and to which it returns.2
Heidegger is rightly credited with bringing Hegel to ground—
universals cashed out in particularity—yet his ontology is speculative in 
1  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 32.
2   Ibid., p. 62.
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a traditional way. For Dasein is an intuiting ego: everything real because 
intelligible is located in the minds discerning it. This is phenomenology 
as it claims transcendental competence: minds discern reality’s essential 
structure and details by inspecting experience and themselves. 
Much of philosophy is comfortable with this bias and its deference 
to Plato’s cave allegory: he alleged that minds can know the ordering 
principles of the cosmos because the quest for reality’s Forms is 
intuition’s trajectory.3 Descartes inverted Plato’s focus: distilling minds 
are self-discovering. Deflecting the skepticism of his first Meditation, 
Descartes discovered the theater where everything is set before our 
inspecting minds, all of it informed by mind’s clear and distinct ideas. 
Nor is anything else thinkable. For what can we know or imagine when 
nothing is either conceivable or existent if not inspectable? Esse est percipi 
was Descartes’ idea before Berkeley used the phrase. It embodies two 
claims: that evidence of existence is a necessary condition for existence, 
and that evidence isn’t secured if a mind isn’t aware of itself (thereby 
confirming its own existence) while inspecting things perceived. For “I 
am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think,” 4 implying 
both awareness of something and mind’s awareness of its own existence 
while inspecting that thing. 
Put aside Descartes’ gesture when he introduced a god as the deus 
ex machina justifying moral certainty that the external world is largely 
as it seems. For all states of affairs lying beyond the arc of consciousness 
earn Kant’s designation as “negative noumena.”5 He reduced agency to 
the dimensions—the single souls—of Leibnizian monads;6 he fortified 
the self-inspecting cogito, re-describing it as the agent responsible for 
schematizing experience in ways that satisfy the maker’s values and 
interests. But this is odd: purpose succeeds because we’re organized, 
stubborn, and clever, not because we create surrogate realities while 
staring at ourselves. 
3 Plato, Republic, Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington (New York: 
Pantheon, 1961), 514a-517e, pp. 747–49. 
4 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in: Discourse on the Method and 
Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. David Weissman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996), p. 65. 
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1965), p. 270. 
6 G. W. V. Leibniz, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, trans. Paul Schrecker 
and Anne Martin Schrecker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), paras. 1–19, pp. 
148–51. 
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Why make these antique allusions? Because the subjectivist tradition 
is second nature to thinkers fearful that invoking agency’s stance in the 
natural world would make them seem naive. Aristotle was confident that 
thinking, making, and doing engage human agents with other people and 
things. His assumptions—ontological realism, truth as correspondence, 
and a representational theory of perception—are known but discounted 
by skeptics who defend Cartesian subjectivism and Kantian idealism. 
Principal ideas of knowledge, perception, and agency fail to assimilate 
either his realism or the Darwinian implications of minds that evolve 
while accommodating their material circumstances. 
Our subjectivist tradition construes us as passengers on a train: 
seeing the countryside through the windows of the observation car, 
we imagine saving the land while never leaving the train. What does it 
matter that philosophy distorts self-understanding by reducing agency 
to Cartesian self-reflection or Kantian world-making? Do we believe 
with Quine that “the quality of myth is relative,” so reality has whatever 
character satisfies our “various interests and purposes”?7 This is fanciful; 
it doesn’t survive an accurate reading of agency, frustration, or error. 
These chapters face the other way: they mate Aristotle with Darwin, 
Peirce, and Freud. I assume that every living creature is situated in the 
material world, and that each has multiple effects on things or events 
that are otherwise independent of human agents and one another. 
Agency’s profile emerges as we observe others and ourselves, then 
augment observation with inferences that identify the likely intra-
psychic, material, and social causes for our actions and effects. We 
rebalance this schism—action or inspection—by controlling action with 
appraisal. Storms have effects they don’t control. We alter our effects by 
revising our aims or their means. 
Yet agency is elusive. This is true superficially because we often 
qualify subject terms with active verbs—“She tripped”—though it was 
a loose rug, nothing careless, that caused her fall. Donald Davidson 
made this point, though there are, he agreed, many actions rightly 
attributed to the agents causing them.8 The more abiding obscurity is 
mental and material. Agency is too close and self-entangled for easy 
7 Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), p. 19.
8  Donald Davidson, “Agency,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2002), pp. 43–62. 
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comprehension: too many of its effects aren’t perceived, inferred, or 
foreseen. It once seemed that mystery dissolves because autonomy and 
free will are apparent; one could reliably say that mind is whatever self-
inspection shows it to be. But nothing has changed more radically than 
this self-conception. Having analogized machine intelligence to human 
ways of thinking, we infer that consciousness and its qualifications are 
emergent effects of a body’s nervous system. We fear that autonomy 
may fall to socialization and machine management: we sing any tune we 
please, though the tunes we know are usually familiar to our neighbors. 
For almost everything we do comes from an inventory accessible to all 
a society’s members. Tastes change, choices alter, though changes are 
usually those we accept, not those we provoke. Autonomy is restricted 
to small initiatives—coffee or tea, white shirt or blue—in contexts 
requiring choices that individuals don’t control. 
Successful practice is evidence that our brains effectively process 
information about the ambient world and our responses to it, but there 
is no direct perception of brain’s complexity and no comprehensive 
understanding of the gap between our powers of self-inspection and the 
neuro-mechanical processes of self-regulation. What’s to be made of aims 
pursued steadily from provocation and desire through planning, initiative, 
frustration, and revision? Some thinkers tease subtlety out of introspective 
data; others reduce intention to the persistence of our behavior. Or, 
like Ryle, Wittgenstein, and Anscombe, they resort to a different sort of 
data. Ignoring the evidence of self-inspection, they parse the grammar 
of the words used when speaking of one’s intentions. Yet different uses 
and different ways of construing them require verification. How is that 
achieved? We test alternate linguistic implications against experience 
and behavior, while supposing that choice and action are impelled by 
intentions and volitions known several ways: by self-inspection, by 
observing other people’s behavior, and—in a preliminary way—by brain 
scans that trace their neural course. Grammar is suggestive, but never 
more than provocative because its rules lack the diversity and nuance of 
aims that are variously pursued and expressed. Nor is this surprising: 
anger and fear are persistent motivators; they are often disguised or 
suppressed, though never reduced to the grammar of anger or fear. 
This essay embodies a tradition that runs from Jonathan Edwards and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson to C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. 
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Many agents—storms and trucks, for example—are impelled by other 
things; humans (and some other animals) are self-moving. Philosophy’s 
American roots are dominated by ideas of agency, initiative, and self-
control. Regulation wasn’t urgent on the frontier, where people had few 
neighbors; it became an issue as America filled with immigrants. How 
would an open society constrain its citizens while liberating them from 
rigid practices and traditions? Seek opportunities, take risks, though 
effects may be consequential, so deliberate about aims and means. 
Purpose is often steady, but don’t expect that it will always be present, 
like blinking lights, to inspecting minds. Is my trajectory fixed when 
driving in fog and rain? Wouldn’t that detract from the care required to 
do it safely? 
This tradition emphasizes autonomy, while acknowledging that 
freedom carries responsibility for controlling one’s actions and 
appraising one’s effects. Hard determinism objects that this self-critical 
response is illusory: it says that every current action is a moment in a 
trajectory initiated at time’s origin, an arc we don’t control. Chapter Two 
argues that hard determinism is false: many things we do are habitual; 
many habits have a lineage that includes DNA and its evolutionary 
survival in circumstances long superseded. Yet agents—material 
though we be—often address situations for which history has prepared 
no specific response.9 Middle-aged, male, and childless, I hold the 
infant left with me while her mother runs an errand. The baby pauses, 
considers, then twists and screams; she isn’t happy. I hold her tighter, 
then loosely; nothing works until I blow across her ear. The screaming 
stops; she relaxes in my arms. Where was this in my history? Where 
is hard determinism in any situation where an agent has choices but 
no established responses to circumstances that are novel or surprising? 
Evolution is deterministic: it explains the generation of speech and 
cooperation, though not their expression or effects in circumstances for 
which we have no preparation. For every situation invites free choice 
because uncertainty and initiative trump the causal tide: canny and 
skilled, we respond to situations for which there is no history. 
Validating free will—choice when history isn’t determining—is 
critical because moral responsibility requires it, and because having it 
9  An earlier version of Chapter Two was published as “Autonomy and Free Will,” 
Metaphilosophy 49 (2018), pp. 609–45.
6 Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will
is a condition for moral identity. Rather than being programmed for 
action, I declare myself to others by appraising and regulating my effects 
on them. This isn’t news: we don’t convince others or ourselves that we 
avoid responsibility because we locate our choices within an ancient 
lineage. Arguments for or against free will won’t change the fact that 
we do or don’t have it; but they are consequential because of their real 
or potential effects on our attitudes. Hard determinism is demoralizing: 
don’t imagine that any difference you make is one you’ve freely chosen, 
given that each of us is a vehicle for effects long ago determined. There 
must be compelling logic and evidence before we concede that our 
apparent control of judgment, choice, and behavior is an illusion. 
These issues have a contentious history. My reading of Aristotle locates 
him within the pragmatic naturalist tradition because of his belief that 
mind is the activity of a body having a certain complexity, and because 
he invariably emphasized self-regulation and one’s responsibility for 
action’s effects.10 Descartes is his contrary: mind is self-sufficient; it 
connects to body by way of the pineal gland, though ablating the gland 
wouldn’t stop mind from making choices as it thinks, remembers, or 
imagines. Yet mind’s choices wouldn’t have effects beyond itself, given 
Descartes’ reasons for doubting that there is an ambient world. Should 
we settle, as with Kant’s “transcendental object,”11 for an “as if” reality, 
one having no consequence beyond our inclination to assume it? 
Freedom to choose when thinking is, he said, all the freedom we have, 
but is that enough freedom to conduct the business of everyday life? 
Subjectivism collapses because no one has identified these putative 
agents—Descartes’ appraising cogito or Kant’s schematizing ego—and 
because material systems are able to perform as dualism alleges they 
cannot. Consciousness and its qualitative data resist physiological 
explanation, though this obstacle is somewhat reduced by engineers 
who build systems acting in ways that would be described as conscious 
if performed by minds. Challenge passes to the Aristotelian side: what 
survives of choice when all its conditions are the capacities of material 
systems? What are autonomy, choice, and moral identity in the context 
of the body and brain? Answers seem apparent when observing people 
10 Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random 
House, 1941), 431a1–435a10, pp. 593–602.
11 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 137. 
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who go about their ordinary tasks: weighing likely outcomes, they 
estimate costs and benefits before deciding what to do. Some agents 
identify with a role having specific tasks and duties; they perform as 
the role prescribes. Others innovate. Either may interrupt standard or 
experimental practice because of regretted effects; we plausibly say 
that both could have chosen to act differently. Determinists agree that 
self-inspection seems to confirm these powers, but nature, they say, is a 
closed book. We aren’t autonomous, and don’t have free will; history is 
the unspooling of causes and effects whose trajectory was decided at the 
start; whenever, whatever its character. Is this judgment supported by 
empirical and logical evidence or is it an a priori dogma? These chapters 
are an appraisal: I conclude that hard determinism is multiply flawed 
with very little supporting argument or evidence.
Why does it matter that this version of the determinist argument 
is false? Because there are critics so skeptical of libertarian excesses 
that they gloat when saying that freedom is a delusion. Their posture 
squares comfortably with discoveries of several kinds: that mind is a 
physical system performing in fundamental ways as computers do; 
and that thought, perception, and memory are material processes. Yet 
biology doesn’t confirm that every contemporary choice is the current 
expression of a trajectory started eons ago. Someone believing that 
reasons make no difference when making hard choices would throw up 
his hands or use a Ouija board when deciding: let history choose. For 
reasons that seem to justify a choice have a cosmetic but no causal effect 
if all was determined at the beginning of time. I propose an alternative 
that eschews both unconditioned freedom and the determinism which 
explains that every event—past or future—was decided by natural 
laws and the conditions prevailing at time’s inception. Soft determinism 
is the hypothesis that every event has causes sufficient to determine 
its character and existence, many that are past but some that express 
the interests or values of agents responding to current circumstances. 
For it often happens that actions are provoked by situations having no 
antecedent in an agent’s history. Laplace assumed that causal energy 
is continuously transformed when sustained in accord with laws that 
have operated since the beginning of time. He would have us explain 
an agent’s response by citing those laws and original conditions. I 
argue that this explanation is incomplete: it ignores the myriad times 
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when causes are insufficient to provoke an effect until completed by the 
responses of agents engaged by provocative situations. 
Are there considerations—evidence and arguments—that defeat 
hard determinism? My solution has four elements: 
i. Agreeing that every property and event has causes sufficient 
to determine its existence and character, it affirms that choices 
underdetermined by their antecedents alter the trajectories of causal 
histories. This happens when choice or action ensues because one 
or more features in a current situation provoke an unprogrammed 
response. 
ii. We have this power because of three factors: a. Agents in one causal 
lineage often address new or surprising situations having constituents 
in lineages independent of their own. Having no fixed reaction (or 
overriding a fixed response), agents experiment; they test and revise 
their actions until effects satisfy their needs. b. Emergence has sufficient 
causal conditions (life emerges from assembled molecules and cells), 
but its effects are liberating. No longer restricted to the powers of their 
lower-order constituents (organs, cells, and molecules), agents have a 
repertoire of powers and skills that redirect the causal trajectories of 
both themselves and the things with which they interact. Or the causal 
tide is interrupted when inherited responses are inhibited. c. Will is two 
things: life-force, and a power that energizes and enacts particular aims. 
Both emerge when evolution produces living things shielded from their 
environments by permeable surfaces (cell walls, for example) that resist 
intrusions while supplying access to nutrients and partners. Every such 
agent is an evolutionary experiment: how will it adapt to circumstances 
when its external buffer enables the development of capacities for using 
circumstances to its advantage? Millenia pass as these functions evolve, 
and others emerge. In humans, emergent powers include deliberation, 
judgment, will, and choice. Is a situation new or surprising? Free will is 
the activation of powers that evolution has enabled: powers for reality-
testing, coping, and restraint. Creatures less endowed, react; we consider 
our options. The full history of will’s causal lineage goes back very far: all 
emergents do. Its activation as free will is the effect of current situations: 
responses are inhibited until circumstances are appraised, options are 
considered, choices are made: I see and like it, but don’t buy it. 
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Calling will “free” doesn’t imply that the act is unconditioned; 
it signifies that willing is free from external constraints, when its 
sufficient conditions are local to the psychic space where decisions 
are made. An observing god might predict will’s evolution with near 
or perfect accuracy; its guesses about agents’ responses to particular 
states of affairs—addressing situations for which there are no prepared 
responses—would be no better than likely. 
iii. Agency is an essential topic in the thinking of pragmatists for 
whom thoughtful action is the key to understanding our relations to 
one another and our circumstances. Yet pragmatism too often reduces 
to the urgencies of practical life or the values and planning that make 
action effective. We emphasize actions in the public world; we neglect 
interiority, though one is altered by a book, a play, or the horror of an 
accident. Active in the near-world of things and opportunities, active in 
relations to one another, we too often ignore the resonance of taste, skill, 
and deliberation. Their cultivation is decisive for aesthetic and moral 
judgment. Autonomy is incomplete if sensibility is unformed. 
iv. Equilibrium implies a vague but useful measure of agency’s 
principal aims. Signifying moral, aesthetic, and emotional balance in the 
relations of agents to those they engage and within agents themselves, 
it expresses a psychic and moral ideal: in control of ourselves, we are 
also responsible for our effects on other people and things. Many factors 
explain the want of balance, but philosophic ideas—hard determinism, 
for example—are a symptom: why learn to modulate our responses if all 
was settled long ago? We reduce the severity of this effect by dispelling 
several persuasions. They include the bellicose reading of Nietzsche’s 
persuasion that power and action are our raison d’être; Descartes’ belief 
that intellect is self-sufficient; the Hegelian, Heideggerian aversion to 
privacy, and Plato’s disdain for emotion. We repair these excesses by 
binding the extremes. Women were once excused from being publicly 
effective, men from educating sensibility. Equilibrium implies the 
convergence of these contraries. Like health, it signifies a condition to 
which we aspire, one whose absence may explain both our displacements 
(money, status, and possessions) and our addictions (alcohol and dope). 
Agency is these two things: control of one’s circumstances; cultivation, 
appraisal, and control of oneself. 
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Free will is conceptually enabling: it clarifies the requirements for 
socialization, autonomy, and moral identity. Yet autonomy is problematic: 
a factional or atomized society is perpetually barren and thwarted. Its 
individuals can’t organize for common or complementary aims; they 
lack the milieu required if art or ideas are to sensitize taste and talents. 
This essay construes socialization as the process of folding autonomous 
agents into the fabric of meanings, roles, and rules responsible for 
order, productivity, and mutual understanding. The conditions for free 
will—self-sufficiency, resistance to intrusions, and inhibition—make us 
singular, but vulnerable because inaccessible or unintelligible to others. 
We risk being unable to sustain ourselves because unable to acquire 
habits and sensibilities that would make us interesting or useful to other 
people. Separate but equal is a political problem; separate but accessible 
and mutually responsive is a psychological and moral virtue. 
Moral identity is the achievement of socialized autonomies. We 
participate in an earthly version of Kant’s kingdom of ends while facing 
two ways: enjoying our separate talents, tastes, and opportunities, we 
are also responsible for duties to other people, and to the systems—
families, friendships, businesses, and states—in which we participate. 
Autonomy is crystallized discipline; it makes us resourceful and 
reliable. The chapters that follow elaborate these themes by addressing 
agency’s constitutive variables: free will, socialization, autonomy, and 
moral identity. They argue that action is constrained by circumstances, 
rules, roles, and affinities, but free within those limits. The degree of 
one’s freedom varies: slaves have little or none; the wealthy residents 
of Paris or New York have a lot. But everyone has projects, beliefs, and 
inclinations. Agency implies autonomy; but autonomy wants power, 
opportunity, partners, and a voice.
Chapter One:  
Agency
1. Semantics
There are words for mind’s activities—judgment and choice, 
for example—but no word that implies their integration. Possible 
candidates—character or sensibility—have the wrong emphases. Agency 
is vague, but useful: it signifies purpose, cause, and appraisal in agents 
who control circumstances and themselves to some degree. Fire and 
wind are also controlling, but their actions lack intention, inhibition, 
and credit or blame. Agency implies those qualifiers.
2. Two Points of Reference
Agency has two principal elaborations. One locates agents in the 
material world while describing their interactions and effects. Aristotle, 
C. S. Peirce, and John Dewey are its principal exponents. An Aristotelian 
or pragmatist pastry chef is capable of thinking, doing, and making. 
He or she imagines the cake to be made, then assembles and bakes the 
ingredients. The other view is Cartesian: it proposes that esse est percipi: 
nothing is real, knowable, or thinkable if it isn’t inspectable when set 
before conscious minds. Thinking, on this Cartesian model, is at once 
an act of doing and making: dreaming and perceiving create content 
that is relentlessly scrutinized for clarity and distinctness; thinking is 
self-discovery and self-appraisal. Two figures express these competing 
views. The first represents Descartes’ emphasis on the autonomy of 
minds structured by their interiority.
© David Weissman, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0197.01
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A = Awareness X = The content of awareness B = Self-awareness
Figure 1: A solitary mind, with awareness, content, and self-awareness.
Figure 1 represents an autonomous mind turned on itself. X signifies 
perceptual or ideational content for first-order awareness, A. B is second-
order self-awareness. Descartes supposed that A and B are mutually 
conditioning. Lower-order awareness enables second-order awareness 
by supplying its content (A and X). Nor is being perceived incidental 
to the existence of A and X, for Descartes, anticipating Berkeley, argued 
that nothing exists if there neither is nor can be confirming evidence of 
its existence: X exists only if it is or can be perceived or conceived by A; A 
exists only if it is or can be perceived by B. Self-awareness, too, is subject 
to this condition. It is self-confirming because reflexive: B is aware of 
itself while aware of A and X. 
Descartes’ first Meditation implies the distinction between knowledge 
claims (necessarily true because the possibility of error is eliminated) and 
opinion (less than knowledge because fallible). Necessity is guaranteed 
if claims are true logically (because tautological), or because the matters 
known stand directly before inspecting minds. A (awareness of content) 
and B (self-awareness) satisfy this second condition: B reflects on A and 
X when they are accessible to B without error or distortion because A 
and B are the acts of a mind that inspects itself while inspecting whatever 
content qualifies it. There is no gap between awareness and its object, no 
place for error because the object of awareness is a qualification of the 
mind itself. 
Figure 1 is pertinent to remarks about agency because it represents 
a mind whose actions are said to be perpetually accessible—visible—to 
the mind itself, and because inspecting minds are said to have no reliable 
access to the ambient world. The figure provokes questions for which 
Descartes supplied inconclusive answers: i. Is perceptual content merely 
imagined, or is some part of it acquired from extra-mental sources? Is 
God its source or is the material world perceived and engaged? ii. Is 
B
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B the mere observer of first-order receptivity or is it responsible for 
using rules or ideas to differentiate and organize the data A receives? 
iii. What does mind know of itself: is all of it exposed to self-perception 
or inference, or is part of it unconscious and inaccessible? (These issues 
are finessed, not solved, when Descartes invokes “moral certainty” in 
the sixth Meditation.)1
Descartes supplied Kant with an answer to the first of the questions 
above when his fourth Meditation made these two claims: that will is 
the power to give or withhold assent, and that assent is always to be 
withheld until ideas are clear and distinct.2
There are, however, two criteria for clarity and distinctness 
in Descartes: ideas are clear and distinct if their negations are 
contradictions, or if they appear with clarity and distinctness (as the 
cogito is said to do) before the mind’s eye. This second condition is much 
looser than the first, for minds may generate clear and distinct images 
in either of two ways. Imagination may set them before the mind as 
in dreams, though dreams may be as paradoxical as Escher drawings. 
Or thought’s content—its representations—are suspected of inaccuracy. 
It was Kant who introduced a looser truth-condition prominent when 
elaborating the monadic character and powers of the transcendental ego 
(his version of the cogito):
I have been reproached for following a similar procedure, namely, 
for defining the power of desire as the power of being the cause, through 
one’s presentation, of the actuality of the object of those presentations. The 
criticism was that, after all, mere wishes are desires too, and yet we all 
know that they alone do not enable us to produce their object. That, 
however, proves nothing more than that some of man’s desires involve 
him in self-contradiction.3 
What does this imply about imagination’s innumerable fantasies? 
Are they all true merely because of the vivacity with which they strike 
the mind? Which are false if all are clear and distinct? 
Figure 2 is a response to Kant and his idealist successors when 
they argue that imagination supplies all the content of experience. 
1  René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in: Discourse on the Method and 
Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. David Weissman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996), pp. 100–08.
2  Ibid., pp. 85–90.
3  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1987), n.18, pp. 16–17.
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It represents a mind constructing a stable map of the ambient world 
while responding to successive interactions with other people or things. 
This is a representation of the materialist-realist ontology common to 
Aristotle and Peirce:
A = Reality B = Mind’s changing representations of reality
⃝  = Mind integrating new information into its model of reality
↘ = Information ↗ = Expectation
Figure 2: A mind that integrates sensory data while testing its hypotheses and 
plans in the near-world. 
Action is stifled without information of the ambient world and the 
beliefs it justifies. Having information requires direct perception of the 
states of affairs relevant if a need or desire is to be satisfied, including 
words exchanged by cooperating agents. Perceiving smoke, inferring 
fire, we deduce that fire would be visible, were the hypothesis true. 
Looking for the evidence (Peirce’s version of induction), we confirm, 
fail to confirm, or falsify the inference (it’s steam, not smoke).4 
Perception is often construed as passive when compared to active 
thought, but this assumption fails to register the conditions for 
perceptual constancy: including the scanning which confirms that new 
data are sufficient to sustain a current perception or different enough to 
force its revision. Accordingly, memory and imagination are as critical 
to the content and stability of perceptual experience as Kant supposed. 
4  C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. I–VI, eds. Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934–35), V, 
paras. 418–34, pp. 278–89. 
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Though sensory data are the effects of mind’s interactions with things 
perceived, not, as he implied, the products of imagination, posits of 
thought’s conceptualizations, or the effects of a source unknown. 
Both accounts acknowledge that mind interprets perceptual data: 
hypotheses speculate about the character of or conditions for states of 
affairs represented by sensory data; or the data are construed in ways 
appropriate to its meaning-bestowing stories (they invoke the gods 
who created us). Both styles acknowledge that interpretations require 
appraisal because all are susceptible to error. But these alternatives 
supply contrasting profiles of agency’s context: thought and imagination 
create scenarios construed as our circumstances; or perception supplies 
the information required if we’re to engage other people and things 
effectively. 
Ideas of truth vary accordingly. Truth is coherence if experience-
creating minds are the only reality. Imagined data, thoughts, or 
sentences relate only to one another, because there are no extra-mental 
states of affairs they satisfy (or none accessible). This is world-making 
in the style of Kant’s argument that experience is created, sustained, 
and justified by the maker’s interests and values: science is better than 
nursery rhymes, but only because of its scale, detail, and the range of its 
applications. Coherence is, however, a feeble standard, because stories 
of all sorts—scientific, religious, or patriotic—are unfalsifiable, unless 
contradictory. 
Distance from Kantian world-making is the strength of its Aristotelian-
Peircean competitor. There are three measures: i. Mind doesn’t have to 
generate all its perceptual content if sensory data are the effects of things 
perceived. For reality is causal, not merely a sequence of data organized 
by habits or rules. Experience is one of its effects ii. Mind has less to do: 
experience isn’t stabilized by mind alone, if some things perceived as 
stable—streets and houses—are stable in themselves. iii. Theories and 
plans cohere with one another and the ambient world if corrected when 
tested because, we infer, reality is coherent. 
The plausibility of the subjectivist model rises or falls with the idea 
that truth is coherence. This is principally a Kantian, not a Cartesian, 
defense. Subjectivism is ambiguous in Descartes: emphasizing the 
cogito, he was all the while a Platonist for whom perceptual data owe 
their identity to the ideas used to differentiate and organize them. 
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Innate ideas, like the Forms, are not pliable under the pressure of one’s 
values and aims; percepts stabilized by one’s clear and distinct ideas 
should themselves be stable. Kant was more sensitive to the relativity of 
conceptual systems, hence to the variability of data whose character and 
organization they schematize. Quine, too, was permissive: 
From among the various conceptual schemes best suited to these 
various pursuits, one—the phenomenalistic—claims epistemological 
priority. Viewed from within the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme, 
the ontologies of physical objects and mathematical objects are myths. 
The quality of myth, however, is relative; relative, in this case, to the 
epistemological point of view. This point of view is one among various, 
corresponding to one among our various interests and purposes.5 
Intelligibility requires coherence, but the standards for coherence 
vary between logical rigor—necessity—and the weaker standards 
of fantasy. Thought’s resistance to incoherence or contradiction is a 
function of the syntax and semantics of individual sentences, but also 
of the thinker’s aims, values, and context. That estimate is complex 
because it depends on both the words used to differentiate and organize 
data, and their interpretation by the schematizing agent. Can one speak 
to gods or the dead? That question is a solecism on some interpretations, 
though not on all. 
The coherence theory is vulnerable in four principal ways: i. 
Contradictions are barred because incoherent. ii. There is no standard 
for the coherence of narratives that don’t qualify as logical deductions. 
Metaphor, allusion, changes of topic or direction: every detour is 
acceptable in conversation until we lose track of the flow. iii. Coherence 
fails as a test of truth because it fails to identify and discredit coherent 
fantasies. How many novels, poems, ads, or religious parables are 
coherent but false? iv. Coherent narratives are resisted when the 
partisans of significance-bestowing beliefs or practices confront 
one another. Why not convert to a different religion or abandon 
a local team for one native to a town I’ve never visited? Because 
each persuasion demands unqualified loyalty to a cohesive tribal 
identity. Where consistency is a formal value, these commitments are 
substantive values. Their parts cohere, if only superficially, because of 
5  Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), p. 19.
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an amalgamating tradition. But why call beliefs or traditions true? Isn’t 
loyalty a sufficient virtue? 
Descartes and Kant were troubled by the disconnect—the gap—
between the content of experience and its extra-mental referents. But 
is that a bridge too far, or only the sometimes troubled distance from 
expectation to encounter? Saying what you like is possible; doing 
what you like is not when action, resistance, and error are ineliminable 
features of experience. Truth as coherence doesn’t test that distance 
when its stories are unfalsifiable fantasies. But it is sometimes a logical 
test of alleged truths: so, the Pythagorean theorem is tested and proven 
by a deduction, though what it proves is the truth by correspondence of 
the proof’s conclusion: that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the 
squares on the sides. 
Coherence becomes free-standing—not evidence for truth as 
correspondence—in circumstances where empirical evidence for 
correspondence is lacking: speculation about nature’s cosmological 
origins is an example. Not wanting to curtail this impulse, we 
encourage hypotheses that exceed our ability to confirm the states of 
affairs imagined. We could withdraw, conceding that our guesses 
aren’t verifiable. But then we obscure the transition from a concern for 
truth to delight in coherent, still testable speculation. There is pleasure 
in fantasy, but also the challenge to cosmologists and physicists who 
breach successive barriers by discovering evidence once presumed 
inaccessible. Religious communities have a different emphasis: they 
urge beliefs and practices that turn everyday pursuits into meaningful 
rituals. More than nourishing, meals with prayer are a dedication. This, 
too, is coherent, though no evidence—not habit or passion—converts 
practices into truths. 
Autonomy and will can go either way: agency expresses itself when 
practical inquiries locate us within the ambient world, but also when 
imagination contrives stories that infuse our lives with significance. 
These stories inform our practices and define our tribal loyalties. Why 
prefer truth to meaning, when the two are as different categorially as 
numbers and rain? There may be no decisive reason, absent soccer riots 
or religious wars. Truth and appraisal are critical values in practical life, 
but sobriety is a minority taste when weighed against the longing for 
significance. 
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3. Individuality
Individuality in thought and skill is apparent; it doesn’t reduce us to 
ciphers wearing generic identities—men or women, young or old—until 
marketers or political candidates address us: present your goods or your 
program in attractive ways and we’ll buy or vote as you prefer. Why 
affirm a different individualism, one appealing to distinctive intellects, 
sensibilities, aims, loyalties, or scruples? Because the emphasis on 
generic identities is an assault on judgment and difference. Ablating 
private voices has several costs. We lose the dignity that comes with 
responsible autonomy; democratic political life suffers when private 
voices can’t organize to protect their interests or pursue an ideal. When 
is the general will realized? (It wills the good for all.6) Every time people 
going different places in separate cars turn onto highways where all 
observe traffic laws that minimize their risks. 
Descartes’—“I am, I exist”—is everyone’s emblematic point of 
reference.7 But who am I, what might I be? We resist invasive socialization 
by defending our private spaces: hear his advice—“doubt…deny…
refuse.”8 Everyone resists occasionally, because we have different aims 
and share a persistent desire for self-expression. Wanting to declare 
ourselves, we stare down others by doubting their authority. This is 
every adolescent voice: “You can’t tell me what to do.” Participation 
in social goods is most consensual, least forced, when others tolerate 
our choices. But that isn’t everyone’s fortune: many desires and most 
talents are suppressed or undiscovered. We find work that pays our 
bills, not vocations sensitive to our abilities. Individuality flourishes 
when intellect and sensibility are moved by provocative tasks: steering 
a boat or playing the viola. Though time-serving—work that atrophies 
one’s skills—is more familiar than work that’s useful. Money, status, 
perks: these are simulacra of well-being; getting them is the price for 
conceding one’s autonomy to roles that are intellectually and emotionally 
underwhelming. Who, apart from artists possessed of intimidating 
originality or people able to pay any bill, can resist the mix of social 
threats and inducements? 
6  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 60.
7  Descartes, Meditations, p. 64.
8  Ibid., p. 66.
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The steady practice required of musicians is a discipline too severe 
for most people, though talking to adults steeped in their musical lives is 
revelatory. Most like what they do; they’re annoyed by ancillary details 
but nourished by playing well with people of complementary skills. 
One of Nietzsche’s remarks speaks to their intensity: 
To become what one is, one must not have the slightest notion of 
what one is...The whole surface of consciousness—consciousness is a 
surface—must be kept clear of all great imperatives…Meanwhile the 
organizing ‘idea’ that is destined to rule keeps growing deep down—it 
begins to command; slowly it leads us back from side roads and wrong 
roads; it prepares single qualities and fitnesses that will one day prove to 
be indispensable as a means towards the whole—one by one, it trains all 
subservient capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, ‘goal’, 
‘aim’, or ‘meaning’.9 
The education evoked here requires learning of a sort that isn’t 
taught. What are the points of reference if “consciousness…must be kept 
clear of all great imperatives”? How shall we understand the “rule [that] 
keeps growing deep down…before giving any hint of [its] dominant 
task, ‘goal’, ‘aim’, or ‘meaning’”? This is purpose beyond the aim of any 
school, purpose as the keel of autonomous lives. There may be several 
ways to learn it, though adversity of two sorts is instrumental. One is 
alienation: socialization loses its force if children excluded at home or 
school find other sustaining themes, friends, tasks, or values. The course 
is harder for those who lack even that much support: people alone, 
people insulted, those who swallow every reverse while coming back 
for more. This is resistance that “keeps growing deep down,” resilience 
that drives individuals in ways and directions for which socialization 
has no answers.
4. Purpose/Intention 
Every living thing acts to preserve and satisfy itself: purpose and 
intention signify its trajectories. The words are interchangeable in many 
contexts, or they express complementary states of mind. Either may 
signify an aim; the other its steady pursuit. 
9  Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 254.
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It’s often supposed that will is episodic: a pressure turned on or 
off. But purpose—our efficient, formal, and final cause—is steady, 
not sporadic. Specific aims for work or pleasure are subordinate to a 
persistent challenge: make life viable for others and oneself. Recall Kant’s 
emphasis on imagination and his claim that time is the form of internal 
intuition: we integrate memories of things past the better to anticipate 
those to come. This was also Nietzsche’s emphasis when writing of the 
will to power, an animal force impelling agents into the future as they 
adapt to evolving circumstances. People who simplify their duties 
sometimes imagine a time when there are no more, but that doesn’t 
happen. We are forward sequencing machines who join fragments of 
the past and present while advancing into the future. Like sharks who 
never sleep, we’re poised for action because self-concerned, responsible 
to others, and aroused already.
Discussions of intention are fraught because of the verificationist 
concern that intrapsychic states are inaccessible to observers. Aristotle 
seems naïve: writing allusively of faculties and capacities when he 
couldn’t pin down their intrapsychic basis, intention and free will seemed 
evident to him. Subsequent naturalists have proceeded accordingly: 
they too have expected that these conditions would be disclosed when 
life is explained as the complex expression of its material constituents. 
Physiologists and engineers have gone a long way toward confirming 
Locke’s speculation that God could have enabled matter to think.10 
But consciousness and its qualitative contents are elusive. It was once 
considered unthinkable that matter could live; we await an equivalent 
explanation for awareness and its content. Having it would reduce the 
mystery of human life without eliminating anything we find significant 
in ourselves.
Descartes did careful physiological experiments and made drawings 
of nerve tracks running from perceptual inputs to muscular responses. 
He imagined constructing a mechanical fox and speculated that all 
mental activity might be physical. Yet his arguments in the second 
Meditation and the dictum ending it—that nothing is better known 
to mind than the mind itself—convinced generations of thinkers that 
all mental life is set before our inspecting minds. It is often assumed, 
10  John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Volume Two (New York: 
Dover, 1959), p. 193.
 21Chapter One: Agency 
without qualification, that purpose/intention falls squarely within the 
range of activities whose occurrence is confirmed unequivocally by 
inspection. Experimentalists such as Wundt11 and Brentano12 worked 
within the Cartesian model by testing subjects’ responses to varying 
stimuli, though others mistrusted those results because the internal 
states of their subjects weren’t accurately calibrated. Henry Maudsley13 
dismissed spiritualistic accounts of mind while describing mental 
pathologies as evidence of degenerate physical states. He anticipated 
eliminationist views of intrapsychic activity, a position espoused 
currently by thinkers who suppose that mental activity is only neural, 
and that the obscurity of consciousness disqualifies it as an authoritative 
basis for understanding cognition or intention.
Behavior has always been a basis for inferences about mental activity: 
I know that you speak a language we share by hearing you speak it. 
Yet behaviorism hadn’t received its status as a totalizing explanation for 
mental activity until Watson formulated his program in the 1920s. See 
what people do, alone or when responding to other people or things; 
base all your conclusions about mental activity on publicly observable 
evidence. Don’t infer unverifiably that observables reveal operations 
which are themselves unobservable. Regard mind as a black box from 
which ensuing behaviors are intelligible without regard to activities 
unknown to observers. Behaviorism of this sort is less extreme than 
eliminationism. It isn’t denied that people have minds: it’s rather that 
activities within them are both indiscernible and incidental to the fact 
that behavior is effective or socially appropriate.
Purpose with a plan, control of resources and oneself, are hallmarks of 
agency, hence the disorientation provoked when Ryle and Wittgenstein 
deplored the idea that intention is an internal psychic state. Ryle’s 
Concept of Mind, 1949, acknowledged that language gives credence to 
Cartesian dualism: talk about judgments, enjoyments, or intentions 
implies the existence of “a ghost in the machine.”14 Yet, this imagined 
11  See Wilhelm Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology, Volume 1 (Emeryville: 
Franklin Classics, 2018).  
12  See Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (New York: Routledge, 
2014).
13  See Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind: An Inquiry Into Their Connection and Mutual 
Influence, Specially in Reference to Mental Disorders (London: HardPress, 2018).
14  Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), p. 15.
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agent is merely a projection of the words invoking it: having learned to 
use words signifying people and things, we use them analogously to 
entify mental activities. Ryle would have us respond by reconstruing 
the ontological commitments of our speech: inhibit the commitment 
to bogus posits; judgment, rather than an activity inaccessible to 
observers, is reparsed as an achievement word, a claim we confirm by 
seeing how the word is used. Do I avoid gambling with someone else’s 
money? Credit me with sound judgment. This is Ryle’s anticipation of 
Wittgenstein’s claim that linguistic analysis is to be used therapeutically: 
the fly escapes the fly-bottle.15
Elizabeth Anscombe applied these lessons in her Intention: ignore 
intrapsychic inclinations or purposes, whether long-term or current. 
Regard intentions as processes; concentrate on acts in progress. We 
show our intention to dress every morning by dressing; the aim of 
crossing a street is manifest when crossing it. Anscombe’s argument 
proceeds, in the style of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, with a 
torrent of linguistic subtleties and an occasional dictum. Distinguishing 
overt behavior from allegedly intrapsychic activities, she remarks that 
those occurring intrapsychically would have to be “known without 
observation,” though “there is no such thing as a cause known without 
observation”16: 
And ’what causes’ [intrapsychic phenomena] is perhaps then thought 
of as an event that brings the effect about—though how it does—i.e. 
whether it should be thought of as a kind of pushing in another medium, 
or in some other way—is of course completely obscure.17 
And in describing intentional actions as such, it will be a mistake to 
look for the description of what occurs—such as the movement of muscles 
or molecules—and then think of intention as something, perhaps, 
very complicated, which qualifies this. The only events to consider are 
intentional actions themselves, and to call an action intentional is to say 
it is intentional under some description [of behavior] that we give (or 
could give of it).18 
15  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New 
York: Macmillan, 1953), para. 309, p. 103.
16  G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 15.
17  Ibid., p. 18.
18  Ibid., p. 29.
 23Chapter One: Agency 
Intention still only occurs in present action. That is, there is still no 
such thing as the further intention with which a man does what he does; 
and no such thing as intention for the future.19 
So intention is never a performance in the mind, though in some 
matters a performance in the mind which is seriously meant may make 
a difference to the correct account of the man’s action—e.g. in embracing 
someone. But the matters in question are necessarily ones in which 
outward acts are ‘significant’ in some way.20 
Anscombe’s behaviorism is Wittgenstein’s: don’t ask for a word’s 
meaning—mind’s way of construing the word—ask for its use in public 
forums. 
Why is their behaviorism preferable to the idea that intrapsychic 
intentions—some voluntary, others habitual—direct motor activity? 
Why exclude the inner realm from our accounts of practical rationality 
while continuing to use words such as purpose and intention? Because 
ordinary language exhibits the texture of experience, the forms of life 
that make experience intelligible. Get rid of the metaphysical posits 
evoked by concepts such as intentions lurking “behind” rational actions; 
extirpate all references to the “inner life”—your personal intentions 
included—then observe that process verbs crystallize your ideas of mind: 
they express everything purposive and appropriate in muscular activity; 
nothing else need be said or inferred. But does that purge the mystery 
of other people’s aims? A companion orders lunch, leaving me to infer 
her intentions: is she a vegetarian? I have a plausible answer when lunch 
arrives, but how much easier if I had asked her preference. Or am I barred 
from asking, because her mind is a “mysterious realm”? Could she have 
answered? She seems resolute; is she a mystery to herself? 
5. Sensibility
Sensibility is inclination and resonance: wanting fresh air, breathing 
in and out, one feels the surge of it. We acknowledge behavior without 
pretending that interiority is a black box, nothing within it intelligible 
to the inhabiting agent. In music and literature, friendship, pleasure 
and pain, we’re never uncertain that they have multiple effects. Yet 
19  Ibid., p. 31.
20  Ibid., p. 49.
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methodologists—worried about public standards of verification—shun 
the inner space because of its alleged obscurity. Their anxiety seems 
perverse to people immersed in emotional conversations or those 
stymied by a crossword puzzle. 
Consider a subway system where trains shuttle passengers between 
stations linked by tunnels. The human nervous system is an analogue. 
Assembled neurons channel signals that originate as sensory data or 
self-generated impulses. The system’s outputs—speech or motion—
affect other things, but here too some activity is focused by the system’s 
internal sensors, by pleasure or pain. Some subways have stations 
designed by architects or artists, though many riders are content if their 
stations are serviceable but drab. People, too, are careless; sensibility 
is a private domain, however public and accessible its expressions. It 
isn’t cultivated because we are overworked or distracted by popular 
entertainments; or because cultivation is thought to be an indulgence. 
Why consider it vain? Because one’s private life should be simple, 
dedicated to tasks fixed by duties to others; because there is something 
dangerous about people overly devoted to their private lives; or because 
their conceit is offensive. These are a volley of reasons for suppressing 
inclinations that distinguish us. But why inhibit a power that enhances 
our lives as often as pain afflicts them? Why not educate sensibility 
to distinguish and appraise some fraction of the nuances to which it’s 
susceptible? 
America has several excuses for its impatience with sensibility’s 
cultivation. The first is our immigrant history: people unintelligible to 
their neighbors suppress their cultural differences to seem mutually 
innocuous. A second is the frontier: people living there had little 
time for pleasures or skills incidental to labor or defense. Third is 
our aversion to tastes that are aristocratic or effete; we prefer vigor 
and plain speaking. Fourth are distractions—popular music, sport, 
or film—that testify to our democratic tastes. A fifth excuse is more 
recent: technology provides instant access to goods that are otherwise 
inaccessible without talent and resources (a piano): there’s no need 
to learn singing or an instrument if music is available online. These 
reasons steep for generations until one loses sight of the reality they 
obscure. Where skill and sensibility are allied, the lack of one reduces 
acuity in the other. Unexploited talent isn’t used or enjoyed. Where 
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“nothing is better known than the mind itself,” introspection is 
shallow access to a resource we’re slow to cultivate. Yet interiority isn’t 
invisible: emotion and its provocations—people, sports, music, and 
nature—are familiar. Its active powers—resonance and artistry—are 
also well known but often ignored or belittled.
Resonance is always private, though its provocations may be shared. 
Excitement is mutual when spending time with a friend or celebrating 
victory in a stadium crowded with a team’s fans. But difference is 
pervasive and easily confirmed: see people waiting for attention in a 
hospital emergency ward, each face wreathed in a different pain. The 
nursing staff has no issue with the essential privacy of experience and 
no inclination to override it by identifying a common organic cause. 
Yet there is this difference between two kinds of experiential content. 
Some, like pains, are distinctively private; socialized responses may 
converge on an imagined limit, but we can’t learn to feel them the same 
ways. Others are socializable, given exposure and education: immerse 
yourself in a culture and notice that you come to enjoy music, dance, 
food, and sociality as its members do. Participation creates neural and 
experiential changes, until sensibilities converge on similar responses. 
How does one know the experiences are similar? Partly by seeing others 
as they respond—with pleasure or fear—to situations in which one 
participates; partly by talking of the experience, or reading what others 
make of it. Yet finding a vocabulary appropriate to a domain of activity 
or expression (music or dance) exceeds most people, critics included. 
They approve or dispute what they’ve seen or heard, but no one seeing 
only what they write can measure a critic’s responses against the events 
provoking them. 
Aristotle would have understood that a piano isn’t melodic unless 
tuned and voiced. He would have agreed that sensibility is formed by 
the training and practical experience that create internal order. This 
process can’t be perpetually conscious without distracting from current 
tasks: one doesn’t relate appropriately to others by calculating one’s 
every response or pausing to dwell on every feeling. Yet something 
is missing if one acquires mechanical facility but no consequential 
interiority. Pianists are perfected by practice and habit, but synthesizers 
aren’t (yet) great pianists. The day may come when engineers write 
software that seems to express a machine’s interiority, its discerning 
26 Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will
ear and taste. We who hear them will falsely suppose that their music 
communicates intellect and feeling in sound. But half the ancient dyad 
will remain. Playing for others will join the complementary sensibilities 
of artist and audience; the machine will feel nothing; auditors hearing 
the same music will resonate alone. Credit the engineers for a sensibility 
missing in their machines. 
6. Thought and Perception
Where purpose drives initiatives responding to need, thought and 
perception supply content and direction.
6i. Aims and means: Aims typically express one’s inclinations or 
duties; their means follow suit. But there are alternative aims, and 
reasons for challenging those preferred. Means too are variable, so they 
too are open to dispute. Justification penetrates wherever choice goes. 
6ii. Hypotheses: What’s to be done; how and with whom? Each 
question provokes a hypothesis, a speculation estimating where I am, 
what I need do, and the resources or help required to do it. These are 
the successive moments of orientation in Figure 2: the agent perceives a 
state of affairs and considers how to respond. 
Framing hypotheses is the art of imagining relationships—Earth to 
the Sun—while inferring the empirical differences their reality would 
make. Where many relationships are conceivable, this second condition 
is decisive: we can’t choose among the competitors, affirming the truth 
of one or another, without perceptual or logical evidence of its truth. 
The frustration of no evidence or insufficient evidence distinguishes 
many scientific hypotheses from those of practical life: expecting this 
key to open that door, we know when it does or does not. 
Where are we; where do we want to go? Plans bridging the distance 
between aims and circumstances have two parts: one maps the relevant 
terrain; the other specifies the sequence of steps to one’s objective. Both 
are hypotheses tested by searching for, then engaging the postulated 
states of affairs. Practices are standardized ways of addressing other 
people or things, but these too are hypotheses and tacit plans. Each is 
compromised when action misfires because altered circumstances have 
made them inappropriate.
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6iii. Interpretation: There are many occasions when information 
about one’s circumstances determines one’s choices: looking for the 
door, one turns when seeing it. Yet states of affairs are not the only 
factors deciding one’s choices: we acquire access to some contexts—
jobs, for example—by acknowledging their rules and accepting their 
roles. Other situations require an interpretation that infuses a context 
or activity with meaning; its “world” is the web of meanings and values 
projected onto material things. Interpretation supersedes hypothesis 
when meaning—significance—is the determinant; buildings are more 
than structures if they’re used as churches or homes. Uniforms or titles 
express one’s status; religious symbols intimate that material things are 
imbued with divinity. 
Hypotheses are true or false; meanings are neither. Affirming a story 
requires one’s commitment to its narrative, not evidence of its truth. For 
“world” is equivocal: it signifies the totality of actual states of affairs, 
and also the domain of one’s interpretation. Stories foster loyalty by 
locating us in relationships whose other participants, whether people 
or powers, give us identity, purpose, and value. This compares to truths 
that make no personal claim: we acknowledge them without feeling 
their significance. Hence the persuasions that truth is bloodless, and that 
loyalty is superior to truth because passion is better than indifference.
6iv. Imagination: Artistry provokes intellectual and emotional 
resonance by way of things artists make, a power founded in imagination 
and an array of mechanical skills. The perceiver’s task is relatively 
simple: construe a work perceptually, intellectually, or emotionally; 
discern its form, see its coherence; enjoy its notes, or words, or shape. 
Compare the working artist: he or she is focused and intense, but not 
always happy. Having an idea and a passion for expressing it, artists are 
oddly displaced. Other tasks are forgiving: strike out this time, do better 
the next time at bat. That flexibility is missing when a directing idea is 
sensitive to every note or brush stroke. 
The agent who paints or writes makes him- or herself the vehicle for 
choices that seem to come from another place. Descartes’ remark—that 
nothing is better known to the mind than the mind itself21—is flawed. 
The painter-writer seems directed by an automatic pilot; the inventive 
21  Descartes, Meditations, p. 70.
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part directs action while out of sight; the conscious part follows 
along. Remember Plato’s account of poets in the Apology: interpreters 
understood their poems better than their authors.22 That rings true when 
one considers artists who make no dramatic show of their work: having 
an idea, deploying it in a favored medium, he or she works steadily 
without discerning the source of evolving ideas. Why this division? 
One speculates that associations are provoked and organized by generic 
heuristics as they apply to specific ideas in a process too ample and 
quick for the detail, scale, and speed of awareness. Work slows or stops 
if one tries to inspect it.
Do artists enjoy their work as much as people viewing or hearing it? 
Perceivers often have catholic tastes; they enjoy things of several kinds, 
usually work done by others. Artists are perfectionists when regarding 
their own efforts, but passive or grumpy when viewing that of others; 
many can’t perceive or consider another’s work without revising it in 
ways appropriate to themselves. How could we bridge the gap between 
the passive recipient and active artist? People buy fast cars despite 
speed limits: sitting in traffic jams is pleasure enough if the motor purrs 
and one sees burls in the walnut dashboard. But this is attenuated 
satisfaction: someone else makes the car; we distinguish ourselves by 
buying it. Autonomy looks the other way: it wants authenticity while 
uncertain about the means for achieving it. 
Sensibility resembles a nerve: the excitation impelled by both 
postures—artist or perceiver—provokes a desire for more arousal. Both 
intensify the feeling that sensibility is the sustaining causes of one’s 
vitality. But these are different powers. People watch its tournaments 
but never play tennis; cultivating taste creates connoisseurs and critics 
without creating artists. Why have both? Isn’t singularity a perpetual 
warning against the unintelligibility of doing things on one’s own; don’t 
stand apart because most social benefits require that one collaborate 
with others? Or is art’s authenticity an aberration we stifle, but share? 
Why not let everyone learn skills for transforming materials in ways 
directed by imagination while controlled by skill. It doesn’t matter 
how dramatic the product or how successful the art; the activity itself 
is critical because nothing less enhances the sense of autonomy when 
something made or done satisfies one’s judgment that it’s well done. 
22  Plato, Apology, 22c, p. 8.
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This demand is a challenge when mastery seems unnecessary to those 
awash in things made ready-to-please: buy what you can’t do or make. 
Yet passivity is costly if we lose self-esteem because of it. Bake or knit, 
fix cars or teeth: the endeavor is less important than the activity because 
agency wants the satisfaction of self-expression. It has many possible 
outlets; let talent and opportunity determine which they shall be.
This dilemma is a tension in our lives as agents: learn the conventional 
techniques or go your own way. Nearly everyone enjoys the advantages 
of socialization; a few have uncompromised lives as artists. Many 
others find spaces and tasks in which to express themselves, but most 
workers are over-worked, under-paid, and too little educated to liberate 
themselves. What could we do to relieve their frustration? Acknowledge 
it: identify some of their talents as children, then maximize opportunities 
for their training and expression. This week’s graduation ceremony at 
New York’s School of American Ballet included a program of dances 
featuring the graduates. The program described several prize winners 
and their exceptional trajectories: from early childhood to SAB. One 
can’t imagine a society that does as much for all its children. Lives are 
a mystery to the living, because there are so few spaces for education 
and self-discovery. One’s service to craft is impelling because of what 
it creates and the people affected. But there is a correlative demand on 
those of us who will always be anonymous: make sense of yourself; 
educate a talent, then feel your strength when it’s released.
6v. Transcendence: Thought exceeds itself when directing our 
engagements with other people or things in ways that acknowledge 
their distinctive properties or interests. Doing this many times a day, 
we transcend ourselves by accommodating them. But transcendence is 
used more often as an aesthetic, moral, or religious command: discover 
the sublime in music or art; become the moral exemplar who serves 
the poor or a community of fellow believers; exceed your finitude by 
addressing your god. This is transcendence as our final cause. Being-
in-the-truth, we achieve perfection when thought or sensibility fulfills 
itself in one or another of these significance-bestowing modes. But 
this account is hyperbolic; a fact perceived when stretching it doesn’t 
cover the majority of human careers: butcher, accountant, or salesman. 
Rejecting truth’s elision with meaning leaves the imperative’s other 
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expressions intact: cultivate thought and sensibility without mistaking 
metaphor for reality.
6vi. Disputed priorities: Mill’s On Liberty cites three regions of 
liberty: consciousness and conscience; tastes and pursuits; and the 
freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others.23 Mill 
supposed that inclinations should be ascetic: tastes would incline to 
those discerned by intellect. But thought loses this authority in the 
consumer culture where advertising and other people tell us what to 
want. Sensibility, as Mill construed it, would be shaped by possibilities 
intellect discovers and refines; yet thought as we understand it is 
instrumental to the satisfaction of tastes acquired without thought: 
the punishing job required to pay for an elegant car. Agency is always 
qualified by socialization, but autonomy is reduced if thought can’t 
discipline its inclinations.
7. Competence and Skill
Agency is more than motion. Activities are diversified by one’s aims, 
materials, and techniques. Every skill (reading or rowing) is conditioned 
by the dispositions acquired when training shapes capacity. 
Reductionists suppose that dispositions (capacities, skills) raise no 
ontological questions—they needn’t be construed as the properties of 
agents—because all they imply is expressed by counterfactuals affirming 
what an agent would do in circumstances of a kind: wheels would 
turn, the car would move if ignition was sparked, the brake released, 
and the accelerator pressed. But isn’t the disposition founded in the 
proper relations of the car’s parts? Isn’t the truth of the counterfactual 
conditional on this matter of fact; and isn’t it true that the dispositions 
of human agents depend equally on the preparation and functional 
interdependence of bodily parts? Learners of every sort—athletes, 
musicians, and paratroopers—practice to embody skills appropriate to 
their tasks. Or should we suppose that the student who labors for days 
and years to master a skill comes to embody nothing at all, though it’s 
truly said that he or she is now capable of doing what he or she couldn’t 
previously do?
23  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), pp. 11–12. 
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Agency presupposes this degree of ontological realism: no amount 
of linguistic legerdemain relieves the agent of having to embody the 
capacities or skills qualifying him or her for the task at issue. But this 
isn’t mysterious. Knives cut because of their fine blades, not because a 
true counterfactual rightly cites what they can do while ignoring their 
material conditions.24
8. Effort
Many actions seem effortless because they’re facilitated by habits 
or circumstances, though agency is experienced as bodily effort 
when activity and responsibility induce strains that are muscular, 
moral, or mental. Effort is ignored at moments of conceptual clarity, 
aesthetic delight, or facile speech, but not when working long hours, 
or concentrating on matters that resist us. Fatigue is reduced by habit, 
planning, or luck; it isn’t eliminated because agency is the activity of 
bodies depleted by the work they do. 
9. Partners
A few elementary things are done alone, though most activities we 
value and many we take for granted require collaborators: citizens, 
friends, spouse, or teammates. Finding partners is easier when an aim 
is shared. But there is also another condition: we need partners whose 
skills are appropriate to an aim. There is no team without players adept 
at its positions; no full orchestra without horns and winds.
People who satisfy these conditions may fail as partners because 
they have interest and skill while unable to subordinate personal desires 
to the reciprocity required by the demands of partnership. A city bus 
driver needs to accommodate his passengers when they want to exit: a 
driver who repeatedly ignores their signals would do better driving a 
truck. This is socialization, as it qualifies autonomy, a topic reserved to 
Chapter Three.
24  David Weissman, “Dispositions as Geometrical-Structural Properties,” Review of 
Metaphysics 32:2 (1978), 275–97.
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10. Efficacy
There is prudence in the expectation that we shall be tomorrow 
as we are today: organized life breaks down if people can’t reliably 
anticipate what their roles require. Ethical practice is taught with all the 
seriousness of professional discipline: do what we expect, do what you 
say you’ll do. Competence is aspiration and skill, the enabling condition 
for efficacy and duty. It tolerates changes of pace, direction, and means, 
but resists turmoil when circumstances change abruptly. 
Efficacy has several measures: is an aim achieved with resources 
used efficiently, in reasonable time, at little or low cost to partners 
or others? How well has the agent performed: were his or her skills 
fully exploited? Is clumsiness explained by the lack of rehearsal or 
planning, by lapses of attention, or for want of coordination among 
the partners? Wanting stability because having it is often a mark of 
safety and because it makes planning easier, we acquire habits that 
adapt us to our circumstances. This is our version of the least energy 
principle: deliberation is unnecessary if we’re habituated to situations 
where nothing has changed. But needs, resources, and aims vary from 
person to person, and within the histories of individuals. There are, 
therefore, these contending impulses: a viable accommodation is our 
steady purpose, but aims or means are revised because of indecision 
or if we’re thwarted by circumstances. We experiment when flexibility 
seems cheaper than the wholesale revamping of established objectives; 
only the failure of every variation convinces us that an aim is too costly 
or unachievable. 
Agents are i. controlled; ii. they are causes affecting other things, 
and, by way of feedback loops, themselves. 
10i. Control: Human agency for Aristotle, Peirce, and Dewey is the 
activity of people having a degree of control over their actions and 
effects in the public world. A rolling stone affects things in its path, 
while having no control of itself. A gymnast does both: he maintains 
his balance by controlling the rings from which he hangs. Social control 
is often construed as the expression of an authority’s power over 
its people; but it is also, more hopefully, the collaborative power of a 
society’s members as they organize to achieve its aims. 
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Personal control looks backward and forward: the past is a reservoir 
of education and acquired ability. Practice enables a skill’s refinement: 
throwing a ball is clumsy until it’s done several times. But self-control 
is more than muscle control: we have aims, partners, scruples, and 
resources. These are variables one manages within a social space 
articulated by layered permissions and constraints; free speech, but no 
slander. Social control is often disguised: one has access to only those 
goods and services that are profitably sold. Control is significant if it 
enables or proscribes ideas, vocations, or partnerships one favors. 
Hence this simpler calculation: where is the locus of initiative? Does 
every agent have the means and authority to make choices appropriate 
to his or her aims, age (five, fifteen, or fifty), and circumstances? Why so 
young? Because autonomy is learned, and because practice begins early.
10ii. Cause: Agents are causes.
10iia. Four causes: Aristotle recognized four causes: material, efficient, 
formal, and final:25 matter is the stuff altered in ways foreshadowed 
by the plan directed by an aim. He supposed that material cause is 
passive to qualification, though each of the causes is active when joined 
in agents who engage other people and things: cooks are the material 
agents who use recipes when baking cakes. Each of agency’s active 
modes—thinking, doing, or making—implicates all the causes, though 
examples emphasize one or more: drawing is different from thinking; 
designing requires both. 
Aristotle’s emphasis on temperance implies two causes—positive and 
negative feedback—that aren’t separately acknowledged, though agency 
is ineffective without them. Positive feedback is inciting: friends seek 
one another’s company because each provokes the others in mutually 
pleasing ways; a runaway stock market cools when negative feedback 
makes buyers prudent. Oversight may go either way: persuaded that 
projects are more expensive than they’re worth, we inhibit actions 
they require; delighted by an intensifying friendship, we pursue it. 
Both versions embody the other four causes: information is the formal 
cause that provokes or inhibits actions that achieve or avert wanted or 
unwanted effects. 
25  Aristotle, Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 
1941), 1013a24–1013b3, pp. 752–53. 
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10iib. Nodal causation: Agency is badly served when colliding billiard 
balls—impact and scatter—are the standard points of reference for 
understanding causal relations. Motion’s mechanics are the same but 
perspective is different when causation is regarded as nodal: agents 
preside over the domains of their effects. Trees are nodal: from foliage 
to roots, each nurtures and defends things living or inert within the 
body of the tree or the shade it casts. An ensemble of trees—a wood or 
forest—is an ecosystem in which each tree affects others while sovereign 
in its space. Human societies are more like forests than we imply when 
reducing their members to single agents or homogenized classes: 
workers or management, buyers or sellers. 
There is also this emergent effect when a node affects other 
things within the range of its influence: the circle of things affected is 
transformed into the moral space for which the node is responsible. 
Most such effects are ignored because they’re trivial and unintended, 
but some relationships—those binding doctors to their patients or 
teachers to their students—are consequential. A classroom is one moral 
space; Greek dramatists understood that a play’s audience is another. 
Each participant thinks and feels in ways that qualify as moral because 
the activity instructs thought and sentiments while integrating the 
participants. But a mob, too, is a moral space. Some have a leader who 
presides over individuals regulated by the messages and feelings he 
passes among them. 
10iic. Self-regulation: Agents regulate themselves out of regard for 
their effects. Responsibility points two ways when agency is the point of 
reference: to one’s actions, and to one’s moral posture. Most actions in 
everyday life—opening and closing doors—leave us morally unaffected; 
but ignore all that is morally inconsequential to consider the posture of 
agents whose choices and actions are sensitive to their effects. Children 
are taught to consider their impact on other people and things; they 
learn as early as four or five that unforced actions redound to an agent’s 
moral identity. We suspect moral preening in people who are perpetually 
mindful of moral lapses in others or themselves, but this is one of the 
benefits of character: habits control actions that reliably express an agent’s 
values. Tradition, vocation, desire, and social context determine the 
network and intensity of one’s duties. Individuals choose relationships 
and opportunities suitable to the depth of their tolerance for duty.
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Yet we’re liable for effects that aren’t seen because urgency or 
excitement deters us from looking, or because they’re unforeseeable. 
There are defenses: we maximize effects appropriate to a current 
aim while minimizing those considered harmful. We’re conservative 
because that makes us mutually predictable and productive, and 
because familiarity with one another and our tasks facilitates control 
of the near future. We look for collaborators who share our values and 
aims, because effects are less secure if partners have values or priorities 
different from one’s own. 
11. Oversight
Imagine a dancer as she sees her posture in the mirror behind the 
barre: observing a drooping hand or elbow, she corrects it. Most of us 
don’t have immediate feedback; we depend for information on observers 
or the people or things we affect. Information is often fragmentary; we’re 
rushed, and don’t consider it. Yet agency is less clumsy, more precisely 
calibrated to intentions if we regulate ourselves while overseeing what 
we do. 
The criteria used to appraise one’s effects vary with the practice and 
domain at issue: bakers aren’t assessed in the same terms as dentists. 
Are there moral or aesthetic criteria that apply across domains? This 
is one of the harder questions, because of cultural and social diversity: 
we don’t agree about the standards appropriate to elementary tasks 
and relationships, let alone those more complex or consequential: never 
murder, except in war. Aesthetic tastes vary radically but aesthetic 
criteria—harmony, rhythm, coherence, and surprise—are more easily 
universalized because discerned in work that is otherwise strange: in 
the calligraphy, for example, of languages we don’t read.
Agents are self-appraising because self-correction and -control are 
conditions for successfully completing many tasks, and because one 
appraises work completed: is it good, or good enough? Many things 
are done thoughtlessly; they’re effective, and don’t need scrutiny. But 
sometimes, we take stock: was I effective; what part of the task would 
have been better accomplished had I been more skilled, or if I had 
understood it better? What were my effects on partners or bystanders? 
The Cartesian perspective is ineliminable, however severe the pressure 
for social conformity: what did I do; how well did I do it? 
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No one is fastidious in everything done, though some actions express 
one’s sense of mastery; doing them poorly reduces self-esteem. But 
there is no accord about the tasks or values appropriate to this sense of 
pride. One may idealize truth, reliability, cooperation, and care, but not 
everyone does. Why are we casual about qualities sometimes regarded 
as essential to moral and communal health? Because we’re skeptical 
about these ideals: societies survive when some members are careless 
about every such virtue. No matter that the machine isn’t performing as 
it could, or that using it this way is destructive: a bicycle with a flat tire 
is still a bicycle; one can ride on the rim. 
Why hold oneself to a different standard if life is satisfactory without 
it? There is no higher reason, merely a regret similar to one’s feelings for 
flowers that bud but don’t bloom. Is there, nevertheless, an obligation 
to fulfill oneself, a duty that no one can enforce if a person doesn’t care 
to make himself responsible for the self-discipline appropriate to his 
talents, duties, and circumstances? This is the urging to which people 
often submit. Accepting the discipline of others may seem cowardly or 
feeble until one considers what such people do: they’re learners of all 
sorts; dancers, pianists, writers, cooks, or parents. There are vocations 
here for everyone. Each can find a niche in which to drive him- or 
herself to a vertiginous standard. What of the many people whose self-
persuasion doesn’t require this exertion? There is often nothing to do; let 
them be, except as they suppress motivation in others. 
There are also two uncertainties, each generated by socialization. 
i. Are the standards of self-appraisal distinctively my own, or does 
oversight express the interests or attitudes of groups in which I 
participate? Do I appraise myself in their terms, or my own? Agency 
is under tension from these two poles: one an agent’s perception of 
the least conditions for success; the other, the group’s tolerance for a 
norm that may have an orientation or standard different from its own. 
People dissatisfied with public standards or those of a team or business 
make themselves unpopular until their work establishes norms that 
others espouse. Aristotle was reassuring: aim for the mean. Nietzsche 
condemned his tolerance; “herd morality” was his diagnosis. ii. Whose 
agent am I? What remains of individual purpose when collaboration 
limits idiosyncrasy and imagination? That is the effect when a team 
member is obliged to choose the standards with which he’s appraised: 
should he be judged in their terms or his own? 
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Efficacy intimates success: work was done; an aim was achieved. 
But agency without achievement is confounding. Oversight exposes 
numerous reasons for failure: obstacles multiplied; costs mounted; the 
objective was vague; the plan was fragmentary; partners were unreliable; 
resources were inadequate; the agent lacked persistence or skill. Each of 
these faults may be chronic; four are noteworthy:
11i. Unrealistic aims: Pole-vaulting thirty feet is plausible on the 
Moon, but not on Earth. Some obstacles are reduced with practice and 
circumstances, but others can’t be breached because of natural limits or 
missing resources. How do we know that objectives exceed us, given 
the example of Plato or Roger Bannister? Do we challenge ourselves 
until defeated, or rethink our aims? Ego ideals are often fragile because 
excessive; charity amidst frustration is a generous instinct. 
11ii. Contrary aims or values: Wanting marriage while refusing every 
offer is puzzling: is every suitor wanting, or are you confused? Contrary 
desires are self-subverting; anyone stymied by them does better to 
suspend hope or activity while considering his or her attitudes.
11iii. Short- versus long-term aims: We often judge efficacy by 
considering short-term effects, though many things—children, 
marriages, careers—are better appraised recurrently. This is more 
complicated than the wisdom of Aristotle’s remark that late success 
feels better than slow decline or a flameout after early achievements. For 
some aims or actions—tonight’s movie or dinner at a new restaurant—
are judged for their immediate effects. Education or a career are better 
appraised with hindsight.
11iv. Change: Every aim and plan is vulnerable to the evolution 
of one’s circumstances. Partners, resources, context, one’s skills and 
stability: each is a contingency beyond an agent’s control. That most are 
stable much of the time explains our success. But how do we protect 
ourselves from the risk that every situation or resource may change 
without warning? Repetition makes us careless; we ignore the question 
because we’re lulled into neglect, or because we believe that persistence 
overcomes most obstacles. There is also prudence: we insure ourselves 
with fail-safe plans or facilities: alternate roads, other people to call, fire 
departments, or hospitals. 
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12. Frustration 
Much that we do is life-enhancing; though we’re diminished by 
bad choices, crude plans, inadequate resources, poor collaboration, 
or circumstances that oppose us. Or we fail because agents beset by 
conflicted aims, feelings, or values can’t organize themselves for their 
tasks. Consider just the last of these flaws. Aristotle’s term for it was 
akrasia.26 We translate his Greek as weakness of the will, though this 
condition occurs when resolve is sabotaged by a conflict of attitudes. 
One side is powered by values or interests expressed by rational ideas 
or aims; the other favors values or interests driven by one’s passions. 
Unable to resolve the conflict, action is paralyzed, or the issue is decided, 
at cost to one side or the other, when agents act impulsively.
Why can’t we avert intrapsychic conflicts? Because interests are 
opposed or because we believe them opposed. We’re sometimes 
paralyzed by offsetting anxieties: I should see a doctor but dislike blood 
tests. Action stops until fear of a cascading aliment exceeds fear of the 
test. We acknowledge half of Hume’s dictum: reason is often slave to the 
passions. This is agency hobbled by the complexity of our nature: we 
deliberate, choose, and plan; but agency stumbles when we’re overcome 
by anguish or regret.
13. Will
Purpose without will is intention without the power to do things 
intended. But we’re not always sabotaged by ambivalence. Isn’t that 
sufficient evidence of will? It isn’t because of an unresolved debate. 
Is will a power that initiates action or redirects the course of actions 
afoot? Or is there an inertial force—a causal tide—that moves blindly 
through us from the beginning of time? Because, if so, autonomy, free 
choice, and responsibility are deceptions: all we do was determined by 
causes initiated in the remote past. This is the belief that we, like other 
creatures, are hard-wired; we respond to stimuli, but our actions are 
determined by the lineage of causes acting on and within us: we don’t 
choose. Chapter Two affirms an alternative: it considers reasons for 
saying that we have free will. The causal tide is diverted, if only a little, 
by our choices and actions.
26  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a10–1152a35, pp. 1041–52.
Chapter Two:  
Free Will
Are we the vehicles of energies and trajectories past, or agents who 
redirect the causal tide for reasons of our own? Hard determinists 
suppose that efficacy expresses nature’s original stock of motion and 
energy, nothing added. Volition’s power to divert the tide is an illusion, 
if this is so. Autonomy is a conceit: humans, no less than windstorms, 
are ephemeral moments in causal histories established long ago. What 
part of this is true?
1. Introduction
Vision has eyes, sound has ears; will seems disembodied. Referring 
volition to mind was once a way of grounding it, though nowadays, 
when consciousness is suspect, that ascription is inconclusive. We 
redeem it by construing will as an expression of hierarchically organized 
brains. Dewey’s description of the reflex arc, in 1896, is our point of 
reference: will is inhibition or release in agents poised to satisfy interests 
or desires.1
Thinkers who contest free will embed us in causal chains that invoke 
the universal determinism of Laplace’s demon. They agree that we 
seem to choose among alternatives, but, they say, the experience of 
choice is illusory: everything happening today was predictable from the 
beginning of time, given original conditions and the laws of nature. This 
is contestable: Jack and Jill were mutually unknown until friendship 
and marriage superseded their indifference. Marriage inhibited choices 
1  John Dewey, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” Psychological Review 3 (1896), 
357–70.
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that each was accustomed to making, though it promoted some that 
neither had considered before. Their relationship was emergent; duties 
created by its reciprocities blocked those parts of causal history enabled 
by their separate lives. Was their bond predictable? There was no sign of 
it in their separate causal histories; marriage was unforeseen until they 
discovered one another. Yet eclipses of the sun are fully determined; 
why assume that this coupling was not? Because its inception was a 
blind date arranged by a randomized lottery. Compatibility evolved 
by fits and starts when each partner adapted to the other’s hopes and 
expectations. Marriage was an intrusion that redirected causal histories 
for reasons current and situational, not historic. Responses to novel or 
surprising situations often redirect the causal tide from within it.
2. Background
Autonomy is self-regulation. Much that we do is habitual, though 
many actions—rising for work, walking faster to get there—are willed. 
Choice is a hallmark of autonomy, so it matters that will’s freedom is 
challenged. Are we free when responding voluntarily to circumstances? 
Or is will never free because our mechanical nature makes us subordinate 
to a history of sufficient causes?
There is, so far, no explanation for the emergence of mind’s conscious 
qualities and actions—color, pain, thought, and choice—but life, too, 
was once a mystery; perhaps inquiry will also expose the exhaustively 
material conditions for conscious phenomena. Other aspects of our 
materiality are already understood. Like machines, we’re programmed 
by society or DNA. Autonomy enables us to satisfy rules at a pace of our 
own; it doesn’t establish that we do anything freely. The law-governed 
processes moving through us started eons ago; hard determinists say 
that we carry their messages while unable to initiate our own. The more 
we understand, the less free we seem to be.
An opposed tradition supposes that will, like all mental activity, falls 
to Descartes’ remark that nothing is better known to mind than mind 
itself.2 Mental structure and activity are, he thought, comprehensively 
2  René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in: Discourse on the Method and 
Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. David Weissman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996), p. 70.
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inspectable, no part hidden or obscure. Philosophy canonized this 
perspective; self-knowledge required finding oneself in the mind’s 
eye. Or so it seemed. Skepticism about self-awareness and self–control 
is unrelenting when both are regarded as evolutionary afterthoughts. 
Freedom, virtue, and responsibility are conceits if all we do is fixed by 
our bodies and causal histories. Imagine a future conversation between 
householders and their robots: “This isn’t a dispute between humans 
and machines but, rather, plain speaking from one machine to another. 
You do a few things well; but, for the most part, not so well as us.” Which 
side is speaking? Do we think better of ourselves if neither side comes 
away fearing that the other has won the argument?
Our knowledge of will and autonomy is grounded in conscious 
reflection, because this is our first source of information about 
everything. Yet volition is problematic; is it directly perceived or merely 
inferred from action and its effects? We lack Descartes’ conviction: there 
may be no mental activity that is accurately and exhaustively known 
to introspection. Consciousness is the filter through which mental 
activities are discerned, not the theater in which they are directly 
perceived. Nor do we safely infer that their character when conscious 
accurately represents them when preconscious: there may be little or 
no isomorphism between the two. Integrating our points of access—
inspection and inference—will be problematic, until we have a detailed 
account of the neural conditions for conscious experience.
I understand autonomy on analogy to a horse and rider moving at 
speed across a plain. The horse—our bodies—does most of the work; 
mind adds purpose and direction. The rider whispers in the horse’s 
ear; he doesn’t know why this works, but often it does. Like the rider, 
we credit ourselves with voluntary self-control; we deliberate before 
acting, then choose the option that seems best suited to our interests 
and circumstances. Human will is an internal power for affecting 
nerves and muscles when provoked by desire or deliberation. Will is 
explained by the altered levels of dopamine that affect brain sites where 
neural or muscular activity is initiated or suppressed.3 Animals display 
purpose when moving as appetite or safety requires; their self-control 
is variable to a degree, though largely instinctual. Will in them may 
3  Jay Schulkin, Effort: A Behavioral Neuroscience Perspective on the Will (Mahwah: 
Psychology Press, 2006), pp. 56–61.
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be an elaboration of tropisms familiar in plants responding to light or 
water. People lacking will would resemble anemones in ocean currents, 
though we humans, more like sharks, are always moving or ready to 
move: memory and imagination are active when muscles are loose.
Skeptics concede that we seem to have free will, and that moral and 
intellectual autonomy require it. But there are two kinds of autonomy: 
one is inflexible, the other adaptive. Light bulbs have the first: being 
mechanically self-sufficient, each works—given energy—because of its 
design. Living things are autonomous in the other way: we anticipate 
and adjust our behavior to altered circumstances. This difference would 
once have seemed rigid; it isn’t anymore. Mechanical control mimics 
human self-control when feedback is self-correcting (self-driving cars 
that learn to observe lane markings; machines that improve their skill at 
chess or Go by surveying games they’ve played and lost). Feedback is 
deterministic if free will has no opportunity to interrupt a causal loop. 
Hence the reduced stature implied when hard determinism supposes 
that human self-control is only a version of the control embodied 
in sophisticated machines. Are we responsible for our judgments, 
intentions, and behavior; are we self-reproving? Could we resist a fad 
or oppose a mob? The rhetoric of self-regulation implies this authority. 
Do we have it?
Our margin of freedom is uncertain because of two ambiguities. 
One obscures the difference between freedom to and freedom from, 
the power to act or will in pursuit of one’s aims versus exemption from 
control. The other is universal determinism, the idea that no act or choice 
is free because each has sufficient causal conditions that stretch forever 
backwards. Is there no relief from history; was everything decided at 
nature’s inception?
3. Freedom To and Freedom From
Freedom from signifies that one isn’t controlled by forces or agents 
that include impulses, attitudes, other people, or things. Freedom to is the 
opportunity, power, and right to choose and pursue one’s aims. These 
phrases express the Enlightenment’s political nerve. Its aim was physical, 
intellectual, and moral autonomy; discover yourself by eliminating 
arbitrary controls on your actions and identity. Liberation required 
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doing or believing as good judgment prescribes; reason would be its 
discipline. Yet this opposition—freedom or restraint—is misconstrued 
if we assume that freedom to will and act presupposes exemption from 
the materiality of one’s body and context. That idea implies Kantian 
spontaneity: choice or action initiated from a position outside space and 
time. The alternative is categorical: one is never free to do something 
when free from everything else. Here are six illustrations:
3i. “You’re free to choose,” we say, though choices or plans are 
limited by aims, values, needs, resources, or likely effects. Circumstances 
are confining: there is no way to do as one chooses irrespective of them.
3ii. “Having the skill and resources required, I’ll do it (bake a cake, 
fly the plane).” This is situated freedom, the autonomy that comes 
with having appropriate means when choosing to act. “You’re free to 
go if you like” is cruel when addressed to people having no way to go 
because disabled or imprisoned.
3iii. “You’re free to disappoint us (your family, friends, or partners).” 
This formula, intimating a neglected duty or broken law, invokes a limit 
one may be unwilling or unable to breach. Statutes (traffic laws) protect 
us or facilitate practices that would be chaotic without them. Duties 
locate us within core systems we’ve formed or inherited. Freedom to 
abandon those roles lapses at the point where families or friendships 
are sabotaged.
3iv. “You’ve considered all the reasons for and against acting. Now 
do one or the other.” Good reasons are causes or permissions; having a 
lawful desire and resources, one acts. This, too, is situated autonomy, 
though now the tipping point has shifted. Before, it was resources; do 
it if you have them. Now, when resources are assumed, preferences are 
established by deliberation. We’re not free to do what good sense tells us 
not to do, though passion sometimes overrides good sense with effects 
we approve.
3v. “Stop what you’re doing.” This implies an inhibiting power, will 
as circuit-breaker. We don’t always see the costs of our choices; better 
stop before they accumulate. This, too, is evidence that we are not free 
from circumstances, reasons, or likely effects.
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3vi. “You’re free to blink or remember.” It may be alleged that these 
are actions of the only sorts unconstrained by anything but the power 
to do them, though here, too, an ability (a capacity justifying the use of 
can) is their material condition. Freedom from every condition—in the 
way of Sartre4 or Descartes in the early Meditations—would entail our 
inability to do anything.
Will’s freedom is situated, never exempt from material, prudential, 
moral, or legal constraints. Is it free within those limits, and, if so, to 
what degree?5 
4. Ontology
Some determinists say that every effect has ancient causes, all lawfully 
determined to produce it. This is event causation; it works mechanically 
by transferring energy or averting its transfer. Agent causation (not 
considered here) is ascribed to human agency by writers who doubt 
that human intentions can be understood in the terms of mechanical 
relations.6 Event causation is the power and process responsible for 
the global drift of material change. Is human autonomy the temporary 
shield that delays our subjection to the causal tide, or is talk of freedom 
a conceit? 
Hard determinism emphasizes that every event has causes sufficient 
to produce it, and that every process and event is constrained by natural 
laws. It demoralizes libertarians of every stripe. Though its conclusion 
is only dogmatic when no inventory of laws, lineages, processes, and 
current conditions supports its claim that every effect was incubated 
in nature’s original conditions. Where, for example, were the myriad 
emergent systems—living things, families, friendships, and cities—
stabilized by the causal reciprocities of their parts? Determinists explain 
that these effects were predictable, given the natural laws controlling 
their generation. Yet contemporary philosophic opinion is distinguished 
4  Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Citadel, 
1956), pp. 409–534.
5  See Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), for a review of most contemporary views.
6  See, for example, Christian List, Why Free Will is Real (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2019); and David Weissman, “Christian List, Why Free Will is Real,” 
Metaphilosophy 50 (2019), 743–47.
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by a difference that makes no difference. Humeans aver that causality 
is constant conjunction and that laws are regularities.7 Or laws are 
described as the higher-order sentences of axiomatized theories,8 
though data confirming their validity—the regularities reported—are 
said to supply the whole meaning of their content. Nature is a grab bag 
of possibilities without essential internal constraints, if laws responsible 
for generating regularities reduce to the phenomena observed.
We require a different ontology, one sensitive to natural order and 
normativity, if what we say of causality is correct to nature while tolerant 
of autonomy and free will. Aristotle is a useful guide. He argued that 
natural normativity is secured by laws existing in rebus.9 Those are laws of 
motion, and (an idea foreign to Aristotle) rules of assembly implicit in the 
geometry and topology of spacetime. Laws of this kind are exhibited in the 
regularities of the periodic table and patterns for the assembly of natural 
kinds. Is universal determinism viable when modified to acknowledge 
that nature’s constraints are located within it? Here are some reasons for 
believing that we should distinguish two of its versions. 
5. Universal Determinism
Determinism comes in two versions: hard and soft. The soft affirms 
that we humans live within the natural world as self-stabilizing 
modules. Having innate powers or those acquired by engaging other 
people or things—learning to walk and talk—we’ve become agents of 
change, causa sui, affecting other things and ourselves. Much that we are 
was caused by conditions we didn’t control; yet now we choose what to 
do, decline it, or stop doing it. Causa sui has theological sources, though 
it applies in our time to machines engineered to manage themselves. 
Discipline has that effect in us,10 but with this difference: having learned 
to read, we choose our books.
7  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1978), pp. 155–58.
8  Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), 
pp. 33–37.
9  Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1001b-1002a14, p. 729. 
10  C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes I–VI, eds. Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934–35), V, 
paras. 5.440–5.442, pp. 294–96.
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Soft determinism agrees that every event has causes sufficient to 
produce it. So, choice, too, is fully determined, with the qualification 
that principal causes decisive for volition are internal to the chooser. 
Every event satisfies natural laws (laws of motion and laws controlling 
the assembly of atoms, molecules, and neurons), though nature tolerates 
alternate choices without interposing a specific law for each. Or should 
we suppose that people entering a supermarket engage a tangle of 
laws—a different one for every product sold—until each shopper is 
entrapped by a law obliging him or her to buy the item it favors?
The efficient causation and holism of this formulation would offend 
Hume. He reduced reality to the force and vivacity of percepts before 
identifying causality with the constant contiguities of “impressions.”11 
But why suppose that practical life is the artful manipulation of 
percepts when that makes no sense of productive activity: dentistry or 
dance, for example? Hume’s theory ignores this implication because 
he believed that esse est percipi expresses a truth that bars penetration 
into the ambient world. I assume that causality is energy exchange 
or inhibition, and that energy’s transmission is inferred, though we 
have no percepts of energy itself. The successes of practical life are 
a paradox, physics has a kinetic but no dynamic interest, if energy is 
only an “inference ticket.”12
Assume that causal efficacy—efficient causation—is congenial to soft 
determinism, then consider that hard determinism resists the autonomy 
enabled by this other version. Hard determinism avers that nothing can 
deviate from trajectories fixed at the beginning of time; every change is 
the current moment in a lineage having a lengthy past and perhaps an 
infinite future, however diverse or complex its origins. We believe that 
attitudes (values) and reasons fix choices calculated to satisfy interests 
or needs, that autonomous bodies and neural complexity enable the 
speed, flexibility, and efficiency of our responses. But this is naïve: 
personal development and idiosyncrasy are the effects of causes we 
didn’t and couldn’t control. Peter Van Inwagen put it simply:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws 
of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went 
on before we were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature 
11  Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 1.
12  Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), pp. 121–27.
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are. Therefore the consequences of these things (including our own acts) 
are not up to us.13
Notice how much of human agency is diminished if this remark is 
true. Everything thought, willed, felt, or done was caused long ago; all 
of it satisfies natural laws, and none of it is “up to us.”
Comprehensive determinism is unarguable if one agrees that 
nothing comes from nothing. For if something exists, if only oneself, 
then there must have been a cause or set of causes sufficient to create it, 
and so on to infinity for every previous state of affairs. Soft determinism 
concedes this point; it, too, locates us within comprehensive causal 
networks. Why prefer it to hard determinism? Because it identifies 
breaches and barriers in the causal tide, and because the softer version 
emphasizes autonomy’s role in the emergence of selfhood, hence the 
implication that each of us is the cause of his or her responses to other 
people and things. Hard determinism has no regard for habits and 
ideas formed in the interplay of memory, talent, and imagination. It 
ignores ingenuity: having to innovate in situations that are nowhere 
anticipated in one’s causal history. Some constraints are historical, 
but others—tight shoes—are current. Hard determinism wants to be 
comprehensive: sets of conditions, from history to the present, are 
sufficient to produce effects that are foreseeable in a lawful world. 
Soft determinists emphasize contingency, risk, and the asymmetry 
of explanation and prediction. Where agents are the critical variable, 
freedom is shorthand for their shifting priorities in circumstances 
that are, themselves, unstable. Hard determinism is lopsided: there 
is too much emphasis on history; no recognition of opportunities 
unanticipated by the causal stream, or those enabled when emergent 
properties or functions block old histories. Though situations are often 
baffling in some respect, so initiative and experiment are required 
before we can respond effectively to them.
6. Explanation/Prediction
What is explanation’s relation to prediction: are the causes specified 
by an explanation sufficient to predict all the properties of their effects? 
13  Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
p. 16.
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This collateral issue clarifies the difference between these two versions 
of determinism.
Both determinisms, hard and soft, agree that every effect is explained if 
we can cite causes sufficient to determine its existence and character, given 
natural laws. They disagree about prediction. Hard determinists suppose 
that everything was decided, hence predictable, at the beginning of time; 
our inability to make accurate prediction is the effect of having imperfect 
information about nature’s laws and original conditions. Having that 
information would enable us to predict, in principle, what an agent will 
do. Though these determinists identify only a few of the conditions for 
any event; most are buried or disguised in its history. Soft determinism 
is equally confounded by the density of historical antecedents, but it has 
the advantage of emphasizing the current choices and actions of existing 
agents. It can’t predict what they will do, because volition is often an 
event’s determining condition, and because the variability of an agent’s 
responses to evolving circumstances makes choice uncertain. 
Here is an example favorable to hard determinists. Adopt 
construction rules for assembling triangles: attach the endpoints 
of three line-segments of any length to one another so that the three 
angles formed are equal to one hundred eighty degrees in a flat 
space. Suppose that this rule, with original conditions, is sufficient to 
explain the generation of every geometrical property or relation in the 
domain of flat-space triangles. Now generalize to spacetime, and ask 
this question: do geometry’s construction rules (construed as natural 
laws determining the assembly of phenomena in spacetime) decide the 
character of all reality, as general relativity implies? It would be true, if 
so, that motion and a geometrized spacetime (as originally configured) 
have determined the existence and character of everything existing 
since the beginning of time. Hard determinism would be vindicated. 
A geometrizing god would know all that is, has been, or will be. But 
consider: Neptune moves as the sun determines, but could the god have 
predicted Beethoven or Stravinsky? Would its failure be evidence that 
complexity obscured its view, or an effect of the style each composer 
developed when responding to the musical culture of his time? Why 
say that such things are unpredictable? Because altered circumstances 
may provoke an agent whose aim or understanding is disrupted: “Sorry. 
I thought you were the mailman.” These are reactions caused in the 
moment, not those prepared over eons of time. 
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Hard determinists suppose that having perfect information would 
enable them to make predictions that are certain to be correct. Why? 
Because inferences less rigorous would have conclusions that are only 
probable because contingent. But do we have evidence that antecedent 
conditions and construction rules—natural laws—were necessary and 
sufficient to determine the existence and character of all that is? No: 
many phenomena—some determined at the last moment, others better 
established—are unexplained. We’re puzzled by a sudden power failure, 
but also by transitions that created life and mind from carbon and 
proteins. Could it have happened that their organization or processes 
were altered by an event or condition independent of anything in their 
history, hence a situation—an electrical storm, heat, or pressure—to 
which life or mind was the unpredicted response? 
Predictions’ failures can be reformulated as a question about laws, 
rather than causes: can we predict values for dependent variables 
signifying effects, if there are values for their conditions? That seems 
unproblematic because of correlations that facilitate prediction by linking 
causes to perceived effects: genes to red hair. Yet correlations are not 
the generative laws required to warrant inferences from effects to their 
determining causes. (Those are inferences available to an omniscient god; 
it knows what color hair will be by seeing how genes control metabolic 
processes.) We know very few such laws as things rise through the 
trajectory from molecules to cells, bodies, and beyond. Hard determinists 
aren’t deterred because their postulate is an ambitious philosophic idea. 
They gamble that science will confirm the symmetry of explanation and 
prediction by discovering conditions sufficient to determine the existence 
and character of all phenomena from the beginning of time: there will be 
reliable inferences from carefully specified effects to the lineage of their 
sufficient causes. Deliberation and choice are conceits if this proves true, 
though confirming evidence is scarce because complexity obscures the 
intermediate processes responsible for those effects. 
7. Cause or Capacity
Hard determinism might claim an easy success with an argument no 
one known to me has proposed. Consider that the material possibility for 
every current property or state of affairs was anticipated in the capacities 
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of nature’s original conditions: they could combine or transform in ways 
that would eventuate in life and mind. Incapacity at our origins would 
have entailed the non-existence in our time of properties and powers 
everywhere apparent. Does this entail that current states of affairs trace 
a straight and determined though obscure and complex trajectory from 
those original conditions? 
That inference exploits an ambiguity in the relation of cause and 
capacity: namely, the mistaken idea that capacities are self-actuating 
energies that impel the changes perceived as causal. But that is a non 
sequitur. Knives have sharp edges enabling them to cut, dig, or spread 
paint. Capacities for all these effects are static until an agent supplies 
energy and motion while using the knife to do one or another. For 
capacities enable effects without themselves being their efficient causes. 
Specific changes in nature’s original conditions—probably capacitated 
for alternate evolutions—likely occurred when contingencies of 
assembly, pressure, or flow produced stirrings—causes—that eventuated 
as nature evolved. Hard determinism bets on the combination of causes 
and capacities, not on the idea that nature is the evolutionary effect of 
an original set of self-actuating capacities. The capacities anticipated 
various outcomes; causes explain the subset we have. 
8. Leibniz or Laplace
No reference to ancient times is required if the whole resembles a 
jigsaw puzzle, every piece shaped to mesh directly with neighbors and 
mediately with the rest. Autonomy would be altogether suppressed 
were it true, as Leibniz claimed, that nature is pervaded by internal 
relations: everything calibrated to everything else.14 This could be 
construed in either of two ways. Things were, at one time, so packed 
together that all were marked in ways that abide since their separation 
as distinct causal lines. How many of nature’s features are marked in 
this way—all, many, or a few—if this is so? Or nature remains a dynamic 
whole: everything is perpetually affected, directly or mediately, by 
every other. This second alternative is a version of universal internal 
relations. It, too, allows of alternate readings. One closer to Leibniz 
14  G. W. V. Leibniz, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, trans. Paul Schrecker 
and Anne Martin Schrecker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), para. 39, p. 154. 
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would short-circuit the emphasis on origins, causes, and laws because 
time and converging causal streams would be incidental to the global—
holistic—entanglement of a complex idea. God sees its simplicity, 
as we do not. The other would explain entanglement as the effect of 
global causal relations such that every thing is both cause and effect of 
every other, whether directly or indirectly. (We are affected indirectly 
by galaxies that expired before the formation of our galaxy.) Things 
considered discrete should be reconstrued, were this true, as phases or 
portions of the complex whole. So, things and their perceivers would be 
reconceived as complexes of mutually determining qualities: the hand 
as seen. Much would be unknown to people having a limited view of the 
whole, though situations yet to occur would resonate already in those 
current: the future, as much as the past or present, would be settled by 
universal reciprocal determination. 
Is either of these ontologies—the colliding streams of hard 
determinism or a global system of internal relations—likely to be 
true? Credit both ideas with the assumption that nature experienced 
explosive inflation after beginning as a small, dense, and dynamic 
plenum where every point was affected directly or indirectly by 
every other. But they diverge: hard determinism supposes that nature 
evolved, differentiating itself into separate causal streams that cross 
or collide. Every current entity or state of affairs has, on this telling, 
a dense history of converging causal lineages: parents, grandparents, 
and great-grandparents. It may be true that all humans share a single 
great-grandmother, yet we have different grandparents, and blood 
lines that separated eons ago. The Leibnizian story reads this history 
differently: we assume naively that the relation of a percept to its 
cause is unproblematically causal, though the Leibnizian account 
avers that causal and convergent are the wrong words for describing 
it. Attention and perspective falsely project separations, then things, 
causes, and causal streams into the weave of qualitative differences. 
These ideas play out in different ways when used to interpret simple 
examples: is it Laplacian or Leibnizian when Jack and Jill meet? 
Laplace would construe their meeting as the converging of mutually 
independent causal lines. Leibniz would have said that the lines were 
never independent: Jack and Jill needn’t discover one another (though 
mutual awareness dawns), because they are already linked.
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Now consider what difference these views make in the context of 
disputes about free will. Imagine an able but distracted driver as he 
moves safely through traffic, until a moose bounds onto the road in front 
of him. Too late to brake, he swerves and misses it. Spinning the wheel 
required the volition commanded by nerves and muscles; its proximate 
condition was the flexible response acquired by years of driving. Was 
there also a longer causal history, perhaps one originating before the 
Punic Wars? Maybe, but why speculate unverifiably when nothing in 
history is relevant to the details of his situation? The sufficient cause 
was a current perception that disrupted the driver’s evolving gestalt. 
His response, a complex of will and action too fast for deliberation, was 
provoked by the disruption. His causal history prepared him for driving 
and even for responding to emergencies, but that experience wasn’t 
sufficient in itself to cause the saving swerve. Its cause is well-described 
as existential: the driver didn’t swerve because impelled by his history, 
he swerved to avoid the moose. 
There are two other ways to interpret this situation, both inimical to 
free will. One is congenial to Leibniz; another favors hard determinism. 
The interpretation is Leibnizian when the relation of the driver’s percept 
to the moose is wrongly construed as causal. We mistakenly speak of a 
causal relationship—the moose percept caused by seeing the moose—
when there is only the eternal but contingent coupling of a percept and 
its referent. Ideas cohere in God’s mind, though none is a free-standing 
thing, and no correlate is cause of another. God is the only substance; he 
thinks all his ideas at once, and he is their only cause. This persuasion 
is raffish but odd. Holism and entanglement seem entailed by the idea 
that the cosmos began as a superheated plasma before fracturing into 
myriad shards, each having a character somewhat independent of 
others. Yet every number in most telephone directories is independent 
of the rest: each could be changed without altering others. This degree 
of independence is characteristic throughout nature: causal lines often 
cross or join to create autonomous strands, but many strands never 
cross. God may know the essential coherence of the Leibnizian world, 
no detail falsely abstracted from the whole, but we do not.
Is hard determinism more compelling? It isn’t, because of a strangely 
Leibnizian impulse within it. Does the look of a bounding moose appear 
to the driver because he is linked to the moose within the holist weave? 
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Does each confront the other at the moment when their entanglement 
has ripened, or because their independent causal lines have converged? 
There is urgency to the dialectic because the Leibnizian solution entails 
a tighter determinism: there is no margin for indeterminism if every 
qualification is perpetually determined by its place within a plenum 
where the existence and character of everything is a function of all 
the rest. For suppose that the moose runs in front of his car while the 
driver’s independent causal lineage generates the impression of a moth, 
not a moose. The causal streams don’t converge, with this effect: the 
driver discounts the perceptual evidence and doesn’t swerve. Does he 
hit the moose? He does not, because swerving is the contemporary effect 
of seeing the moose, a situation in which histories converge, not an effect 
immanent in either causal line. 
Why is hard determinism a closet version of Leibnizian internal 
relations? Because hard determinism needs the Leibnizian thesis to 
avert having to concede that swerving has only this encounter, not 
history, to explain it. Seeing the moose is incidental if seeming to see a 
moth or mouse would have had the same effect: he swerves in each of 
these situations. See these determinists as they exploit Leibniz’s internal 
relations without endorsing his theism: let every choice and action 
be explained by the global holism, the global determinism created by 
nature’s cohesive (holistic) evolution from its original conditions.
These implications are closer to home if we imagine a conversation 
between two strangers, one asking directions, the other imagining simple 
answers. Hard determinists hear the first question—”Where am I”?—
as an effect generated by the speaker’s causal lineage. But what of the 
second speaker’s response: “Corner of State and Madison, Chicago.” Is 
that an effect of his causal history, or is it the effect of that history coupled 
to this alien because unanticipated request coming from an unrelated 
lineage? We have these three interpretations: i. The Leibnizian isn’t 
surprised by the query or its response because, he believes, everything 
is implicated in everything else. ii. The hard determinist is embarrassed: 
he can’t explain why independent causal histories are aligned such that 
the response to every question is an appropriate answer. You ask for salt, 
and I pass it. Is there a pre-established harmony, so that independent 
causal lines never formed: everything was and is connected to everything 
else? iii. Or is it true that the two speakers do stand within lineages that 
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were independent until this moment, when a speaker freely responds to 
another’s surprising question with an appropriate answer? He speaks 
from within his lineage (he knows where he is), though his response is 
provoked by a question having no precedent within his history.
Is everything decided, as Leibniz and Laplace tell us, by internal 
relations or long ago by natural laws and original conditions? We often 
devote considerable time and energy to making things happen, but we 
could trouble less if reality is designed to harmonize questions with 
answers, needs with resources. But aren’t there disappointments, and 
worse? Yes, but they can be ignored at moments when reality has been 
organized, from its inception, to reward us. No wonder people speculate 
that a benign Leibnizian deity oversees us. But look away: efficacy also 
has this other explanation. The bread I buy is the one I ordered. The 
driver swerves because his vision is reliable: seeing the moose, he averts 
an accident. 
9. “Things Are Not Up to Us.”
What are the implications of Van Inwagen’s skeptical précis? What is 
autonomy—self-regulation, self-direction—when everything has causes 
affecting all it is and does? Is there freedom to choose one’s direction 
when choice seems foreclosed by the myriad causes shaping antecedents, 
hence oneself? Autonomy is never more than notional, if this is so. Nor is 
the experience of volition more than a conscious tic if choices and actions 
are determined by ancestral causal conditions. Hard determinism is 
nevertheless faulty because its version of history—cosmic or human—
is simplistic. Consider its principal claims: i. Locating humans within 
long causal chains entails that personal choices are predetermined. For 
every current affair is the most recent in a possibly infinite succession of 
events. This is the causal tide, the array of histories generated, sustained, 
or amended by successive efficient causes. ii. There is nothing arbitrary 
or speculative in this thesis because causal trajectories satisfy or embody 
deterministic natural laws. Nothing happens by chance; every outcome 
is foreshadowed. All would be foreseen by an omniscient god. Here are 
some responses:
9i. The causal tide: Hard determinism avers that every current change 
is the last in a history that extends from time immemorial (the time of 
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the Big Bang or before) to the present: a garrulous crow is the current 
event in a lineage that may have no beginning or end. There are myriad 
histories, each integrated within the tapestry of cosmic time. But nature’s 
content has two principal constituents. One is implied by energy’s 
conservation: none is lost or created. The other, its complement, is the 
sequence of forms—the qualitative effects—produced when matters 
are altered or transformed by their interaction. You bake cakes, I brew 
coffee: two fractions of the total energy cache. Energy isn’t exchanged 
without interacting causes, but the qualities of causes and effects are 
contingencies relative to the stable pool of energy.
Imagine that energy is stripped of qualities, exposing energy raw: 
no longer apples or pears, just the energy they embody. This distinction 
is consequential, though it implies an ambiguity: how loosely are 
these two—energy and its expressions—connected? Should we affirm 
that energy is the material reality while its expressions are dreamlike 
phenomena, perhaps fantasies of a kind projected onto the ambient 
world as we think about or imagine it? That would be a retelling of 
Plato’s cave allegory: people imagining stable entities or processes 
as they strain to make sense of shadows on the cave walls.15 Only the 
presumed reality—energy, rather than Forms—would be different. This 
implication is unintended because it reduces nature to a disembodied 
surd or, as in Plato’s metaphor, a story confirmed merely by repeating 
it. The alternative avers that energy’s relation to its expressions is that of 
identity. The expressions are protean, their measures are diverse, though 
energy retains its essential character as nature’s way of creating stability 
or effecting change. Accordingly, every energy exchange—every causal 
relationship—bundles and transfers energy in a specific qualitative 
form: knives cut as spoons do not.
Distinguishing the finite energy pool from qualitative effects 
is tantalizing because it suggests a possible response to hard 
determinists. The energy pool remains intact—it courses through 
every change—though qualities have no effect on subsequent events if 
they are extinguished before later effects have occurred, or if emergent 
phenomena have powers and effects that displace their antecedents. This 
distinction—energy versus its contingent expressions—is ignored when 
15  Plato, Republic, Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns 
(New York: Pantheon, 1961), 514a-517e, pp. 747–50.
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determinism supposes that nature is a continuous surge from its origin. 
Is the tide sometimes interrupted—its effects superseded—by jumps in 
the qualitative record? Are there barriers that shield later events from 
the qualities or dispositions of some antecedents?
There are four points to consider: ia. the alleged weave of quality-
preserving causes versus qualitative breaks in the causal chain; ib. 
ambiguities in the idea of a causal tide; ic. the relative independence 
of causal strands; and id. causal history versus the priority of current 
situations. A fifth point—emergence—requires a separate, subsequent 
entry. 
9ia. Is nature a continuous weave of quality-preserving causes? Every 
qualitative change is energized by our world’s stable pool of energy: 
energy is often conserved as a specific quality or complex: dinosaurs 
reproduced their kind for eons. This result satisfies hard determinism, 
though it doesn’t follow that every qualitative change is conserved to 
affect its successors or that there is qualitative continuity in lines of 
natural succession. Punctuated equilibrium is the thesis that evolution 
makes jumps. Genetic sports enable new functions and behavior because 
of altered bodily structures: flight or speech, for example. 
There are sufficient conditions (molecular and environmental) 
for the altered structures, hence sufficient conditions for the altered 
behavior, though the grunts of a preceding generation are not a sufficient 
condition for whatever is articulate in the speech of its successors.
9ib. Ambiguities in the idea of a causal tide: There is ambiguity when 
the alleged flow of causes and effects is thought to imply that every 
change presupposes the collaboration of all its antecedents, though 
antecedents are partitioned: an effect is caused by some but not by most 
others. The metaphor is also ambiguous in these other ways. It obscures 
the different weights of causes that are proximate or remote, necessary 
or sufficient. It ignores discontinuities, causes that perish because they 
are unsustainable in themselves or unsustainable because of inimical 
circumstances (depleted resources or competitors). Some events can’t 
have a direct effect on successors because exterminations, wars, or 
depressions preclude later effects by annulling them, or because they 
are too remote to affect the light cones of others. Most things, events, 
or forces come and go with no permanent grip on reality, though some 
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(gravity and DNA) are enduring causes of subsequent effects. Birds are 
less secure: they derive from dinosaurs, though dodos have no heirs.
Nature’s historian resembles a knitter reconstructing a garment 
chewed by moths: find and tie the severed strands. Nature, too, is more 
ragged than we imply when invoking the idea of its continuous weave. 
We acknowledge the half-truth but defend against its exaggeration: 
yes, to energy flow and conservation; no, to the steady continuity of 
qualitative change.
9ic. Mutually independent causal strands: It is essential to my argument 
for free will that causal strands are, for the most part, mutually 
independent. The unfamiliarity of people meeting for the first time 
exemplifies situations in which previous history leaves both parties 
unprepared for their encounter, hence unable to make informed choices 
about what to say or do. The possibility of having no information about 
one’s prospective circumstances may be challenged on the slender basis 
that the independence—hence unfamiliarity—of situations-to-come is 
implausible when every causal lineage embodies myriad cross-stitches. 
Could we know (remember or anticipate) more than we think we do? 
Or does history create a weave so dense that trying to recover buried 
strands would defeat the most scrupulous search for evidence, much 
of it indecipherable or destroyed? Every human is a remote cousin, yet 
one often meets people with whom one shares no identifiable ancestor.
9id. Causal history versus the priority of current situations: Where muscle 
control activates or inhibits movement, raising and turning a hand 
seems an unproblematic example of free will. Hard determinists prefer 
this other surmise: every event is the successor to ancient causes. But is 
that so? Consider my gesture: I’m imitating someone who’s teaching me 
the hand signals used as insults by members of his tribe. I’ve learned 
the gesture because of a chance meeting at a local bar, not because this 
effect has sufficient conditions in my causal history. Here, as often, a 
new or surprising situation provokes a response enabled by emergent 
powers: thought, perception, memory, or imagination is challenged in a 
way having no antecedent in one’s experience.
Hard determinism implies that history is the unspooling of original 
causes as they shape subsequent history. Unforeseen complexities create 
surprises, but their essential ingredients and conditions (energy and the 
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laws of motion) were there from the start. This part of their surmise is 
plausible and likely true, though it misses two things: idi. the difference 
between efficient and formal cause; and idii, responses to situations that 
are unanticipated by the agents’ causal histories (Jack and Jill).
9idi. Efficient and formal causes: Suppose history is the transformation 
of primordial factors—energy and spacetime—present at the 
hypothesized start when geometry and topology prescribed limits to 
nature’s evolution. Efficient causes exhibit the energy driving qualitative 
change and changes of motion. Particles were formed by imbalances—a 
formal cause—in the original energic broth. Later, stabilized particles 
emerged as organized ensembles within regions of greater size: 
molecules and weather, for example. Every formal cause frames its 
circumstances; each is a complex, a configuration that establishes limits 
on actions or changes appropriate or possible within it.
History preserves the record of efficient causes in the respect that their 
portion of energy is conserved. Formal causes are less secure because 
they include configurations or assemblies that are often ephemeral: 
people standing in line or waiting for a bus. A presiding god would see 
both factors: energy and its configurations. Energy’s flow would seem 
lawful, perhaps necessary in a parochial sense because native to this 
possible world (not necessary universally, because energy may behave 
differently in other possible worlds). The god would also observe formal 
causes: some are inconsequential; others constrain the formation of 
atoms or molecules, or the behavior of people working together. Much 
else would be less assured: there might be no discernible design, for 
example, in the evolution of public enthusiasms or city clutter.
Formal cause is critical to situations where choice flourishes 
(for reasons considered below) because situations having the same 
constituents are distinguished by the formal causes that organize 
them. So, teams use the same players in different configurations; they 
organize a defense for one opponent using a different configuration to 
defend against another. Now consider an opposing offense: imagine it’s 
surprised by the other’s defense, until it sees and acts on opportunities 
neither had anticipated. This is the reality of teams testing one another 
in the early stages of a game, if each lines up in ways the other hadn’t 
anticipated. 
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9idii. Unanticipated situations: Situations are structured ensembles: 
formal causes organize their quantitative and qualitative features. Most 
come and go while leaving no trace, because of having no efficacy or 
stability as wholes: a basket of laundry, dishes in the sink. Solutions 
are familiar; habits, rules, or practices direct our responses. But some 
occasions are baffling; with no useful memory or habit to prepare us, we 
improvise or react. Imagine walking on a remote mountain trail during 
a storm. Rain intensifies; I run for cover as lightning crackles above. Yes, 
I’ve been caught in the rain before, though never out here where birds 
cower and light flashes all around. There will be habits on which to rely 
if something like this happens again, but now—and for every novel 
situation—history is suggestive but not determining. 
Hard determinists might speculate that situations are disguised by 
their apparent novelty, though recognized all the while: we don’t recall 
having encountered them before, though we know what to do because 
they’re familiar. Or the agent is truly unprepared, though his or her 
preparation is irrelevant because fate (converging causal streams) have 
determined the outcome. Placid as a Venus’s flytrap, situations seem 
inert until we excite predetermined effects by engaging them. But is it 
plausible that circumstances, so blandly passive to inspection, impel 
responses we can’t inhibit? Imagine entering a building where buzzers 
are the point of entry for the many apartments. How do I decide which 
to press? The buzzers are indifferent; ring any one, the choice is mine. 
Having no information appropriate to an informed choice, I close 
my eyes, reach forward, and press the buzzer closest to hand. What 
happens next: whom do I meet; what shall I do? Could an omniscient 
god advise me?
Hard determinists tell a reassuring story: a car moving at reasonable 
speed in a straight line—a time slice in one lineage—is struck by a 
meteorite from another. The convergence of these histories seems 
accidental, though their intersection was prefigured. Does it follow 
that every situation develops as trajectories collide? All choices have 
conditions sufficient to determine them, but choice’s determinants 
include values, aims, and information about a situation’s qualitative 
features, more rarely information about the lineage of its conditioning 
antecedents. Jack and Jill’s marriage has emergent effects that neither 
anticipates. Often befuddled, they navigate current situations because 
of converging values and aims, not because of ancient solutions.
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9ii. Natural laws: Hard determinism appeals to “natural laws,” though 
law’s status is moot. Very little in modern or contemporary philosophy 
challenges the belief that natural normativity is a myth exposed and 
dispatched by Hume’s phenomenalist analysis of causation, 16 and his 
remark that is doesn’t entail ought.17 Theorists who reduce causality to 
regularity deplore the naiveté of thinkers still provoked by observing 
that the offspring of mice are mice, not rabbits. Humeans suppose that 
the regularity of this sequence is the whole content of the law explaining 
it, though regularity is the fact needing explanation, not the norm 
explaining it. That reason is DNA, a cause both formal and efficient.
Sympathetic to the Aristotelian idea that natural laws exist in 
things they control and to Descartes’ surmise that the normativity of 
kinds (qualitative differences Aristotle described as substantial forms18) 
is founded in the geometry of space,19 I suggest that there are natural 
laws of two sorts. Those controlling the evolution of causal processes 
are generative laws that limit energy exchange: fires caused by striking 
matches. Laws of the other sort establish the geometrical configurations 
available to causal processes; principles of least energy (shortest 
paths) are presumably founded in their trajectories. Spacetime is the 
elemental substance transformed when laws of the two sorts converge 
as geometrized laws of motion. So, one construction rule creates circles 
by bending lines; another produces triangles by joining line segments. 
Materiality complicates these recipes as genes direct the assembly of 
proteins. 
This is a strongly necessitarian view of natural laws. Does it justify 
the hard determinist claim that all causes pertinent to today’s choices 
have ancestries going back to the beginning of time? Does it validate 
Laplace’s formula?
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its 
past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment 
would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all 
items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough 
to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the 
16  Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 12–13.
17  Ibid., p. 469.
18  Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1041a7–1041b32, pp. 810–11.
19  See René Descartes, The Geometry of René Descartes, trans. David Eugene Smith and 
Marcia L. Latham (New York: Dover, 1954).
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movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest 
atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just 
like the past would be present before its eyes.20 
No natural change could stray from the specific determinations 
permitted by law; everything that is was predictable from the start, given 
the lawful evolution of original conditions. Where each of a tree’s limbs 
bend or twist in particular ways, there is a law that can, in principle, 
explain its formation.
Put aside doubts about the strict determinism of natural laws. 
Notice instead that this formulation ignores an apparent qualification: 
the configuration of this tree’s limbs differs from that of trees nearby, 
though all are subject to the same laws. This is true of nature more 
generally: small sets of laws—whether generative or formal—apply 
across all of nature’s myriad domains and differences; any variation that 
satisfies them is tolerated. Explicating universal determinism by citing 
natural laws is, therefore, less decisive than it seems. Supplement them 
by citing the original conditions (Laplace’s “all positions of all items”) 
whose evolution was and is controlled by laws.
Yet determinism, however well founded, is itself the enabler of 
deviations in nature’s evolution. They occur because of capacities that 
first evolved with the emergence of living things. Those were organisms 
whose cell walls created protected interior spaces. Filtering nutrients 
and information while defending them from intruders, these spaces 
enabled simple organisms to inhibit responses while surveying their 
circumstances. Prioritizing their interests, they evolved mechanisms 
for satisfying their interests in safety, food, or sex. Hard determinism 
was breached, because those primitive choices expressed an agent’s 
appraisal of its situation: which needs were more likely to be satisfied, 
given its circumstances? That appraisals and choices were primitive 
is assumed; yet they evolved as defenses were fortified and flexible 
responses were refined. This was practical freedom in its earliest 
expressions. Why believe that this inference is correct? Because such 
creatures survived to reproduce and evolve; because fossils confirm 
their evolution; and because the brains in our bony skulls are principal 
20  Pierre Simon Laplace, An Essay on Probabilities, trans. F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory 
(New York: Dover, 1951), p. 4.
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evidence that the surmise is true. This is determinism as it generated 
inhibition, deliberation, and choice. 
Hard determinism presents itself as impregnable: every event is 
powered by energies embodied by its antecedents. Each is a moment in 
a continuous swathe, a tapestry of histories multiply cross-stitched, all 
constrained in every detail by natural laws. Yet we hesitate, because an 
observing god would acknowledge ruptured stabilities, expired causal 
strands, and this evolutionary sport.
10. Emergent Wholes, Their Properties and Powers 
Hard determinism ignores emergents and their causal roles. A 
triangle’s properties emerge when its line segments are connected. 
Systems emerge—molecules from atoms, teams from their players—
when reciprocal causal relations bind their parts. This is a representation 
of emergence as it starts with elementary particles and rises to complex 
systems:
Figure 3: The emergence of complexity, with stability at 4, 7, and 10.
Suppose each number of this series signifies phenomena of 
increasing complexity: 1=particles; 2=atoms; 3=molecules; 4=cells; 
5=tissues; 6=organs; 7=animal (human) bodies; 8=families; 9=villages 
or tribes; 10=cities or states. The trajectory stabilizes at points 4, 7, and 
10 because they signify entities able to obtain and stock energy sufficient 
to maintain themselves. Everything short of these points falls back to the 
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Laws having application at the early orders may be strongly 
deterministic because spacetime geometry constrains bonding and 
the formation of atoms and molecules. This may still be true at level 4, 
though regularities at levels 7 and 10 are disrupted by the diversity and 
complexity of things whose formation they regulate: social development 
is variable; communities have distinct histories, forms, and resources. 
They evolve in different ways. But variable doesn’t mean indeterminate: 
triangles formed by joining three line segments, like tunes created by 
joining five notes, are determinate. Every such structure has a decided 
character because the properties and relations of its constituents are 
determinate. Subsequent changes or elaborations may evolve in various 
ways, but each of them will also be determinate. An orchestra joins 
many musicians in an ensemble capable of playing many sorts of music, 
though all produce music of determinate tones and rhythms by playing 
in determinate ways. Every brain is a system of many neurons, each 
having a specific character and function while linked in specific ways to 
others. Brains are adaptable and responsive to evolving circumstances; 
they are sometimes underdetermined because uneducated or 
unmotivated, but they are never undetermined. What they will do is 
nevertheless determinable because reasons and collateral—mutually 
independent—causes decide what their subsequent determinations 
(the modifications of previous determinations) shall be. Free will 
is enabled by the structural features of some living things, as argued 
below; it doesn’t supervene as a bloom lacking conditions sufficient to 
produce or explain it. 
Emergence is critical to free will in two respects: i. Living things 
are monadic; their walled interiors are spaces that buffer intrusions; 
ii. Abilities that evolve within these spaces are strategies for successful 
responses to internal and external challenges. These are powers for 
deliberation, judgment, and choice, hence for reasons that function as 
causes. They vindicate the idea that free will is a biological adaptation, 
not a mysterious power that alters the causal tide from a position 
external to it. 
10i. Living things are monadic: Living things are complex systems 
having an inside devoted to life-sustaining processes, and an outside 
that buffers relations to other things. The outside is a barrier to intrusions 
and an entrée to information about the entity’s circumstances. The inside 
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is a protected space where agents deliberate and choose when they’ve 
acquired faculties and strategies for coping with external challenges and 
opportunities: what to do, when to flee. 
10ii. Reasons as causes: We often deviate from a lineage of antecedent 
causes when deliberation affords reasons for choice and action. These 
are two things: the emergent power for interrupting—redirecting—
the stream of causes, and one’s reasons for intervening. Reasons are 
justifiers: given circumstances and values, they warrant choice and 
action appropriate to an aim. Justifiers are odd because they needn’t 
cite actual states of affairs. I may keep my closets tidy because the 
ghosts living there don’t like disorder. Though too casual a regard 
for truth isn’t sustainable: sympathy and imagination embellish the 
margins, but truth—reality testing—is the control that makes choice 
viable. Justification requires it; we align ourselves with things as they 
are, or as we imagine they are. Reasons may be commanding because 
meaningful (my god requires it); because they express interests or 
needs (we’re cold); or because they require that one inhibit choice and 
action out of concern for others. Many reasons are traditional, but some 
are contemporary and situational: take an umbrella, it’s raining.
10iii. Free will reconstrued: Will is a biological adaptation to external 
circumstances, a power acquired under the protection of the internal 
spaces created when monadic living things emerged. The will to live is 
an impelling drive rooted in life itself, a steady backdrop to the choice of 
particular aims: coffee or tea, walk or ride. Why call willing free, falsely 
implying that it’s unconditioned? Because will is exempt, to a degree, 
within these spaces from determination by other things, considerations, 
or processes in or outside them. This doesn’t imply a shortage of 
conditions—including reasons—sufficient to provoke it. 
Kant supposed that free will sets action’s trajectory from outside 
the tide of material conditions,21 but there is an alternative: choice and 
action redirect the tide without escaping it. We deliberate within the 
tide, hesitating but never leaving it. Preventing a rout saves lives or 
careers: we don’t step out of history when changing its direction.
21  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 52.    
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11. Character/Sensibility
Character, sensibility, and personality name different aspects of the 
structure giving autonomy its force and coherence. Character is a set 
of stabilizing habits and attitudes. Sensibility is resonance. Personality, 
style and mien, is the shallower term of this triad; I ignore it.
Character is agency’s keel: it comprises instincts, inclinations, and 
aims. All are educated in the style of one’s society, while embodied as 
reciprocally regulating habits; liking noise, I don’t exceed the tolerance 
of neighbors who don’t like it as much. Sensibility begins as innate 
irritability before acquiring form as a responsive weave of information, 
tastes, and sentiments. It looks two ways: we learn from others; but 
incorporate their effects as an array of distinguishing tastes, desires, and 
vulnerabilities. Hard determinists evoke the energic tide as if every next 
change has no resources for ignoring or opposing its antecedents. But 
sensibility blocks inputs opposed by one’s aims or tastes: fashionistas 
sometimes resist new styles. 
Add situations and consider this obstacle to hard determinism. 
Sensibilities address situations by way of gestalts. These are a 
sensibility’s windows into the ambient world; like eyeglasses that enable 
sight, gestalts direct our search for features pertinent to our intentions 
and attitudes. All are holistic; each has a fore- and background that 
projects the thinker’s aims or anxieties onto the map of his or her 
circumstances. Each is a formal cause: an interpretation, hypothesis, 
or plan. Configuration dominates the thinking of architects, painters, 
and photographers; scientists and novelists hypothesize or interpret. 
Plans prepare us for practical life; framing a situation, they direct our 
interventions by sequencing actions and expected responses in ways 
relevant to our aims. Frustration measures the discrepancy between the 
values or objectives expressed by a gestalt and the effects accruing as 
it provokes an action; equilibrium is established when action’s effects 
satisfy the interests prefigured, or when a new gestalt, better adapted to 
circumstances, displaces the one before. 
Orientation is usually steady; gestalts are conserved when aims 
and circumstances are stable. But mind would be regularly disoriented 
if action were forever encumbered by gestalts superseded by altered 
circumstances, understandings, or desires. That doesn’t happen, because 
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gestalts are regularly revised or replaced. This is consequential for the 
determinist argument because it implies that evidence for bits of one’s 
past is lost. Why? Because the gestalt is an orientation, a form; one may 
remember some or all its constituent details, but not the way they’re 
integrated: not the gestalt. Its effect on choice and action, however 
significant, may terminate without intrapsychic evidence of its role: I 
don’t recall how I saw things, or why. Hard determinists may reply that 
every gestalt has effects on psychic memory that abide, buried but real. 
But this is a surmise: sometimes true and verifiable, it is often unverified 
and unverifiable. Something comparable happens on large scales when 
stars or debris sucked into black holes escape as radiation: information 
about the material ingested is not (it seems) recoverable from escaping 
energy. The cycle from birth to death has an equivalent effect: dust to 
dust when most of the middle is lost. 
Does the brain refresh itself during sleep, purging the previous day’s 
business? Not always: people are often dominated by the same concerns 
for days or more. Effective accommodation to changing conditions 
is, however, essential to well-being: we may edit or replace outdated 
gestalts every few moments when action requires that we clear outdated 
information or expectations from thought or perception. For we’re often 
surprised by evolving situations. Needing to adapt, wanting to secure 
ourselves while controlling them, we adjust our ways of perceiving 
the near-world. That purge rebukes hard determinism: the past cannot 
determine all we do because we eliminate some part of our information 
about it when confronting altered circumstances.22
Imagine causal strands linked by partners newly acquainted. Is their 
convergence anchored in the remote past, rather than a recent chance 
encounter? Hard determinism fails this test for three reasons pertinent 
to sensibility:
11i. Hard determinism alleges that everything current is the latter-
day effect of natural laws as they regulate the transformation of original 
conditions. But is that so? Jack and Jill met at a boxing match where she 
was one of the fighters, and he was an usher. They stayed in touch after 
22  Shuntaro Izawa et al., “REM sleep–active MCH neurons are involved in forgetting 
hippocampus-dependent memories,” Science 365:6459 (2019), 1308–13, https://
www.doi.org/10.1126/science.aax9238
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learning that both raise bats. This is too many accidents for any of nature’s 
laws. What explains their affinity? Sensibility, not law. Relationships are 
situational; they’re sustained by reciprocity, passion, and the negative 
feedback that quashes arguments, not by laws and original conditions. 
11ii. Sensibility is often a barrier to the effects of its antecedent 
formations. Consider the athlete traded from one team to another. 
His old team values ingenuity—players take chances—the new one 
emphasizes teamwork. He navigates the difference by suppressing 
what he learned from his former team while acquiring the discipline of 
the new one. Teams, jobs, or marriages: sensibilities respond to altered 
circumstances.
11iii. Novel situations provoke ingenuity. A news story, several years 
ago, described a man who saved his life when pinned under a rock by 
cutting off his arm. No historical narrative explains his courage; what 
law determined it?
Hard determinism founders when a novel situation is coupled to a 
sensibility of moderate complexity: there will be effects, relevant laws will 
be satisfied, but four contingencies make the character of those effects 
uncertain: i. The occasional instability of a sensibility’s values makes 
decision unstable: am I sure that I like this? ii. The shifting pressures of 
competing inclinations (chocolate or a diet pill) makes aims inconsistent 
and planning ineffective: I thought I wanted this result though having it, 
I regret wanting it. iii. Situations evolve, often unpredictably, because of 
the material conditions engaged (credit markets, weather), not because 
of apposite laws or the agents addressing them. iv. Planning is frustrated 
when we lack information about a situation’s evolution under the force 
of our actions.
There is often a prevailing direction to a situation’s evolution, 
though drift is fixed by material conditions, not only by natural laws. 
Laplace might propose that we identify the laws controlling a situation’s 
development as we engage it, but generational and formal laws tolerate 
innumerable variations. Memory and imagination are alternate 
determinants: they collaborate as mind tracks material changes by 
reformulating its gestalts. This sometimes works, though the novelty or 
complexity provoked by crossing causal strands is often bewildering.
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12. Initiative
Choice is usually contextualized; it expresses an agent’s history, 
perspective, and interests when focused by a current situation. Focus 
is unproblematic when circumstances are accurately represented by 
the gestalts directing choice and action: wanting a shirt, I go to the 
closet where they hang. We improvise when gestalts falter because 
of frustration triggered by error, or because of confused expectations 
provoked by conflicted aims. There are three plausible strategies: an 
inquiry that gathers better information about one’s situation; clarified 
aims; or an interpretation that makes conflict seem coherent. The 
following is a sample test of hard determinism.
Earth is generous when the first spaceship to Mars discovers a thriving 
musical culture. The best of Martian composers is puzzled when these 
visitors give him a piano. He tinkers for weeks before beginning to write 
duets for piano and local frogs. The music is odd to human ears, but 
all call it beautiful. Martian history doesn’t explain this result; Earth’s 
history all the less. Imagination is the more likely cause: something 
productive happens in the space where it reconciles the gap between 
old and new. Starting with available information, rules, and techniques, 
one analogizes, extrapolates, or generalizes until understanding affords 
a solution. Whether the context is practical or artistic, this is the power 
that fills the space.
Hard determinists will respond that originality isn’t less determined 
for our failure to understand it. That is true, but incidental because 
the question is different: how to understand solutions generated when 
there is no technique or well of information appropriate to solving 
them. Determinists may surmise that there were instruments like 
pianos in Martian culture, though we postulate that there were no 
useful analogues to our keyboards in its history. They weren’t required 
in the current situation because there as here, inquiry and experiment 
are sometimes the cure for incomprehension. Contributing the piano 
exemplifies Mill’s method of difference: add something new, then get an 
original effect by exploiting the freedom to innovate.23
Now limit attention to Earth and consider the freedom of people 
responding to local circumstances. Consider the man deliberating 
23  John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Volume 1 (London: HardPress, 2016), pp. 450–63.
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when caught in the rain: is it heavy or light; how far is he going; is 
his coat water repellent? Experience helps when deciding what to do, 
but judgment and his gestalt are sensitive to circumstances. Having 
decided to continue without an umbrella, suddenly hearing wind and 
the crack of thunder, feeling a deluge as the skies open, he changes 
his mind. His decision is altered by shock, fear, and heavy rain, not 
by daydreams or the history of his ancestors. Could he have decided 
otherwise? Given the prospect of a life-changing reward, a treasure 
just ahead, he would have pursued it. But that wasn’t a live option in 
his perception of the moment; when all his choices were dim or worse, 
he ran for shelter. Hard determinists are unconvinced: here on Earth, 
where all the energies of the past and all their effects are inventoried, 
nothing happens that isn’t foreshadowed. But is that so? Our stroller 
is often caught in storms he ignores when told of bullion free for the 
taking behind the tree ahead. Why not infer that he would have ignored 
this threat, too, but for the intimation that this storm might be deadly? 
Why be surprised, given his fear, that his response was different? 
This is smart autonomy: the agent who responds appropriately when 
registering his circumstances.
Hard determinists regard “autonomy” as a temporary cul de sac 
formed by antecedent causes, then reabsorbed by the tide. But this is 
faulty in several ways: i. It ignores the modular character of systems 
that are effectively self-sustaining, given supportive circumstances. ii. It 
ignores the relative independence of causal strands. iii. It assumes that 
circumstances always impose themselves upon us, though conditions 
often tolerate alternate responses: chocolate, strawberry, or vanilla. iv. 
It ignores ingenuity, and the interface where established skills meet 
unfamiliar situations. This is the dialectic that prevents human history 
from perpetually recycling the same routines. Having estimated where 
we are, we improvise, test the result, revise, then test again.
Were Google and Facebook written in Tarot cards those many 
eons ago? Not quite: they were imaginative extrapolations from an 
established base, including telephones and the internet. Other issues—
consciousness and dark matter—require innovations of a different sort. 
Solutions will come when imagination structures understanding in 
ways that are currently unforeseen and maybe unanticipated.
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13. Productive Imagination
Gestalts make practical situations intelligible: one isn’t surprised 
when served with chopsticks in a Chinese restaurant. Their role in art is 
different: there, gestalts are ideas directing the organization of an art’s 
figures or words. History is respected, but innovation is prized. Materials 
are an art’s substance; like bricks or notes, they precede it. But there is 
no organizational principle, no formal cause until the artist imagines 
it. Listen to the Beatles’ “Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band,” then 
consider that George Martin, its producer, was the principal source of 
its format. Its raffish qualities had precursors in English music halls but 
there was no line of ancient conditions responsible for Martin’s design; 
the whole he created exceeded its parts and antecedents. Laugier’s 
forest hut24 prefigures the rule exemplified in every house, but is there 
a rule discernible in every novel, sonata, or painting? Understanding is 
a faculty of rules, but imagination is a faculty that creates unexpected 
results when it plays with old rules or invents new ones. Where every 
artist or thinker has access to the same materials, imagination creates 
wholes that stand apart from their antecedents. Originality has 
antecedents but no history: Haydn preceded Mozart, but Mozart was 
different from Haydn.
Finished work inspires others to formulate rules for creating similar 
wholes, be it music or design, by organizing an art’s materials. The 
rules are a style adaptable by artists less sure of themselves, however 
subtle. Each vogue has a history: an original master and adherents, then 
a diminished old age when acclaim has drained a style’s vitality. What 
distinguishes great artists from stylists? Principally, ideas, judgment, 
initiative, and wit. Do artists of either sort work freely? Most are slow to 
answer: imagination (rules and materials) direct him or her; the artist 
is its instrument. But these aren’t the artists of Plato’s Apology, poets 
inspired by the gods though unable to explain the meaning of their 
poems. Great artists discriminate: every brush stroke is a choice, one has 
said. What justifies the inference that imagination can never do more 
than regurgitate its causes?
24  See Marc-Antoine Laugier, Essay on Architecture (London: HardPress, 2013).
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14. Consciousness
How much do we know of will by way of consciousness; what 
part is unconscious? Four distinctions are fundamental. We may 
be: i. unconscious after a blow to the head, processing no perceptual 
information, performing no cognitive activity; ii. unconscious in the 
respect that we perform effectively without conscious attention to 
the activity, or to obstacles to which we respond effectively (driving 
successfully while preoccupied); iii. conscious of attending to relevant 
features of a situation: traffic or a child, for example; iv. self-aware 
because a task requires careful attention. (ii is preconscious relative to 
iii; iii is preconscious relative to iv.)
Will is active in the last three of the four postures above: ii. One is 
distracted though effective through successive traffic lights, without 
awareness or memory. iii. Newly attentive, one scans the road for 
obstacles. iv. A new driver, fearing the judgment of an on-board instructor, 
does nothing to the steering wheel or pedals without anticipating their 
effects. Why concede will’s operation when its conscious markers are 
absent? Because perception or cognition has activated the voluntary 
control center in the associative cortex, hence nerves that control muscles 
and acts pertinent to circumstances. Will is inferred in the cause of the 
second and third mode; choice and action are perceived (with a slight 
delay) when consciousness is self-awareness.
Is there more to will than consciousness reveals? Would there be 
reason to claim having a will if we weren’t aware of choosing among 
alternatives or acting as we’ve chosen? Self-awareness is an extended 
window into our circumstances, hence the assumption that will is best 
seen for what it is when present to self-inspection. But is that so: is it 
odd that the evidence of will is usually less decisive than an array of 
flashing lights? Walking in a strange city, arriving at a fork in the road, 
I decide arbitrarily to go left. I’m aware of making the choice, though it 
and the act of stepping left are almost simultaneous. Does it matter if 
an fMRI shows that choosing to go left occurred fractionally before my 
awareness? It matters, though the implication is benign: electrochemical 
signals are transmitted in finite velocities. (Consciousness is not a froth 
where messages pass simultaneously.) Will is opaque, even to self-
awareness, but that is true to some degree of every mental state inferred 
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or perceived. None will be fully understood until physiology explains 
all the expressions and gradations of phenomenal life. In the meantime, 
details elude us.
15. Choosing Freely
This is our anomaly: we are formed by materiality and our causal 
history, though free will is essential to the texture, purpose, and moral 
quality of personal and social life. We could elude the implications of 
materiality by assuming that will stands outside the stream of causes 
sufficient to produce its effects. That was Kant’s idea: will is free when 
exempt from the influence of material conditions; choices are made 
spontaneously from outside space and time. But this is magical thinking, 
one evoking a time when human bodies were said to be endowed with 
immaterial souls. What is “free will,” if we suppress the inclination 
to mythologize? Construe it as a metaphor for resources exploited in 
different ways. Earthquakes and firestorms interrupt the causal tide; 
mind does it too when inhibiting impulses frees mind for deliberations 
and decisions that reorient the causal flow.
Hard determinism ascribes the sufficient conditions for every 
current action and effect to matter’s ancient configuration and the laws 
determining energy’s evolving forms. Circumstances are primed; history 
determines one’s every decision; what looks like choice is actually a 
narrowed focus, one whose only possible outcome is the action taken. 
Soft determinism demurs: there are sufficient conditions for every event, 
but one or more of an event’s conditions may have no history: those are 
conditions that arise when the converging causal lineages are those of 
human agents. Jack and Jill meet as strangers; each affecting the other 
from the distance entailed by their independence. Each makes space for 
deliberation and judgment by inhibiting impulses; values and strategies 
evolve as they test one another. Time will pass before each can expect 
securely predictable responses from the other; or their coupling will 
terminate because of mutual disappointment. 
Hard determinists would explain the result by inferring that 
determining seeds were planted eons before; but this would ignore the 
evidence of current interactions. Why search an indecipherable past 
for proof of incipient conflict or compatibility when all the evidence is 
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generated by the convergence of independent causal streams? These 
two don’t share a past or parallel preparation for this encounter. Do 
they fight? One might predict that they won’t get along, but that’s a 
guess informed by previous observations. Better to wait and see if they 
coalesce. That would be the effect of testing one another, not one having 
necessary and sufficient conditions in ancient times. 
Circumstances are elastic; they can be altered, though not by 
everyone. Rabbits are stuck with habits that make them vulnerable to 
hawks; we revise practices having effects we dislike. We’re liberated 
when confronting novel or surprising situations because we’re free 
to experiment when having no established response. Addressing a 
situation with an inappropriate gestalt, we fumble for a time before 
revising it. Regretting an action, we resist doing it again. Why? Because 
of a current frustration, not for reasons ascribable to an ancient cause. 
Discussion below is focused by rubrics that organize the array 
of mind’s interventions. i. First are domains where inhibition is an 
emergent power. It creates spaces where deliberation, judgment, and 
choice emerge and stabilize, because they adapt us more effectively to 
our circumstances. ii. Next are novel or surprising situations where self-
control is exigent because the effects of choice and action are uncertain 
or unknown. iii. Third are choices whose principal or only effects are 
personal. iv. Initiative and invention are fourth. Their agents are artists, 
engineers, and all the theoretical or practical thinkers who remake a 
domain by reconceiving its materials or forms. v. Last is a summary of 
reasons for saying that hard determinism is defeated.
15i. Emergence. Emergence is the effect of complexity: an emergent 
has properties and powers—stability, life, or mind—that are absent in 
its proper parts. Emergence is critical to volition because it generates 
modes of animal response—inhibition, deliberation, and choice, for 
example—that were previously unavailable. These powers weren’t up 
to us: they emerged in response to circumstances that favored their 
evolution. 
We reasonably infer that the relational capacities of matter’s 
precursors enabled or precluded nature’s subsequent evolution. Yet 
(as above) their dispositions prefigured possibilities for alternate 
evolutions; they were not sufficient conditions for human properties 
that evolved with the accretion of later developments: the present 
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was not pre-formed in the past. Hard determinists would agree that 
successive events of many kinds were required before deliberation 
and choice could emerge within animals able to inhibit or choose their 
responses to external stimuli. But all of this is explained, they would 
say, by successive advances in the causal tide. No steps were jumped; 
transformations were linear; every change had its sufficient conditions. 
One may accept this generic account while taking exception to its 
conclusion; emergence may itself have hard determinist conditions, 
though it explains the inception of free will and is, thereby, a 
countervailing step in the determinist evolution of cosmic history. 
That is so because living things achieved a degree of freedom 
from their circumstances when their internal organization created the 
external barriers, the cell walls of unicellular animals. Those spaces were 
the protected sites where organisms developed capacities and strategies 
for sustaining themselves. This was primitive autonomy: needing food, 
they withstood deprivation by storing energy; stabilizing themselves, 
they resisted predators and one another. The spaces evolved; faculties 
that developed within humans—deliberation, judgment, and choice—
made autonomy flexible, subtle, and effective. The internal spaces 
were always natural; their evolution was conditioned by capacities and 
causes traceable to the origins of the universe. Their consequences in 
us—deliberation and free will—enable imagination, initiative, control 
of ourselves, and our circumstances. Will as a faculty has had a lengthy 
incubation; choices enacted in current situations are often habitual. 
But sometimes, they express reasons, judgments, or tastes provoked 
by circumstances rather than history. Histories deviate to some degree 
because of our choices. 
Was the evolution of living things—entities with protected internal 
spaces—a contingency dependent on the drift of circumstances, or 
a necessity, given laws controlling the evolution of nature’s original 
conditions? Each of these variables may be construed in either of two 
ways: ia. causal laws are deterministic or probabilistic; ib. nature’s 
dispositions, the capacities inhering in its original conditions, were 
determinable or generically specific (hair that was red, rather than 
hair that could be variously colored). There are also these additional 
considerations, and a response: ic. self-control; id. moral identity; and 
ie. riposte. 
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15ia. Causal history, and the force of causal laws: Circumstances are 
tightly predictable, given causal laws; or they embody inexplicable 
accidents, because the laws are probabilistic. Probabilistic laws violate 
the principle of sufficient reason: there is no assurance that a set of 
conditions is sufficient to produce a specific effect. Hard determinism is 
fatally compromised if this is true, because all or most causal streams are 
laced with events that seem to have violated deterministic causal laws.
There may have been qualitative jumps in causal history, effects that 
could not be traced to the determinist evolution of nature’s original 
conditions. 
15ib. The character of the dispositions inherent in nature’s original 
conditions: This point is critical, but obscure. The capacities inhering 
in nature’s original conditions might have been determinable, hence 
susceptible to alternate evolutions, or specific, as seeds (apple or pear) 
prefigure specific evolutions. We don’t have to know which refinement 
is accurate because buffered animal bodies with interior spaces and 
evolved interior functions could have emerged on either telling. 
Either way—laws that are deterministic or probabilistic, capacities 
that were determinable or specific—we vindicate the material 
possibility that free will could emerge in creatures having an external 
buffer and the elaborate internal functions that emerged when taking 
advantage of its protection. For having an external buffer gives us time 
to inhibit responses while gathering information; there was time to 
deliberate, judge, and choose. This was the likely inception of free will, 
and, on causal assumptions—whether determinist or probabilistic—the 
condition for its emergence. 
Emergent free will was, I hypothesize, an evolutionary effect; its 
affirmation isn’t the conclusion to a conceptual argument. Laplace 
might have agreed that monadic creatures having buffered interiors 
could harbor the development of faculties and strategies appropriate 
to their well-being. Free will would not be unconditioned, if this 
were true: attitudes, aims, and information would bias an agent’s 
judgments about personal aims or choices and the conduct appropriate 
to encounters with people or things in separate causal streams. But 
that leverage would be as much autonomy, as much free will as fallible 
creatures could hope or want. 
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15ic. Self-control: Self-regulation is one of our principal evolutionary 
achievements. This is temperance made habitual, control made 
conscious and voluntary. Regulation has numerous expressions. Some 
are holistic: we stabilize bodily integrity and social relations within 
sustainable parameters. Other expressions engage particular functions: 
we discipline thought and passion, oversee the choice of aims, enable 
planning, direct action, and correct error. Each requires the oversight 
provided by feedback. Negative feedback prevents organs or modular 
systems from working at rates too fast or slow for the effective operation 
of systems to which they’re coupled; positive feedback promotes 
activities supplying motivation or energy for activities of high priority. 
Mechanisms of both sorts are hard-wired neural circuits that inhibit 
action or provoke it when target thresholds are attained. Voluntary 
control makes some thresholds adjustable when set points vary with 
values and aims. The neural architecture enabling feedback has two 
levels: the level responsible for muscular activity is surveyed from a 
higher order where it’s twice appraised: actions and effects are measured 
for efficacy, and for consonance with values, hence conscience. 
Regulation is conspicuous when we choose aims, make plans, or 
formulate reasons for attitudes, choices, or actions (ici); and as we 
practice self-control (icii): 
15ici. Aims, plans, and reasons: Why do you hold her hand when 
crossing streets? To keep her from bolting into traffic if the light turns red. 
Determinists counsel perspective: why emphasize current experience 
when circumstances would have neither character nor existence without 
its antecedents? Because the contested issue is the force of history versus 
current interests and reasons. Our outlook is prospective, not past; the 
task is urgent, and often without precedent. What’s to be done? We 
reflect and decide. Innovations are usually small, but real. Does it matter 
to these choices that some of our ancestors were salamanders?
15icii. Regulation, character, and judgment: Regulation implies that 
one is self-directing and -correcting. Much of our control is evidence of 
habits and inclinations—character—as they stabilize choice and activity. 
Judgment is the vital faculty when we’re confounded by contrary 
interests or surprising situations. Considering our options, choosing 
what seems best, we appraise our choices when seeing or imagining 
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their effects. These are consequences for oneself or others, be they 
partners or bystanders. Who has priority; how do we decide? Personal 
values make some of these determinations; social and cultural values 
make others. We accede to a “decent” standard for making decisions, 
though it varies among cultures and societies. Is there a mean to which 
all should defer? Live and let live is the fail-safe answer when duties, 
costs, and advantages are weighed.
15id. Moral identity: Choices, their effects and self-control, are 
the measure of moral identity: what do we choose; how well do we 
control actions that affect others or ourselves? More than recognition 
that we are causes having effects, responsibility is the moral posture of 
agents who hold themselves blame- or praiseworthy for their actions 
and effects. Responsibility is both a reason for ascribing free will 
(no one is culpable for effects he or she didn’t will or couldn’t avert) 
and evidence of it (soldiers who risk themselves to save comrades). 
Altruism and self-sacrifice may be explained as instincts acquired 
without choice, but that leaves much unexplained. Imagine a young 
man, normally feckless and out of work, who refuses a reward after 
finding and returning a wallet stuffed with cash. His family and friends 
are surprised; nothing in his history predicts it. He shrugs when asked 
to explain: “It wasn’t mine.”
Responsibility may be construed from the third-person vantage of 
those who declare what should be done, given a role, rule or law; or 
the stance of the person engaged. Is his or her moral sense determined, 
because learned and habitual; or is it sometimes evinced as an expression 
of choice? One may choose to satisfy a rule newly learned, or to do the 
same thing without knowing the rule because of fellow feeling. Tightly 
packed on a subway or bus, we make room for others out of regard for 
their comfort or ours. Inertia forces some changes; others are voluntary. 
Are these accommodations generous or merely prudential? Many are 
both: nothing good happens without cooperation; much we fear happens 
when it breaks down. This is the moral dimension to self-control. Many 
actions are routine, yet each is an opportunity to express one’s moral 
perspective. Cab drivers are often aggressive. Time is money; many 
are determined not to waste it. But sometimes, one rides with drivers 
who give way to pedestrians and other cars. One driver explained to me 
that each person has a personal trajectory and often a narrow beam of 
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attention; he makes way, knowing that his passengers will arrive, little 
delayed, at their destinations. 
These are two moral postures, usually assumed at once: how I satisfy 
my roles and pertinent rules; how I declare myself. The two often cohere. 
But there are distinct levels of concern: everything done in a routinized 
way can be informed by regard for its effects. Both perspectives have 
social utility, though the first is too often a disguise for thoughtlessness. 
For what’s to be done, who is culpable if established tasks or positions are 
used as shields to obscure their consequences? That happens when roles 
having pernicious effects are exercised in legally sanctioned ways: judges 
who impose gratuitously harsh sentences for minor crimes, politicians 
who argue procedural scruples while ignoring public interests. Moral 
identity of the professional kind is sometimes perfunctory; the other 
sort—choice and behavior regulated out of regard for their effects—is 
the better expression of one’s conscience and aims. Consciousness is the 
private moral space where choices are considered. But are the choices 
freely made? Only sometimes. 
15ie. Riposte: Hard determinists believe that conditions required by 
these expressions of free will are never satisfied: every current state 
of affairs disguises the sediments from which they arise. Acting now, 
we’re anchored in the past, though situations evolve, causal history is 
redirected when circumstances are engaged in ways, large or small, 
that have no antecedents. Raised in the desert, new to cities, rain, and 
puddles, I avoid stepping in this puddle when seeing what others do. 
For if every act has causes sufficient to produce it, the causes for some 
responses are newly learned. 
15ii. Situations that engage individuals with other people or things: Why 
don’t we explain every human initiative and response by citing ancient 
events? Because the same evolutionary effect that explains free will, 
also explains history’s frequent irrelevance to contemporary problem-
solving. Free will is provoked and tested when agents are engaged in 
situations that are new, surprising, or problematic in any way. That 
effect is more typical than rare when aims or fears give prominence to 
states of affairs that seemed innocuous moments before. The situations 
concerning us locate individuals in relation to other people or things, 
or they are individual and intrapsychic. Both are complexes of interests, 
values, contingent states of affairs, and choices.
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Consider situations joining two independent lineages: agents who 
are mutually unknown address one another. Their interaction reorients 
one or both causal streams when one or more of three considerations 
affect choice and action: i. information about the situation disorients the 
gestalts of one or both agents because it is new or surprising; ii. one or 
both perceive that their interests are threatened or enhanced in these 
altered circumstances; iii. one or both agents are motivated to act in a 
way or ways appropriate to his or her interests. Each factor is disruptive 
in this respect: it provokes thought and choice; do something or nothing. 
How does one respond to situations having no antecedents in 
one’s experience? History and habit are a backdrop: they’re often 
inclining, but not compelling. For we have resources that enlarge the 
array of testable choices: namely, emergent powers—deliberation and 
foresight—that enable other responses. There are principally three 
options: leave decisions to random impulses; deliberate on the basis of 
imperfect information and personal or social interests; or gamble. Each 
is a strategy sufficient to determine the issue, but none is a cause fully 
determined by ancient history. 
Consider Jack and Jill. Both need freedom to experiment, because 
neither has sufficient information about the other. Who is he, who is 
she; what difference does that make to what he or she might do? Hard 
determinists believe that every current state of affairs obscures its causes 
without preventing them from determining a current effect. That’s partly 
true. A friend who spoke no Japanese went to Japan with the Navy. He 
returned with a wife who spoke no English. Incomprehension defeated 
them. But this isn’t an issue for Jack and Jill. They share enough history 
to clarify misunderstandings, enough confidence to engage one another 
when neither is sure of the outcome.
Hard determinists emphasize the integrity of causal histories without 
distinguishing enduring conditions from reacting, adapting agents: DNA 
is heritable—it has history—as many situations are not. Circumstances 
established without regard for their human occupants—the Manhattan 
street grid, for example—are often stable, yet most situations alter 
perpetually to some degree because of changes in material conditions 
or those agents. Change is confusing, but also liberating: we can’t 
respond effectively to altered situations if we’re preoccupied with those 
superseded. Adaptability, more than opposable thumbs, is our saving 
80 Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will
power in situations having no viable precedents. Hard determinism 
does us no favors by to tethering us to the past. Stifle free will, and you 
suppress initiative and accommodation.
Unfamiliarity or surprise makes choice risky. Responses are 
unpredictable when we face bewildering situations; one can’t tell what 
people will do or what their effects may be. Hard determinists invoke 
causes and causal laws to explain the trajectory and fine grain of these 
responses, but minds (with information, aims, and values expressed 
as attitudes) are one of two variables when agents encounter novel or 
surprising circumstances. The other is the provoking situation: what 
is it, how is it construed; which demands is it making? Choice and 
its effects are unpredictable if nothing in one’s past anticipates this 
encounter. Think of Mormons pushing wheelbarrows from upstate 
New York to Utah when the stock of horses, mules, and carriages was 
exhausted. What passion enabled them to make a choice for which no 
ancient history could have prepared them?
Here, in sequence, are graded situations that test choice or ingenuity. 
Responses are ever more problematic as we’re challenged to understand 
the circumstances we address: 
15iia. Social conditioning: Is free will precluded because people 
everywhere are creatures of their circumstances? As children and adults, 
the British favor Marmite; Americans like peanut butter. (Children 
born in one place, but quickly transferred to the other, learn the bias of 
their new home.) Every day millions of people in either place express a 
desire for one or the other. Our question—is your choice freely made—
is situational and current, not obscurely historical (peanut butter was 
invented in 1895, Marmite in 1902). Wanting answers, we ask the people 
choosing: do you have other choices; is anything obliging you to choose 
as you do? What could we mean by denying that choices are freely made 
when almost everyone polled says, Yes, there are alternatives, but I 
want this one? Some respondents can be discounted as addicts. The rest 
make choices that are conditioned but free: they have choices, there is a 
context of learned preference but no coercion. Context is ineliminable: 
there is no way to strip away material conditions that educate us for 
choice while limiting available choices, and no way to shuck every 
learned expectation when addressing our circumstances. But there is 
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free choice within these limits: freedom enjoyed when choosing among 
available alternatives for reasons or tastes of one’s own.
15iib. Reciprocity: Reciprocity is situational: it emerges with 
opportunities for engaging people whose interests are similar or 
complementary to one’s own. Given several options (if only yes or no), 
we choose among them. Are choices free? Not always: people often 
seize a desired object when it’s available. But imagine an opportunity 
unavailable until there is access to someone like-minded. Wanting 
the pleasure of a tennis match, tired of hitting balls against a wall, I 
agree to play this new acquaintance. Why call my choice free when 
this is an opportunity I’ve sought? I wouldn’t agree had she played at 
Wimbledon: I do because this is a match I could win. Free will doesn’t 
preclude causation; it implies exemption from conditions that may have 
once prevented it. Having the opportunity, I choose it.
15iic. Impulse: Specific impulses—for chocolate or vanilla—are 
distinguished from the steady purpose or intention that drives living 
things to engage others while securing and satisfying themselves. 
Impulses are often habitual: we act again as we have before. Imagine 
being asked to choose coffee or tea. One often decides between them, but 
usually with no pattern to one’s choices. Ancient causes may sometimes 
explain us, but do they also explain this week’s random profile: coffee 
on Mondays, Thursdays, and Fridays, tea the other days (a different 
order next week)? How would one go about specifying remote causes 
for this difference? Choosing among alternatives is familiar to everyone 
who dresses in the morning or shops for groceries. Why is it fraught 
when the explanation for trivial choices is will’s determination by a 
transient interest or need? I’m drinking tea today because of a recent 
choice: I’m curious about the taste of leaves purchased yesterday. The 
relevant history is short.
Impulsive signifies a range of actions, from the automatic to the 
voluntary, with entries in the middle that are uncertain. Consider the 
voluntary: I raise my hand as evidence of free will. Why call it willful, 
implying freedom to choose? Two considerations are pertinent when 
mind has the power to submit or resist: i. Calling an act impulsive 
implies that brain’s causal role is involuntary though brains that evolved 
by way of our causal history—systems having a complex, hierarchically 
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organized structure—have some degree of self-control. ii. Higher-order 
control sometimes supervenes on behavior that is lower order and 
involuntary. That control may have greater effect when consciousness 
augments the brain’s power to open or close its hierarchically organized 
neural gates. What provokes this self-regulating response? There may 
be reasons of several kinds: belief that the impulse is dangerous, or fear 
that it subverts an aim.
15iid. Contrarians: Imagine someone who rejects a current standard 
for reasons of his own. Others tolerate situations that annoy them; he 
expresses dissent by acting in ways these situations discourage. Which 
is the better explanation for his response: ancient causes percolating 
through him, or a sensibility that expresses his distress with socially 
sanctioned behavior? Is his conduct reactive, implying that choices aren’t 
free when conditioned by sensibility? Or is it reactive but voluntary and 
controlled: he has reasons—practical, moral, or aesthetic—for resisting 
conditions he deplores. Is this second response question-begging: why 
deny that our subject is merely reactive if his reasons are aesthetic 
(practical or moral), given that sensibility is acquired, during childhood 
and beyond, without control? Because acquired sensibilities are often 
revised and refined by people who have their reasons for resisting 
socially approved beliefs or tastes. Their judgments and self-control put 
them at odds with people more comfortably socialized.
15iie. Surprised, but steady: We’re often surprised, but accustomed to 
finding useful responses. That’s partly because solutions proved viable 
in other circumstances can be adapted to a present situation, partly 
because we innovate when necessary or ask the help of someone more 
adept. We’re rarely confused to the point of having to admit defeat, 
though natural or social disasters sometimes defeat us. This is a plausible 
example: My room fills with smoke; the door is locked from outside. 
Surveying my options, I go through the open window, with only a short 
drop to the grass below. Smoke was the motivator, the reason; the drop to 
the grass was remembered and imagined; deliberation and choice were 
quick. Why be sure that my choice had no precedent in my lifetime and 
lineage? I can’t speak for lives previous to mine; what to do in situations 
like this may be stored in tribal memories. But the sufficient condition 
for this choice—curling smoke—was singular and current. There were 
 83Chapter Two: Free Will 
other conditions—some long standing and familiar—but they aren’t 
pertinent to the issue at hand because choices and actions always have 
multiple conditions. The contested point is specific: are choices made for 
reasons that are contemporary, rather than ancient. 
Each of these provocations provoke several responses: 
15iif. Inhibition: This is a first response, however momentary: we’re 
surprised, something isn’t recognized or right; it needs to be identified 
and appraised. Inhibition is an early expression of agent autonomy: 
stopping an activity, with or without deliberation, is something we 
do when realizing that it threatens unacceptable effects. We might 
explain this response in historical terms: an external cause provokes 
us before another, internal, shuts us down. But inhibition has evolved 
in autonomous agents—buffered monads—capable of deliberation, 
judgment, and choice. I wanted to go but changed my mind; I thought 
I could do it, but I can’t. Acknowledge that situations often provoke 
these tensions, then ask if ambivalence is reduced or cured by tracing 
it, without confirmation, to remote origins. Free will doesn’t entail 
the absence of determination; it sometimes expresses itself as the 
inhibition of impulses and the self-control enabling one to consider 
pertinent alternatives.
15iig. Deliberation, judgment, choice, and their context: Deliberation is 
disciplined reflection. Its hypotheses signify possible states of affairs; its 
aims and plans are directives. Each acquires meaning by way of signs 
having sense and reference; all are organized using learned rules that 
promote consistency, coherence, and cogency. Wanting a resolution 
appropriate to our situation and interests, we test choice and action 
by considering their imagined effects: what are their likely costs and 
benefits? Decisions are poor if analysis is shallow; directives are tentative 
if intentions are ambivalent. Assessments are fallible for reasons that 
are recent or current, not ancient. But now, when reflection is past, we 
choose and act or decide that doing nothing is the better way.
Situations with properties that are novel, surprising, or puzzling 
are the vulnerable chink in the determinist argument that everything 
current was anticipated in nature’s laws and original conditions. 
Laplace might have said that novel situations resemble traffic jams, 
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cars stymied when none can move because each blocks the others. 
The jam is unforeseen but it would have been predictable had one 
known the earlier distribution of cars and the roads on which they 
move. But this reply is incomplete: original conditions, natural laws, 
and efficient causes are not the only relevant variables. It ignores 
complexity—organization—hence the formal causes, the perceived 
complexity of situations that change repeatedly as circumstances 
evolve. Determinists likely respond that complexity is merely the 
assembly of a situation’s elements. A traffic jam is a jumble of cars; 
provide for their configuration by plotting each car’s trajectory and 
nothing remains unexplained. 
This analytic perception may seem deep and powerful, but it 
strips experience and its circumstances of the emphases and forms—
the contingencies that give it texture, detail, and significance. For 
complexities—in health, beauty, and rhythm—are often corporate 
(holistic) rather than aggregative. Each is a configuration having 
a distinctive form. Each form is the formal cause that renders the 
complexity intelligible. An orchestra’s musicians play their separate 
parts in ways that create the complex but unitary effects prefigured in 
their music’s score, though many corporate effects are not foreseeable 
by plotting converging causal streams because we don’t know all the 
relevant variables or the effects of their interactions. Choreography 
reduces the variables; we see the evolving shape of a dance; personal 
health and economies are more obscure. 
Situations are complex to some degree; they evolve in ways that are 
consequential for disputes about free will. Jack and Jill are uncertain 
about one another’s responses; their interactions are tentative, 
experimental. Hard determinists affirm that their god knows every 
situation and its resolution; it knows the outcome to every writer’s 
frustration, the evolution of every complexity. Opacity isn’t a problem 
when predicting planetary motions; why does it complicate the relations 
of situations in which people address unknown or unrecognized others? 
Because planets and their moons don’t misconstrue one another or the 
sun. People often misidentify a situation’s other constituents without 
clarifying their personal aims or values. Choices and actions are often 
tentative; responses are often surprising. Uncertainty is chronic. Hence 
the evolution and emergence of inhibition, deliberation, and initiatives 
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that are tentative. Why suppose that every step was decided long ago, 
when so many of our cognitive abilities address the need to resolve 
uncertainties that are problematic and current?
Let’s make the argument congenial to hard determinists by rendering 
two factors in ways they would approve. It’s agreed that energy is 
conserved, so sufficient causal conditions for every current state of 
affairs embody energy from the ancient cache. And we say that emergent 
properties—those of a circle, for example—are foreseeable given their 
generating conditions. Emergent properties are often surprising, but 
nothing about them is unpredictable if this is true. These concessions 
entail that current states of affairs are determined by the ancient stock of 
energy, and that emergent properties are the causal or configurational 
effects of properties originating in a simpler domain (that of cells or 
molecules, for example).
Now consider: Jack and Jill are mutually attracted, but mutually 
puzzling. Why call their future determined when their calculations—
tentative, fallible, revisable—are one of its principal determinants? A 
rigidly determined future looks plausible if energy is conserved and 
if there are sufficient conditions for all emergent properties, but two 
considerations are ignored. One is the random factor introduced when 
agents engage circumstances that are novel or surprising. Neptune 
isn’t surprised by the sun, but Jack and Jill often surprise one another. 
Why aren’t their responses predictable in principle since the beginning 
of time? Imagine their conversations as each responds to the other in 
ways appropriate to the other’s previous words, not because of ancient 
antecedents: “Pass the butter,” she asks; he does it. The hard determinist 
intrudes with his principal weapon: everything is predictable; an 
omniscient god knew what she would say and what he would do. We 
should understand that a contemporary cause—her request—embodies 
the ancient lineage while clothed in its current guise. 
This is faulty in three respects: 
15iigi. All was allegedly decided eons ago, precluding the 
possibility that a current effect is the result of a cause contemporaneous 
with or immediately preceding it, though Jack has always waffled 
unpredictably. Having never met anyone like Jill, he’s all the more 
erratic. His response to Jill has no traceable antecedents in her history, 
but also none in his. 
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15iigii. How should we construe the hard determinist reading 
of this situation: Jill makes a request, and she hears the response of 
something in her causal lineage (an anticipation of Jack); Jack hears and 
responds to a request from something in his past (an anticipation of 
Jill)? Or should we suppose that Jack and Jill are linked in a Leibnizian 
universe, so her request eternally entails his response? The Laplacian 
model of hard determinism postulates that independent causal streams 
perpetually evolve in ways determined by the evolution of their 
original conditions. Yet little or nothing is said about the convergence 
of previously independent streams, hence Jack’s relation to Jill when 
nothing in either lineage anticipates their responses to one another. 
Does hard determinism insinuate a Leibnizian solution: Jack and Jill are 
already bonded by eternally established internal relations? That would 
be inappropriate to a problem founded in a Laplacian assumption: that 
nature is an assembly of lineages, many that evolve and cross while 
others are mutually independent. 
15iigiii. Add that the “omniscient” god invoked to locate sufficient 
causes for their exchange in ancient history is a deus ex machina, a 
philosophic conceit for which there is no confirming evidence. It seems 
plausible that our universe may be entirely closed, every next change 
a predictable (in principle) consequence of some or all that has gone 
before. But it is also plausible that nature is perpetually reoriented 
for reasons that are situational and contingent. Emergence may be a 
principal reason for its indeterminacy. For if each emergent property has 
sufficient causal conditions, it may happen that effects are imperfectly 
foreseeable when two emergents, both tentative and disoriented, engage 
one another. 
Is everything exactly determined, given the precise specification of 
values for relevant variables and laws controlling their evolution? Or 
do we merely opine that determination is exact because we fear the 
irregularity of a world where interaction’s effects are probable only?
15iii. Situations that are principally individual and intrapsychic: There 
are three points of reference: iiia. initiative and invention in art; iiib. 
resistance; and iiic. ordinary decisions. Deliberation is often their context, 
though impulse is commonplace when making everyday decisions.
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15iiia. Initiative and invention in art: Responses to surprise are 
defensive if we’re uneasy, but provocative if we’re artists or entrepreneurs 
seeing opportunities rather than threats. Initiatives express their control 
of a medium: metal or clay. But could Bach, Cole Porter, or Henry Ford 
rightly say that his initiatives were his own? Current expressions take 
contemporary forms, but is that more than a disguise for ancient origins?
Some years ago, a gallery in New York exhibited nineteen (or so) 
Picasso portraits. All or most featured the head and shoulders of a 
single male subject painted in shades of black, white, and red. Most 
differed little from one another; they were, collectively, the record of 
an experiment in composition. The show might have been described as 
an historical record: portraiture as paleontology, Picasso’s renditions 
of an ancient form. But that appraisal would have missed the gallery’s 
aim: his ways of construing the form were the only reason for the 
exhibition. Can we save the gist of the determinist reading by making 
the same point with a different emphasis: was the aggressive style of 
the paintings prefigured by a different artist painting or dreaming 
eons ago? Who would that have been? Consider again the autonomous 
spaces—the conscious minds—that evolution and emergence have 
supplied. Most of us fill them with everyday tasks, sentiments, and 
memory. That jumble provides content for material reworked and 
refined by productive imaginations: body parts are familiar; artists see 
them differently. 
Nietzsche, writing of eternal recurrence, affirmed that artistic styles 
are invented, forgotten, and recalled.25 But something elemental is 
implied by the distinction of productive and reproductive imagination.26 
For we are, as he also said, creators of values and ideas. Artists innovate 
unpredictably while embellishing or augmenting familiar melodies, 
materials, or designs. Anton Diabelli supplied a waltz; Beethoven wrote 
an hour’s worth of variations. 
15iiib. Resistance: Imagine someone challenged by an idea or 
design—a paragraph or drawing—of her creation. Exploratory steps 
25  Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: 
Viking, 1954), p. 322.
26  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1965), p. 165.
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were predictable, but now she’s thwarted by thought’s alien product: 
she doesn’t know how to develop or correct it. This is the impasse of 
writers or artists stymied by obstacles of their own making. They analyze, 
probe, or free associate, wanting insights that would leverage a useful 
change. Not having assured solutions, they experiment or surrender. Is 
the difficulty exaggerated when the struggle is intrapsychic, both sides 
occurring in one mind? These situations are remarkable only for pitting 
minds against themselves; they resemble every situation that confronts 
a thinker with data exceeding his or her ability to construe it. Resistant 
content is mastered when we discover an inkling of its motivating idea. 
Or the idea is obscure in itself, so we try alternate ways of refining it. 
Success is partial; many first efforts can’t be saved. 
Finding myself provoked by something of my own making 
assimilates this example to those considered above: we address other 
people or things in puzzling situations. But examples of this sort are 
easily modified without losing their point: we shrink the situation to 
the scale of reflecting mind by supposing, as often happens, that the 
ideas to be clarified are conceived but uninscribed. Resolution evades 
us until initiative succeeds on the back of imagination: solutions 
dawn as we analogize, extrapolate, generalize, or free associate. Or 
we leverage a choice by citing a reason: the idea was too complicated; 
we’ve simplified it. 
15iiic. Personal choices that are ordinary or arcane: Puzzling situations 
were the point of reference in the section above: how to respond to 
other people or things when they challenge one’s inventory of habitual 
or prepared responses. There are also the free choices made when 
circumstances are insufficient to decide an issue. Chocolate or vanilla, 
coffee or tea? Reality doesn’t care which choice it is, when eons haven’t 
been sufficient to fix these outcomes. They occur when history receives 
a supplement: a determinable (a property or situation having two or 
more possible expressions) receives a determinate expression because 
of a decision based on new information pertinent to a reason, interest, or 
value. Here are two examples: one cerebral, the other anecdotal. 
Tycho Brahe made observations from which Kepler inferred that 
planetary orbits are elliptical rather than circular. The data in Brahe’s 
diaries were previously unknown; his inference was a startling departure 
from the assumption that planetary orbits are circular. Thought 
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leapfrogged from Copernicus to Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo to Newton: 
understanding achieved determination (a specific hypothesis with 
confirming data) when a value (inquiry) provoked an extrapolation 
that was unprepared by centuries of reflection. Why was that possible? 
Because the interests, ideas, and values directing inquiry were applied 
innovatively, rather than mechanically: what could the data imply if 
not circularity, when each of its variations was long construed as less 
worth of Plato and God because of being a distortion? Thank Kepler’s 
imagination for exceeding all that previous history had conceived. 
Choice intervenes when circumstances allow either of two or more 
determinations. Decision wouldn’t be required if every interest had 
only one possible satisfier, but reality is determinable in respect to many 
interests and values, hence to many reasons for acting. Walk or ride, 
coffee or tea: why choose one or the other? The answer may be habit, 
but it could be that there is new information pertinent to the reasons, 
interests, or values shaping one’s choices. Wanting something to do, I 
can’t decide between taking a walk or riding a bicycle. Choice decides: 
I mount the bike, only to realize that both tires are flat. Resolve is quick 
because desire is flexible; I’ll walk. 
But isn’t choice conditioned by motives that are themselves 
historically conditioned? That is so but qualified because interests 
and values are responsive to new information. Kepler was looking for 
eccentric orbits or willing to consider them; Brahe’s records supplied 
confirming data. The ankle that kept me from walking is better now; 
I’ll test it. Hard determinists resist the distinction between antecedent 
conditions and our responsiveness to new evidence; they intone a 
message like that of Plato’s Meno,27 though orientations change when 
information is acquired, not merely repackaged. Could one argue 
that deviations consequent on new information are never more than 
responses to antecedent conditions? That would be an inference with a 
name: post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
Choice is always a risk, but less so when agents anticipate opportunities 
once unknown because information has revised our estimates of action’s 
likely effects. Assume that dark matter hides civilizations we shall 
eventually discover. Their ways will likely be strange to us, though we 
may decipher them well enough to respond to their messages in ways 
27  Plato, Meno, pp. 353–85.
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their agents comprehend. That won’t require innate ideas or determinist 
histories because imagination and inference will have bootstrapped us 
beyond every current limit. Physicists swooned, then adjusted, when 
Newton reflected after seeing an apple fall. Something comparable will 
happen again, probably many times.
15iiid. Disputed variables: We invite confusion when these five 
variables have contested implications for free will:
15iiidi. Information: Any information that extends understanding of 
one’s self or circumstances is a basis for initiatives that may have no 
precedent in one’s history. The inciting information may concern one’s 
lineage or matters having no precedent within it. Either origin may be 
decisive in fixing a response to a problematic situation or for determining 
a determinable’s expressions. I hadn’t known that my grandmother was 
a gambler: should I caution my daughter? 
Information is a baseline for discussions of free will because this 
is the least contentious way of escaping the determination of one’s 
lineage. Genes determine many things without being known to the 
agents affected, but many aspects of one’s lineage have no effects 
unless they‘re known. Do other variables have an equivalent force, and 
if so do they have it principally or only because they too are fueled 
by information that exceeds whatever is or was known of an agent’s 
history? A principal example is the interplay of information and 
values. Suppose that values are (at least) inclinations to favor or resist 
a thought or practice, and that new information prompts one to alter 
an established habit out of regard for value: valuing health, open to the 
news that speed, sugar, and inactivity are unhealthy, I change. Add that 
this functional relationship is sometimes reversed: information alters 
values. Naïve about climate change before learning of global warming, 
I trade my car for a bicycle. 
15iiidii. Reasons: Reasons are justifiers. They are second-order 
causes: exercise is a cause of health; but citing health is a cause 
of exercise. Aristotle’s notion of final cause is often criticized for 
its implication that finality is a process directing change, but that 
understanding is correct when the cause of an outcome is the intention 
directing it. The condition provoking an intention may have had a 
 91Chapter Two: Free Will 
succession of antecedents, but many reasons driving it are current: 
one drinks because thirsty. Could one choose otherwise? That often 
happens: I’m thirsty, but I’ll wait. What makes the choice possible? 
Muscular—functional—control. 
Here too information is decisive. Tomorrow’s game has everyone 
excited, but heavy snow has fractured the roof of the stadium; the game 
is cancelled, I won’t go. My decision is responsive to reasons because 
my reasons are sensitive to news. The information need only be news to 
me, not new in itself: I’m surprised by a sequence of red-haired babies, 
though my wife had chosen baby clothes of a matching shade because 
she knew the likely outcome. But she’s an in-law and not herself affected 
by the determining blood line; it was information, not inspiration or 
antecedents, that enabled her choice. 
15iiidiii. Values: Values are the set points of the body/brain’s positive 
and negative feedback systems, but also the sensitive leading edge of 
thought, choice, and action. They impel some actions (call a friend), 
while inhibiting others (ignore insults). Those rooted in metabolic 
processes are stable if one is healthy, though they change with illness 
or age. Others are labile because determined by socialization or 
information: much of current technology was unforeseeable; wanting it 
was nowhere in our history. 
15iiidiv. Imagination: How could we establish that imagination—
invention, analogy, or extrapolation—is more than the quasi-
grammatical operation of reconfiguring available colors, shapes, ideas, 
or words? Suppose that many new musical compositions are prefigured 
in the eighty-eight keys of a standard piano: for why, if so, aren’t 
they apparent? Because each sequence of notes needs discovery and 
exposure. A note-sequencing machine will generate occasional phrases 
of musical interest, but hear the difference when its software program is 
exposed to bird song or ululating voices. Would it have been musically 
productive without that information? Only in a random—accidental—
way. Why this difference? Because imagination is the power for bringing 
the brain/machine’s innate heuristics to bear on this new information. 
More than a combinatorial faculty, it is musically sensitive; its innate or 
acquired aesthetic values make it musically selective. 
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15iiidv. Functions: Consider the facility apparent in actors, dancers, 
and athletes: they move supplely; they’re self-controlled. Each of 
their neurological-muscular capacities has operational integrity that 
exceeds its causal lineage in the respect that each is lodged altogether 
within agents who control their expressions. Is this the mechanical 
evolution of complex systems? No: choice and action exceed a causal 
lineage when impelled by information: one learns Wolof or French, not 
American English, because that is the content of sounds children hear. 
Hard determinists emphasize lineages of sufficient causes; they pass 
over the difference between causes and the determinable capacities 
activated by information, values, or initiative. There is always history in 
the beginning, but history is penetrated by accidents, information, and 
opportunities: one learns baseball, not cricket, because that is the game 
locals play. The god who sees us at the beginning of life only discerns all 
we can do given our innate capacities and antecedents; it doesn’t see all 
our opportunities or all we shall choose to do or be. 
15iv. Hard determinism is defeated: We have four reasons for discounting 
the hard determinist claim that there are no expressions of free will: 
15iva. Living beings have an inside protected from things outside 
by a membrane that resists intrusions while filtering information 
and nutrients. That structure enabled the emergence of faculties for 
deliberation, judgment, choice, and will. Other animals have these 
powers to some degree, though not to their pitch in humans. 
15ivb. The gestalts with which we address situations express 
personal orientations, hence histories, but also responses to current 
situations. They orient us in two ways: creating coherence by integrating 
the disparate matters thought or perceived and by creating frames in 
which the difference of figure and ground expresses an agent’s dominant 
values or concerns. A new or troubling situation disrupts a previously 
established gestalt; starting again, so to speak, a thinker finds his or her 
way to a different orientation, often one having no exact precedent. A 
bit of history—information in the previous gestalt—is suppressed. Is the 
information forgotten? Details may be remembered; the orientation is 
often lost. This is creative destruction: previous assumptions are a drag 
on current perceptions, though a radical change in situations alters old 
persuasions. Yesterday’s stranger is today’s good friend. 
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Hard determinism is defeated at the first moment of addressing 
troubling situations. For superseding gestalts—however fragmentary 
and confused—disrupt the causal tide. We’re challenged to construe our 
circumstances in terms relevant to our values and interests when they 
seem unprecedented in our history. What are we to do? Responses may 
be cautious, or unpredictable and daring to some degree. We deviate 
from established patterns: forgetting or ignoring standards that were 
once obligatory.
15ivc. Sheltering within barriers that defend our vital interiors, 
we are causes that respond to other things or plan our engagements 
with them. Novelty provokes us. Addressing problematic situations, 
choosing among a determinable’s possible expressions, we rely on 
information that justifies our reasons, interests, or values. We err 
sometimes, but the choice is ours. 
15ivd. Is there, nevertheless, a way to vindicate hard determinism? 
Yes: argue, with evidence, that the causal version of Leibnizian holism is 
valid. (The whole is a differentiated, dynamic entity in spacetime, rather 
than a complex, static idea in the mind of God.) There are, this implies, 
no independent causal streams; no encounters such that agents address 
situations for which they are unprepared. It implies that surprise or 
apparent novelty are mistaken impressions, and that personal experiments 
(Jack and Jill) are conceits. For all is entangled; everything is cause and 
effect of everything else and has been since the beginning of time. But this 
is a dream, an idea distinct from the more plausible surmise that nature is 
still marked by the effects of its early history when, prior to its expansion, 
all was tightly packed. Is it still wholly compressed; or is it true that there 
are no precedents for many agent encounters because independent causal 
streams did form and often converge?
16. Last Thoughts
This book has a simple aim: establish within the context of soft 
determinism that humans have autonomy and free will. Autonomy 
isn’t controversial, every animal has a degree of it; self-maintenance and 
sociality are common to all. Yet autonomy may be automatic because 
programmed, hence insufficient to secure free will and all it implies: 
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inhibition, initiative, invention, responsibility, credit or blame. Many 
choices are routine; habit explains them. But what decides the issue 
if assembled causes are indifferent while inclinations are mutually 
opposed? That leaves deliberation as the source of viable alternatives; 
choice expresses its judgments, values, and priorities. 
Mind was formed by causes; aren’t its decisions also caused? Yes, 
though there may have been little or no germ of current determinants 
in their antecedents. Composers trained in classical harmonies were 
disoriented by Schoenberg’s twelve-tone scale. History was no guide; 
their choices were experiments. This point generalizes: anyone facing 
a situation for which he or she is unprepared responds reactively—
without thought—or the response is delayed while interests and values 
are calibrated. Judicious responses are distinctive and personal because 
the sensibility that emerged with experience is a dense, self-organizing 
formation, a barrier to history that generates priorities of its own. Do 
situations of this sort often arise? They occur whenever speakers await 
a reply after saying something for which interlocutors have no answers: 
“Will you marry me”?, “Do you like quantum gravity”?
Freedom is the power to address other people and things in ways 
appropriate to oneself. This is a creative force, one determining mind’s 
powers in the margin that remains when material obstacles, natural 
laws, and social rules or roles are acknowledged. Why credit volition 
with responsibility for one’s psychic and behavioral identity? Because 
this is the fulcrum for initiative, invention, cooperation, or dissent. Is 
will always free in ways congenial to soft determinism, free because 
the conditions for choice are internal to autonomous agents? That isn’t 
sure: it’s not a contradiction that events in the early universe initiated 
a lineage still vital in our time, something that infiltrates the internal 
spaces of some, all, or most people. This concession won’t pacify hard 
determinists because their thesis—nothing is “up to us”—needs more 
than this possibility to justify it.
Chapter Three:  
Socialization
1. Conflicted Aims
We say that agents having autonomy and free will are responsible 
for their effects; yet responsibility is attenuated if individuals satisfy 
familiar rubrics: grocer, spouse, parent, or judge. For rights and duties 
are socially bestowed, not privately earned if one inherits status by 
virtue of filling a role, rather than by creating a singular space of 
one’s own. People often achieve identity by submitting to formulaic 
tastes and vocations, though some mold identity to a personal 
design. Imagine older women surrounded by adoring relatives and 
friends after a lifetime caring for them. Compare their virtue to the 
self-concern that ignores stabilizing social relations. Though there is 
a contrary strand to our thinking: man is made in the image of God; 
all are members of the kingdom of ends. Mill’s On Liberty is a secular 
version of our fantasied atomism: 
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, 
first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of 
conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and 
feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, 
practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological….Secondly, the 
principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of 
our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such 
consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow 
creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they 
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this 
liberty of each individual follows the liberty, within the same limits, of 
combination among individuals, freedom to unite for any purpose not 
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involving harm to others, the persons combining being supposed to be 
of full age and not forced or deceived.1
Most everyone would be happier living at peace with neighbors in 
handsome, productive circumstances while enjoying a family, friends, 
and one’s talents. The individuals of this dream enjoy both skills and the 
resonance provoked by their virtuous effects on others; yet these aims 
conflict because social structures, even Mill’s voluntary collaborations, 
shape individual development and initiatives to their advantage. We 
drive safely because that’s prudent and because laws require it, though 
this often requires sitting in traffic jams that make commuting hellish 
for all who do it. This is socialization, sometimes defending, other 
times vandalizing the lives of its willing collaborators. How else could 
we satisfy a desire for the autonomy and enjoyment of individual 
lives, when crowding and scarce resources require laws that facilitate 
movement or proscribe harm?
This might be our aim: loosen social demands in order that individuals 
have space to discover their talents and use their opportunities. 
Collaboration provides the goods and services required to sustain life to 
a desired standard. Now couple this effect to an additional aim: balance 
a society’s work with tasks that liberate workers to think and choose. 
Teach varied skills; break up routine with varied responsibilities; 
mechanize work that’s only repetitive. Read Marx, and believe the 
sincerity of his respect for talent and his regard for the poor.2 We won’t 
liberate the poet in everyone; we can introduce elasticity into social 
demands that suffocate choice and self-discovery. Most of agency’s 
effects occur with little premeditation: like kicking a stone. But those 
identified with a human cause—as parents affect their children—ring 
with the purpose and values of agency. More than duty, there is passion, 
self-discovery, and one’s humanizing effects on others. Many actions are 
private initiatives—start a business, take a walk—but many others are 
social obligations founded in rules or roles. Filling a role is a measure 
of the habits acquired with experience; we‘re effective because of stable 
1  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 
pp. 11–12.
2  Karl Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy,” Early 
Writings, trans. Rodney Livingston and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin, 1975), 
pp. 259–78.
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skills and personal discipline. But why do we persist when conditions 
oppose us? Is it pride, or the anxious response to socialization and 
acquired duties: do we satisfy partners who expect efficiency in tasks 
complementary to theirs? 
Imagine that a role’s occupant is conscious of the irony in his posture: 
he’s aware that his identity is compromised by the tasks, status, and 
advantages that consume him. “I accept its duties,” he affirms, “but I am 
not its creature.” How does he reconcile that difference? Some roles are 
chosen, others are inherited or acquired unintentionally: the job taken 
when nothing else is available. Later, when autonomy and identity are 
mediated by a role that consumes identity and aspiration, one responds 
as the person he or she has become. Would one do this job had there been 
other choices? Perhaps not; many people have roles that were acquired 
rather than chosen. One infers from Mill’s three regions of liberty that he 
didn’t know such people. His acquaintances, or only those he imagined, 
wanted no abiding obligations to other people. One thinks of them 
tending gardens, keeping diaries, or dressing for dinner when eating 
alone. Why do it; or, when a first impulse has passed, why continue 
doing it? There might be no reason but habit, though the explanation 
might also be a dreadful moment in social history—a Victorian social 
purgatory—or an inflexible idea of singular selves. 
Is there relief from these extremes: Mill’s atomism or the holism that 
leaves no space for autonomy? 
2. Idiosyncrasy
What fraction of purpose or action is rightly ascribed to individuals 
and their private aims when much is subsumed under socially 
sponsored rules or practices? Does selfhood—including purpose, 
desire, and moral identity—have currency distinct from George Herbert 
Mead’s “generalized other,”3 or from one’s roles in a family, business, 
or team? This question is unresolved since Plato’s allegory of the cave.4 
It describes people locked in place while discerning vague shadows 
3  George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed, Charles Morris (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 440. 
4  Plato, Republic, Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns 
(New York: Pantheon, 1961), 514a-517e, pp. 747–49
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on the wall before them; they ascribe character to the shadows while 
coordinating their interpretations. Adjusting those stories to make 
themselves mutually intelligible—learning to tell the same story—they 
see the same things: I know who I am by knowing what makes me 
recognizable to you.
But is that all I know myself to be? Kant and Hegel agreed that 
passions are too feeble a basis for personal identity. Often verging on 
the chaotic, feelings make us opaque to ourselves. One supposes that 
Kant and Hegel were equally impatient of personal fantasies, however 
generalized. Like Plato writing of the Forms, their ideas of selfhood 
invoke the universality of reason, its content and virtues. Kant located 
selves within the kingdom of ends where each thinker realizes his or 
her rational nature by affirming the categorical imperative;5 Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirt supersedes particularity and contingency by 
introducing a trajectory that buries individuals in layers of universality 
and necessity.6 Alternative formulations save particularity by affirming 
it (as Nietzsche did), or by making individuality the emergent effect of 
sociality. So, Mead argued that I know what I mean or intend (hence 
who I am) when knowing how I would respond to your responses 
to me.7 A succession of actions—each a response to the other and an 
anticipation of the other’s likely response to the first—locates both 
agents within this evolving dialectic. Other accounts are less ingenious 
but more straightforwardly social: children learn the language and 
habits of their caretakers, then the rules and roles of a community. They 
are comfortable among themselves and recognizable to adults by virtue 
of knowing society’s constraints, including their duties and the spaces 
left to choice. Rules are observed because deviants are ostracized.
Is personal identity altogether subordinate to one’s social identity? 
Am I a cipher when shorn of socialized habits and roles? Each of us has 
powers—muscular, artistic, or intellectual—made determinate when 
imagination and initiative shape determinable roles and opportunities. 
The idiosyncrasies of one’s powers and inclinations are obscured when 
5  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 41–42.
6  See G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. G. B. Baillie (New York: 
Harper, 1967).
7  George Herbert Mead, George Herbert Mead: On Social Psychology—Selected Papers, 
ed. Anselm Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 50–51.
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tastes and desires are subordinate to the norms, duties, and roles that 
secure and support us. But socialization also has disruptive effects, not 
least because of a discomfort that all feel to some degree when obliged 
to satisfy rules or roles designed to fulfill holistic or abstract interests. 
What dare I be when situations oblige me to construe myself in ways 
that suppress an abiding idea of myself? How do I relieve the pain of 
wearing shoes made for no one in particular?
Philosophers obsessed by the obstacle of verifying other people’s 
intrapsychic experience emphasize public criteria for private thoughts 
and feelings. They construe our uniformities as evidence that privacy 
and idiosyncrasy are extinguished for want of intelligibility or because 
altruism makes us self-effacing. Verificationist bookkeeping ignores 
private differences, as if they were nothing at all, though privacy and 
interiority may be inexpungable. There may be more within us than 
public criteria acknowledge: thought and feeling may be lurking, careful 
not to ruffle the surface of public talk. Bluetooth, mind to mind, would 
dispel all doubts—I know what you’re thinking—but that technology 
is a step away. The demand for public verification is, all the while, 
quixotic: we have tastes and desires unknown to others, as well as 
talents unknown to ourselves. We are conscious, often self-conscious, 
but never directly observed by others because one’s companions are 
obliged to infer what they can’t perceive. We might construe behavior as 
the test and essence of selfhood, were it established that mind’s content 
reduces to amorphous feelings or percepts. But that misdescribes mind’s 
faculties and content: perception is often clear; thought and plans are 
often cogent and precise. We have the surmise—credited to Kant but 
familiar since Plato—that experience is organized by schemas—rules—
that differentiate thoughts or percepts while configuring them in ways 
appropriate to an aim.8 Someone who makes his way, wordlessly, into a 
bank vault by picking the lock proves the clarity of his thinking.
Listen to what people say; hear their word choice, and the precision 
with which they say it: acknowledge that you know how they think. 
Though something more, something provocative because disruptive, 
is also apparent. Kant distinguished reproductive from productive 
imagination: one uses schemas to recreate tableaux of sorts previously 
8  Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1965), pp. 180–87.
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experienced; the other prefigures experiences that may have no 
antecedents. Everyone has memories, most of them jejune. But there 
are also people with ideas that are remarkable or merely odd; these are 
the artists Nietzsche celebrated. Most move among us like unobserved 
comets passing Earth, though some are acknowledged as they revise our 
ways of thinking, doing, or making. Publicity corrupts its artists when 
society requires that innovations be framed in terms comprehensible 
to popular tastes. Hence the social cycles of inertia and renewal: we’re 
somnolent when practices and persuasions are reduced to a lowest 
common denominator; we awaken to new ideas. Some practices cycle 
mindlessly—buttons on a sleeve, skirts above or below the knee—others 
evolve when gifted individuals, artists and others, breach a society’s 
boundaries by extrapolating to possibilities unknown.
Reconsider a time of stasis; notice that homogeneity and conformity 
were more the result of suppression than the absence of difference. We 
speak a common language but interpret it with nuances peculiar to 
ourselves. A few of us paint, think, or play in ways that others are slow 
to perceive or understand, yet wit takes ideas and practices in surprising 
directions; we generalize, analogize, or extrapolate to outcomes that 
were unforeseen. People resist these changes, then embrace them; 
sociality covers over the breach, hardly conceding that anything has 
changed. Yet look more closely at the ways people think and act; see all 
that is distinctive in their ways of construing and expressing information 
or performing familiar tasks. Individuality is a constant imprint on 
thought and practice, though we satisfy the demands of organization 
and cooperation by ignoring it.
Are these real differences or only a libertarian fantasy; where is 
diversity in people doing common things while having common 
thoughts? It flourishes under the veneer of a regularizing gloss. We 
learn different content or subtly different abilities because of different 
orientations or interests, or because we vary in our capacities for 
acquiring information or skills. These are obstacles to socialization and 
evidence for autonomy, because each of us is a barrier to uniformity. 
Idiosyncrasy suggests that people are autonomous to this degree: we 
acquire information and skills in ways calibrated to our perspectives, 
aims, and capacities. Hence this all but ineliminable conflict for everyone 
living with others: we can’t learn current doctrines, tastes, or practices 
without suppressing something vital in ourselves. 
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We are formed by our societies without being their creatures. My 
barber described his mother to me earlier today. She’s eighty-four and 
lives alone in a village outside Palermo. She has a bad knee; her short-
term memory is poor; but she presides over a domain—her home—and 
won’t compromise her autonomy. Having visitors, she climbs a ladder 
in her garden to pick fresh fruit for their breakfast; they return to New 
York finding that she’s hidden all her monthly retirement money in their 
suitcases. Why? Because caring for her children, in her way, is her vocation. 
Is it vaguely ridiculous that old people insist on their autonomy? A 
principal choreographer died a week ago at eighty-eight. He was in his 
hospice bed on his last night, silent and immobile, when the hospice 
doctor visited him. May I ask you several questions, she asked? No 
response. May I ask you two questions? Still no response. Are you 
in pain, sir, and if so, where? The choreographer rose out of his bed: 
“You are my only pain.” The doctor called his dance company the next 
morning to say that he had weakened overnight and might die during 
the day: “Except that in his case, maybe two weeks.” He died that day. 
(As told by the company director.)
3. Talent
Talents aren’t known until there are opportunities for their education 
and expression. This coupling is tricky because cultures are specific and 
proud; why search for talents unknown or anomalous with established 
practices: there’s no demand for a Caruso or Michael Jordan if no one 
sings or plays basketball. 
Agency embodies an essential irony: we are autonomous, though 
our actions are unintelligible, illegal, or ineffective if they fail to satisfy 
social interests or standards. This discrepancy expresses two constraints 
on agent talents: what we do—tasks we inherit or acquire—and the fact 
that standards for doing them well are socialized. Speaking intelligibly to 
others requires that one use a language they understand. The performance 
condition requires skill; the social condition requires the reciprocities of 
people having similar skills. Differences are suppressed because we have 
interests and needs that individuals can’t satisfy alone: a shortstop plays 
his position by adjusting to the styles of his teammates; intimates speak 
to one another in ways that each has learned to hear. Differences persist 
because we speak a public language while using it in distinctive ways. 
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Social energy falters when old patterns and the habits defending them 
are the only defense against stasis and decline. Add the costs of personal 
frustration and the loss gains urgency. Society as much as its members 
often needs regeneration, but what’s to be done when identifying and 
cultivating unknown powers seems thankless? Three steps are incumbent: 
i. Regard everyone as a luminous space, a center of mostly unsuspected 
talents or inclinations. We needn’t pretend to know those energies or their 
details; it’s enough that we acknowledge the possibility of achievements 
that express unknown abilities. ii. Let tolerance for difference abet early 
learning in practices that are standardized to some degree: including 
reading, mathematics, or play. Encourage improvisation directed by a 
question: what would you like to do today and what tools do you need 
for doing it? Let teachers sometimes observe children rather than instruct 
them; see what is done when we don’t know what it is or how to direct 
it. One of New York City Ballet’s premier male dancers was raised on a 
Navajo reservation in New Mexico. Imagine the tolerance and insight of 
the parents who encouraged him. iii. Let adults show patience and respect 
for inclinations that seem odd or unproductive in one another. Let people 
grow when they seem past the age of growing.
Why do societies change, often radically, when socialization is a 
persistent stone that weighs on the imaginations and practices of its 
members? They’re altered by circumstances—economies, governments, 
wars, or climate—and by individuals who rise unbidden with effects 
that were nowhere anticipated.
4. Interiority 
Interiority is two things: a resonant private space, and the educable 
sensibility that fills it. Individuals vary: singularity shines through 
because interiority never yields entirely to the demands of collaboration 
or social discipline. Behavior is sometimes uniform—we cooperate or 
submit—though we hear the same messages differently. Interiority is 
indestructible so long as one retains an autonomous nervous system 
that filters information in ways conforming to one’s values, attitudes, 
understandings, and desires. The system may be suppressed or 
manipulated, but its resistance is evidence that interiority has force 
and form. Words used to characterize it—character, personality, and 
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sensibility—are allusive but superficial because the experiential side is 
the only one clearly perceived or understood; its physiological structure 
is inferred, not inspected. 
Gaston Bachelard’s example of interiority—he compared houses to 
homes—can’t be faulted.9 Most houses were never one’s home; they 
evoke no memories and have no meaning to visitors who see only a 
structure and its furnishings. Those are markers to one for whom the 
house was home, but she looks past them, remembering how things 
were used, with whom, and when. The structure may be serially 
repurposed across the history of its occupations; but home is a fixture—
specific but different—in successive biographies. Someone new to a 
house looks on passively; former residents are alight. For sensibility is a 
tripwire. Its design and construction are subtle and idiosyncratic, with 
meanings, aims, and persuasions superimposed on temperament: we’re 
sanguine and steady, or edgy and reactive. The array of its variations 
has values too diverse for easy reduction to the simple means prescribed 
by rules, roles, or generic identities. Though people submit to common 
standards because submission is rewarded, and resistance is punished; 
or idiosyncrasy is sedulous and safe because it’s ignored by social 
demands and identities. Yet homes aren’t better if all are equipped in 
the style of a transient motel. So is experience diminished if generic 
identities strip members of purpose and vitality. Do we want what we 
separately need? Or do we desire the same things irrespective of their 
worth? Is interiority allowed to breathe?
Homes want furnishings; interiority needs cultivation. Children 
won’t cultivate thought, feeling, or skills if parents and teachers don’t 
show them how they’re acquired. Watch anyone skilled in a task and ask 
how he or she has come to its mastery. There are self-made craftsmen 
or athletes, though most learned discipline from a teacher. This is the 
anomaly of our differences: having distinct talents and separate private 
spaces in which to enjoy them, our talents acquire form by incorporating 
the ways of our culture’s socialized pursuits. Being athletic, one learns 
the games of his or her community; liking music, we learn its instruments. 
Individuality takes form as the student incorporates a social resource. 
Instructors represent this aspect of local culture to subjects who embody 
9 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1964), pp. 7–8.
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their social messages in ways that are self-transforming. This is the 
alternating cycle—back and forth—as a society slows to teach, then 
advances on the skills of those it has taught. 
Why is interiority elaborated in some, but ignored or suppressed 
in others? Is it odd that all a team’s players are distinctly talented 
and trained, while advertisers treat their fans to the same vacuous 
messages? This division is costly because it creates a society of 
mutually unintelligible castes: people who enjoy their educated skills 
or tastes, and those satisfied by generic distractions or rewards. My 
analogy—woods to societies—fails at this point because sustainable 
ecosystems are usually coherent: relations among their niches make 
them mutually sustaining. That is not so where respect for interiority 
is reserved to people who are well-educated and financially secure or 
to those who are socially entrenched because they perpetuate class 
traditions. 
Do we educate for generic efficiencies (everyone learns to read) or 
the cultivation of each member’s personal taste and judgment? The first 
ignores our differences; the other makes us mutually estranged (you 
like languages, I prefer math). Disparity is expected with educations 
sensitive to our differences, though routines calculated to enforce 
uniformity—boot camp and rote learning—punish the variability of 
those instructed; we live by many of the same rules without living in the 
same ways. Nodal causation somewhat mitigates these effects because 
its regularizing norm—live and let live—tolerates individual variation. 
People controlling their individual talents and lives will be different. 
Tolerance mitigates mutual impatience. 
5. Social Space
Walk along a beach on a clear day when space seems void of limits; 
we don’t see its geometry or intrinsic force fields. Social space is like 
that when we move through it unopposed. Compare playing a game 
that invokes a nest of regulations: there are rules of the game, including 
the roles and responsibilities of team members; regulations that limit 
fraternization; regulations prescribing the character of relations between 
opposing teams (penalties for aggression); and regulations proscribing 
or prescribing conduct appropriate to any social relation (saying thank 
you or hello). 
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Walking together seems unproblematic; walking down a crowded 
street is only one or two steps less constraining than playing a team 
sport. For regulations enable collaborations by articulating the social 
spaces where they form. This idea—articulated social spaces—amplifies 
the idea that human societies resemble a stand of trees. For if the 
autonomy of each tree is qualified by forest ecology, so is the autonomy 
of human agency qualified by the layered regulations that constrain 
activity and collaboration in a densely occupied social space. Think of 
people uncomfortable in big cities. Disliking the noise and agitation 
(what locals experience as energy), they’re disoriented by the vague 
apprehension that the social space is informed by layers of constraint. 
They intuit that each person, resident or visitor, has only a narrow path 
within the system of regulations that define his or her space. Don’t tell 
these visitors that the freedom of city residents is greater than any they 
know. For their city is a plenum of opportunity. Yes, it embodies layers 
of constraint, but also systems and domains that teach and incite the 
passions and talents of its residents. There is disruption when artists 
and entrepreneurs alter aims and perceptions, but a city excited by 
diversity and organized for business pauses and stabilizes. Private lives 
are less hectic in quieter cities, but Athens, Venice, Paris, and New York 
are instructive: agitation is productive. 
Notice too this offsetting tension: the social space of regulations 
is an ethos informed by three “transcendentals”: the good, the true, 
and the beautiful. This is the culture of Plato’s cave: emerging from 
darkness, we rise in light that enables and impels. We satisfy social 
scruples and maybe these ideals because education and opportunity 
foreclose doing otherwise. Consider goodness, because its value is 
pervasive and least contested. Activity creates and sustains it by way 
of the reciprocities established and the effects achieved as work is 
done. Friendships, families, and neighborhoods, businesses, schools, 
and communities are the spawn of activities initiated when people are 
interdependent and effective, but needy. We often appraise agency’s 
effects by citing gross material changes: washing clothes or painting a 
fence. Though salient examples would have us consider one another. 
How are we altered, partly by things we do, partly by our bonds to 
partners? This is moral resonance; it has memory and extension. We 
create webs of moral conscience without knowing how far or deep 
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they go. People respond when news spreads in morally resonant 
communities: someone falls in the street; others stop to help. An expert 
at making prostheses responded to pictures of amputees in a distant 
war by making limbs for its victims; his effects were magnified when 
other makers volunteered their help after learning of him. Hospitals, 
police, and firemen embody these values. 
Truth is instrumental; no plan enhances its success by 
misrepresenting an activity’s aim, partners, terrain, or resources. Yet 
true answers to these four questions exceed practicality because none 
are more essential to our nature and self-understanding: What am I, 
or what are we? What is the character of other people and things? 
What is my, or our, place among them? What is it good to do or be? 
Other questions may also seem urgent: Is there a god, if so, what is 
its nature, and how are we judged? Every inquiry has one of these 
topics as its generic directive; truth is their animator. Now beauty. 
Moral goodness requires our engagements with one another; the 
inquiries seeking truth are propelled by accumulated insights. Some 
things are beautiful in themselves; others require the imagination and 
skill of single artists. They would be largely mute without the styles 
in which they train, though artistic genius is mostly autonomous in 
the rare people having it. They elaborate on traditions or exceed them, 
without explaining why they’ve deviated, or how observers should 
regard their innovations. We accept a tradition’s gaps without being 
able to explain, or even notice them. 
Too much preoccupation with the good, the true, and the beautiful is 
likely to sabotage any project they inspire. We ignore them because they 
aren’t perceived as relevant to all that’s pedestrian in everyday life or 
because too much concern for them makes us clumsy. But these are the 
vectors animating social space. Are they “transcendental,” implying an 
origin out of nature? Not really. It’s our need and aspiration, individually 
and collectively, that drive them. 
6. Normativity
How do regulations acquire their force? The threat of punishment 
is one reason, though most people are motivated by an urgency that 
evokes the collective interest and passion of Rousseau’s “general will,” 
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not by fear. We respond to the requirements for effective sociality by 
acknowledging its layered conditions. Some concern the tasks or roles 
appropriate to an activity’s aims or participants: drivers and their 
passengers. Others determine one or another dimension of the social 
context where the activity is performed: students and teachers; parents 
and children. Some are legislated; others are well-marked, though 
usually informal. Habermas has emphasized the shared interest in 
procedures that enable coordination.10 John Dewey’s idea of privacy—it 
binds individuals sharing an aim—combines this regard for collaboration 
with that of efficacy, tolerance and respect.11 
What is normativity? Kant ascribed it to an a priori imperative, though 
it has the simpler basis intimated in Aristotle’s remark that man is a 
social animal: we need and are, mostly, comfortable with one another. 
Discomfort is sometimes real; violence is our pathology. But we defer to 
bonds and regularities that enable safety, efficacy, and well-being. There 
is normativity in all the practices sanctioned by mutual deference. 
7. Socialization 
We accommodate ourselves to a society’s structure and aims as we go 
our separate ways. The result is socialized autonomy: singular persons 
sharing the common forms of thought, cooperation, and sensibility. 
7i. Socialization is the public bath where personal differences are 
nuanced or suppressed. It has four primary modes: ia. We commit 
ourselves to friends, spouses, or partners. ib. Thought, feeling, taste, and 
behavior conform to local standards. ic. We choose or inherit roles in 
families or businesses, cities or states. Roles differ with one’s occupation 
or aims, but here, too, we learn practices that normalize relations and 
tasks: playing midfield or third base is roughly the same, whatever one’s 
team. id. We satisfy local laws: whatever direction you’re going, whatever 
your destination, traffic laws are mostly the same. Idiosyncrasies are 
submerged, without being extinguished. 
10  See Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization 
of Society, Volume 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
11  John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Athens: Swallow Press, 1954), pp. 15–16. 
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7ia. Commitment: We bind ourselves to others in passion, duty, or as 
partners sharing an aim. Individuality is submerged or suppressed in 
each of these modes, though it shapes our ways of performing standard 
tasks. Does passion express affection or lust; am I committed to this 
team, this game, or to my salary? The actions of people doing the same 
things for different motives may look the same, but individuals, and 
sometimes their partners, know the difference. 
7ib. Local standards: Predictability and safety, productivity and 
civility require that we do ordinary things in recognizable ways. Yet 
standards are satisfied in ways sensitive to local differences. I once went 
miles out of my way after seeing the sign for a prize-winning ice-cream 
store, only to find that vanilla was the one flavor sold. 
7ic. Roles in associations and organizations: Associations are assemblies 
of people having a shared interest; members usually have the same or 
similar duties and rank. An organization’s members are distinguished 
by their functions: doctor or nurse; student or teacher. Each of an 
organization’s roles has distinctive duties and freedoms, so aspirants 
educate themselves for the tasks to be assigned. Applicants are often 
required to pass a certifying exam, though not one so standardizing 
that it eliminates personal styles or idiosyncrasies. Cab drivers are often 
terrifying, though all have passed an exam. 
7id. Laws: Laws standardize practice without effacing distinctions 
introduced by lawyers or accountants speaking for their clients. 
Regularizing behavior doesn’t eliminate private interests. 
7ii. Socialization may have either of two aims: obliterate difference or 
manage it. There are societies of both sorts. Both tell us how to behave, 
what to suppress. Both relegate autonomy and idiosyncrasy to three 
places: iia. inclinations; iib. the choice of vocations; and iic. an altered 
perception of sociality.
7iia. Inclinations: We want and like different things. Every economy 
able to produce more than the rudiments of well-being responds by 
supplying a variety of goods and tastes: bread for those who want it, 
but butter and jam, too.
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7iib. Vocations: Vocations are often inherited; those chosen are 
expressions of inclination, opportunity, or need. Every vocation, 
whatever its origin, introduces us to a version of sociality that is 
focused by a practice, task, or aim. Each is distinguished by its ways of 
binding agents doing the same or complementary work: parents to one 
another and their children; buyers to sellers. Every such relationship 
is a collaboration; each requires give-and-take to succeed because 
partnership in complementary roles is a negotiation. But cooperation 
drains autonomy when participation is obligatory and terms are 
rigid. Agents who have little or no freedom to define their roles must, 
nevertheless, establish viable relations to partners in complementary 
roles. Think of teachers and their students, soldiers and their officers. 
The roles are determining, but there’s latitude for accommodation. 
7iic. An altered perception of sociality: Socialization is often construed as 
a homogenizing process: we acquire generic identity as fans, workers, or 
citizens. But there is a different way to understand us: neither generically 
nor by way of the organizing rules or roles that make us anonymous. 
Nodal causation is the critical difference. Episodic causes occur many 
times a day, some in predictable sequences, others randomly. Most are 
incidental to an agent’s identity: we close a door or turn off the lights. 
Causation of this other sort occurs, as noted in Chapter One, when many 
agents preside at once within assembled domains. Trees are nodal: each 
nurtures and defends things living within or around it. An ensemble 
of trees—a wood or copse—is an ecosystem in which each tree affects 
others while sovereign in its space. 
Human societies are more like forests than we imply when reducing 
their members to single agents or homogenized classes: Jack or Jill; men 
or women. Trees are rooted: each stands amidst a changing ensemble 
of others, or alone. Humans approximate these ensembles when each 
participates in associations or organizations distinguished by their aims 
or traditions. Think of these as alternate canopies, each having its style of 
affiliation, all posing specific constraints—rules and roles—on the tasks 
and freedoms of their participants. Each ensemble assigns some degree 
of freedom to its participants, but none—a saving grace—eliminates 
idiosyncrasies that distinguish agents from one another. Citizenship is 
usually more permissive than church membership; friendship is less 
constraining than a priesthood. Participating in several assemblies at 
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once, we alter our expectations and behavior accordingly: some are 
flexible; others demand responses that are prescribed and specific. Why 
are trees a cogent analogue in these variable circumstances? Because 
each affects others, while having latitude to secure and nourish itself.     
Personal differences intrude everywhere, though philosophy tells 
homogenizing stories. Mill’s On Liberty and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
define our dialectical extremes, one for the individualism that sets us 
apart, the other for the rationalism that makes us indistinguishable. 
Both are caricatures. Look for social texture, and you find diversities 
they obscure. Every person is a persistent source of effects that overlap 
those of other nodes. Together, they add dissonance but also variability 
and viability to the whole. This is true of particular undertakings, and 
of generational trends. Mapping a society from above, one sees centers 
of intense activity—families, businesses, or schools—distributed in low-
density savannahs. Look closer, and you see individuals active in ways 
that satisfy both themselves and their reciprocally related partners, 
not isolated persons or generic ciphers. Sameness from a distance is 
difference close up, because the sustaining activities are a function of 
motivation and individual skills.
Sociality construed nodally is liberating because it acknowledges that 
an ensemble’s constituents—its people and their relationships—vary in 
character, purpose, and effects. Their differences don’t incite hostility 
if tolerance and laws normalize social life. Activities once perceived 
as disruptive or inane are digested in the stabilizing flow of fruitful 
diversity. Hip hop isn’t grand opera; many people are indifferent to both. 
8. Collaboration, Cooperation, Command
Consider these three modes of sociality: i. people having common or 
complementary aims plan a way of achieving their aims; ii. they choose 
or inherit roles within that design; then iii. cooperate to achieve its aims. 
Having a specific role entitles people to command the work of partners 
who supply their information or resources; it obliges them to satisfy 
those who await successful completion of their tasks. There is also the 
benefit achieved when a society’s members respond to imperatives in 
the work of its thinkers and artists: they digest ideas or products with 
feeling or understanding sufficient to incorporate or reject them. 
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8i. Collaboration: “In the beginning,” said Locke, “when all the world 
was America,”12 one could go to a trackless wilderness and carve out a 
space in which to live without having to defend against the jealousies of 
people like those Hobbes described.13 But life would be hard. It’s easier 
when tasks are shared by specialists, each doing his or her part better 
than a single person doing all of it. Collaboration implies either or both 
of two activities: participants formulate a design that synchronizes the 
tasks or interests responsible for completing a project, or they coordinate 
their work while doing the tasks required to finish it. 
8ii. Cooperation implies the reciprocal accommodations of the people 
(or machines) performing a project’s tasks. Agents make themselves 
accessible to those from whom they take unfinished work, and intelligible 
to those to whom they pass it when their part is done.
Collaboration and cooperation are two aspects of the reciprocities 
essential to the formation and work of productive systems: families, 
schools, businesses, or states. Little of any complexity or social value is 
achieved without them; hence the pressure on individuals to participate, 
to conform. Glaring exceptions—cubist painting and Beethoven’s late 
quartets—are apparent, but they too are works created in the social 
dialectic of thinkers who elaborate their differences when provoked by 
history and their peers. 8iii. Command: Agency is confusing because of 
looking these two ways: it implies the autonomy of individual agents, 
while making them responsible for behavior that satisfies social norms. 
Am I entitled to a voice of my own, or am I an instrument responsible 
for sustaining Mead’s “generalized other”? Agency loses its personal 
force if every action is calibrated to whatever passes as social duty 
or momentum. We cherish the idea of freedom without realizing the 
exemption it promises from systems and regimes that suppress tastes, 
talents, and the social relations enabling their expression. Command is 
saved for dreams; we retreat because the insecurity we fear is closer at 
hand than the success of initiatives we imagine. 
Watch people going to work in the morning, then leaving at night. 
See them patient and sturdy, then exhausted and depressed. Some enjoy 
12  John Locke, The First and Second Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), p. 92. 
13  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 89. 
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their work, but many do not. Could we be more secure; better used; more 
autonomous; better able to fix vocations for ourselves? Is there no way 
to reduce self-alienation in the regimented societies where self-identity 
is mostly social identity? Could there be incremental changes that make 
economic and social organization responsive to individual initiatives? 
Rather than dread the time when technology reduces opportunities for 
human employment, let’s encourage the progress, already centuries 
old, that liberates workers from dismal jobs. Give substance and status 
to autonomy; relieve the stress of work by discovering, educating, 
and exploiting talents. Societies transformed by art or thought would 
sometimes feel anarchic: people going every which way. But there 
would be less anger, less despair, fewer people feeling that no one cares 
who they are or what they’re worth. 
9. Cities
Generic talk of men or women, workers or management obscures 
their identities by effacing significant differences. Homogenization is 
hard to resist because generic abstraction is easy, and because it’s often 
appropriate: a subway’s many riders are mostly faceless; destinations 
are different, but all need an efficient service. There are three versions 
of urban socialization. Two are apparent in cities where gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft are competing modes of social organization.14 A third style 
maximizes autonomy. 
Gemeinschaft—community—implies the intimacy of people bound 
by beliefs and practices focused by religion, vocation, or shared pride 
in a team. Tribal meanings inform participants who recognize and defer 
to one another; all find solace with those who understand the world 
as they do. Gesellschaft signifies rationalized systems where efficient 
housing, transportation, and bureaucracy bind workers to their jobs. 
Efficient services supply basic needs, but anomie saves residents from 
obligations to unrecognized neighbors. Anonymity reinforces privacy; 
it makes interiority a principal resource. Yet gesellschaft reduces the 
motivating force of interiority: sensibility is devalued because it’s not 
14  Ferdinand Tonnies, “On Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: Conclusions and Outlooks,” 
Perspectives on Urban Society: Preindustrial to Postindustrial, ed. Efren N. Padilla 
(Boston: Pearson, 2006), pp. 92–99.  
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easily monetized or managed, and because it has no social cachet to 
people who shun its cultivation. 
Urban attitudes look these several ways: to rationalized neighborhoods 
and services; to ethnic communities that preserve traditional beliefs and 
practices; and to the vocational communities of musicians, dancers, 
writers, or artists. Georg Simmel stressed the interiority of residents 
who enjoy cities where the conditions for work, transportation, housing, 
food, health, education, and governance are rationalized. But his 
“metropolitan man” goes everywhere to listen or gawk.15 His motives are 
expressed sotto voce: forgive us if we enjoy all that is quaint nearby. These 
sophisticates are consumers; they live in towns where critical functions 
are reorganized on efficient principles, but they enjoy difference, and 
imagine that paying for lunch helps to sustain it. Their cities have 
trajectories like that of Jane Jacobs’ neighborhood in New York’s West 
Village as it passed from neighborly community to urban efficiency. She 
lamented the loss of low buildings and local streets, but her perspective 
was transitional: relations to her neighbors were business like; all were 
committed to defending their turf from threatening intruders. Frequent 
reference to “eyes on the street”16 was less a profession of community 
than fear that their neighborhood would be violated. 
Louis Wirth described a deeper interiority where vocations are 
enabled by the efficiencies of technology and professional services:17 
we sacrifice the warmth of family doctors if local medical practice is 
competent and reliable. Effects magnify when cultivated professionals 
enrich schools, concert halls, and galleries by supporting artists who have 
come to their cities for jobs, training, or excitement. This is socialization 
of a singular kind: go where others challenge you to learn what art can 
be, while you write or paint in ways of your own. Artist communities 
are the unplanned genius of city density: members cultivate their skills 
under the direction of teachers and fellow workers, while propagating 
creative spaces of varying sizes and intensities. Communities assemble 
spontaneously in neighborhoods where rents are cheap, and cafes want 
the trade of artists who challenge one another while exchanging ideas. 
15  Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” Perspectives on Urban Society, pp. 
134–44.
16  Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage, 1992), 
p. 56.
17  Louis Wirth “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” Perspectives on Urban Society, pp. 134–44.
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There are academies where training is sustained and formal, but also 
schools where experience is the teacher. International finance is one 
of those; its complexity requires bankers, lawyers, and accountants 
who perfect their skills while working with one another. These many 
centers—of business, invention, ballet, or sport—justify the crazed title 
of Rem Koolhaas’s early book, Delirious New York: delirious because of its 
energy, diversity, and unpredictability.18 
Most of city life is ordinary rather than distinguished. It isn’t usually 
inventive or intense: predictability and safety require that it be so. Yet 
the steady pursuit of everyday life is not ordinary or uniform: people 
trained to satisfy social norms distinguish themselves in small ways. 
Personality shows because one dresses a little differently, or one does 
his work with a distinctive twist. Some train drivers on the New York 
subway pull smoothly into stations; others lurch. Is that intentional, or 
the effect of poor control? One isn’t sure, though standing passengers 
stretched forward and back know the difference. For nothing is 
regularized to the degree that effective instruction and command 
would have it; we don’t learn the abstract standards, or we resist 
them in the name of idiosyncrasy. Military discipline often crushes 
personality, though some armies encourage it, because battlefields 
aren’t training exercises: initiative is required when situations aren’t 
predictable. City dwellers are adaptable because city life isn’t always 
routine. You shake yourself when something irregular happens; you 
stop to help or walk away.
The third style of urban socialization is here in the distinctive array 
of one’s interests and duties. Residents are socialized by having to 
make choices of their own for work, housing, or friends. People living 
in smaller communities fear the homogenization of city life; they 
see mass transit and traffic jams, they feel the energy, but dislike the 
mutual indifference. Confused by residents who choose new tasks or 
duties when overburdened already, they see excess where residents see 
opportunity. The city churns; and every resident endures episodes or 
conditions he or she dislikes. But residents experience and experiment 
with local diversities. All have tastes, inclinations, and an acquired 
personal rhythm: how much can one tolerate; what does one enjoy? 
18  See Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York (New York: Monacelli, 1997).
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10. Disequilibrium
Imagine a situation in which two conditions are satisfied: every 
person discovers and cultivates a talent before taking a job that exploits 
it. Better still, each functioning adult has a space in which to enjoy his 
or her talents while having a vocation that is socially useful or, at worst, 
innocuous. All resemble the autonomous medieval goldsmiths about 
whom Marx fantasized.
These conditions are ideal. In biology, they would be sufficient for 
life-sustaining health; here in human experience, these are conditions 
for psychological and social health. Distributive justice requires that 
equilibrium—talents educated and enjoyed—is a condition achieved by 
all a society’s members. This is an unrealizable aim, though justified 
because we need an ideal: we can’t fix a broken arm without considering 
the shape of those intact. Equilibrium implies that several personal 
conditions are satisfied: we educate talents whose exercise gives 
pleasure to the agent, while earning a decent standard of living and the 
respect of others. The athlete is paid by his team while working with 
mates who value his play; the lone artist has the respect and financial 
support of people who value her work. Complexities ramify, usually to 
the disadvantage of equilibrium, so we ignore them in order to sketch 
and justify the ideal.
Imagine being secure in a job that exploits a highly developed 
skill. One has financial and institutional support for work that is 
socially popular (sport) or tolerated (humanities professor). There is 
no gap between a preferred activity and one’s job. Work is sometimes 
frustrating, but persistence and skill eventually succeed. Compare the 
disorientation of people who cannot say what they do, except to tell 
where they report about matters whose significance eludes them. They 
are paid; efficiency may have earned them promotions. Yet it isn’t clear 
to them that their product or activity serves more than a rhetorical or 
cosmetic aim. Wanting something visibly worthwhile, they find it in 
themselves, not because of a deeper insight into ultimate values, rather 
because a productive talent has weight that’s absent in job titles and 
made-up vocations. Marx was succinct: we want work that exploits a 
talent we enjoy using; control of the work we do; credit for doing it; and 
financial support that enables us to continue using the skill while caring 
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for those for whom we’re responsible. These satisfactions are mostly 
private; few are sources of great wealth, though securely employed 
carpenters, gardeners, or violists are admirably placed. Why? Because 
they discovered and refined a talent, and because they’ve escaped lives 
of frustration appeased by distractions.
Equilibrium is therapeutic; it resolves the tension created when people 
are confused because of wanting self-expression in circumstances that 
reduce them to jobs, debts, or responsibilities they can’t ignore. Yet this 
characterization may seem false; people of all ages want affiliation and 
recognition in styles approved by their cultures or societies; the benefits 
lavished on others are rewards they want for themselves. Unrealized 
talents occasion no regret when people like their jobs, clients, and 
fellow workers: an unsuspected skill for speaking Dutch has no cachet 
in a society where no one else speaks it. Promotion, respect, a steady 
income: these are rewards with immediate satisfactions. Do these effects 
compensate for the failure to plumb some part of oneself? They are a 
compensation, if one doesn’t realize having talents whose cultivation 
would be transforming.
Why does equilibrium seem alien? Because achieving it is an accident 
in circumstances never designed for personal advantage; only a small 
fraction of adults do what they want to be doing, given their talents or 
skills. Why aren’t more people favored? Because society is a machine 
organized to defend and sustain the majority of its citizens in ways 
that promote the stability of its government, economy, resources, and 
bureaucracy. Are most adults beset by duties that can’t be foresworn 
short of bankruptcy, child desertion, or divorce? Why be surprised that 
deep gratification eludes us or that we persist as health allows, hoping 
all the while that our children may do better?
Disequilibrium has several causes. Population density, primitive 
social services, oligarchy, prejudice, and economic organization are 
slow to relent. Freedom to is sometimes lauded as the most desirable 
power of all. Though modes of production and conceptions of well-
being require forms of organization that largely preclude the discovery 
or cultivation of personal talents. We see ourselves as workers of a kind 
having effects of a kind; we’re appraised for work we do, not for work 
we might have done if significant talents had been discerned, educated, 
and used. Many factors—industrial organization, labor unions, media, 
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and marketing—consolidate these emphases, though there are other 
ways of perceiving who we are, and what we might do for ourselves 
and one another.
Is there a plausible way to reconstrue ourselves and our circumstances? 
The analogy proposed above may be liberating. Construe human 
societies on analogy to forests: each tree matures under the protection 
of the forest canopy, while providing cover for life within, around, 
and under it. See human autonomy as intrinsic and inalienable, while 
acknowledging that there is no effective autonomy without social rules, 
roles, vocations, and resources. We can’t be autonomous apart from 
societies that nourish, protect, educate, and employ us. Established 
ideas reject this middle ground: we are generic ciphers intelligible to 
employers, marketers, and ourselves by way of the work we do or things 
we buy.
Change will be conceptual before it’s material: we won’t honor 
ourselves or one another until we integrate this schizoid perception so 
both parts can breathe. Each of us knows him- or herself as a singular mix 
of thoughts and feelings, aims, and anxieties; but also as a person having 
generic roles and duties. How do we join incongruent identities without 
distortion? How can I be perceived as a node in a social ecosystem, 
perceived by others and myself as both autonomous and responsible to 
people or things dependent on me? This will be slow to happen because 
each person’s access to desirable material goods depends on a narrow 
vocational focus: doing this, whatever it be, to get what the agent and 
family or friends need or desire.
There is also a conceptual failure, one having a long history. We 
emphasize freedom from but say too little of the factors or influences from 
which we want relief; we say even less about freedom to, its preparation 
and aims. The Enlightenment sought liberation from dogma and 
authority, both religious and royal. Having achieved these objectives, it 
left the choice of one’s aims to personal discretion. Why this tolerance? 
Because democracy came to have an extended meaning. No longer 
restricted to a notion of sovereignty—government by the people—it 
became a generalized permission: let everyone decide his or her aims 
and means, given respect for laws that serve the public interest. Nothing 
in this formulation urges a more careful consideration of who we are or 
what we need. Those are issues safely ignored when we skip forward 
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several centuries to an economy that dazzles us with goods and services 
that were once unimaginable. Can we alter this point of view if we 
suppress its frustrations? That’s not likely when conditions for change 
are so much weaker than the constraints and inducements holding us 
in place.
Chapter Four:  
Autonomy
1. Minerva
A feral cat loiters at my open garden door. Living in the rough has 
made her canny; she knows the neighborhood and its opportunities. 
She hunts alone, she prowls. Like us, she sees her prospects through 
a conditioned lens: food, where it is, how to get it. Minerva has never 
been inside this house, but provoke her with a smell, look away, and 
she’ll bound inside. These are conditioned responses: DNA honed by 
experience. But consider any first entry into a house she doesn’t know. 
No established practice explains it because there is no habit specific to 
this house: she hasn’t been here before. Just now, she lingers outside, 
moving a little in response to every motion of mine, awaiting a move 
that would override her natural prudence. Seeing food or smelling it, 
seeing the doorway clear, she would enter.
Would that express a decision? No less than my decision to enter a 
provocative door. Would it be an act of will? It would in this respect: 
conditioning has shaped her response to opportunity, but she doesn’t 
chance entering unless a signal provokes her. Having that sign—my 
distance from the door—she would strike. Where is freedom? In her 
flexible power for responding to me and the door. No, you say, she 
doesn’t decide; she isn’t free; she responds to every stimulus with trip-
wire efficiency. But this is a reply from the old behaviorism: we too react 
quickly sometimes, expressing a decision by way of an action. Describing 
ourselves in this way would ignore cognitive and volitional faculties for 
which there is abundant fMRI data. Is there equivalent evidence that 
© David Weissman, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0197.04
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cats deliberate when provoked; do they reflect and decide? Not with our 
complexity, but they are canny. 
This one reconnoiters for minutes, circling left and right. Will I 
interfere? Not sure of my response, she waits. When I move, she bolts. 
The calculation is hers; the action is her response to an altered situation. 
Why call it less than free? Because she’s a cat? That underestimates her; 
it flatters us.
2. Semantics
Autonomy is ambiguous because of its core meaning. There are 
three ways to construe it: having power to decide what is done, how, 
and why. Each implies some degree of control. Having that power is 
a condition we often satisfy—calling a friend, making lunch; hence 
the persuasion that one is often autonomous in all three ways. That 
impression dissipates with the realization that control is attenuated by 
limits on resources, opportunities, and the array of aims that are viable 
and socially approved. 
3. Assertion
Autonomy at its core is always personal and private. Intelligence is 
conspicuous in the work it does—its expressions are often available to 
public view—but one sees a finished product, not its genesis. Sensibility 
is disguised or concealed, but everywhere relevant to the history, habits, 
context, and tastes of the person engaged. Does everyone at a family 
gathering have the same feelings and opinions as every other? Are their 
differences exposed? Surely not. Would they be neutrally perceived if 
expressed? No to that as well. Yet autonomy wants resistance. Apparent 
success is misleading when it seems effortless: too easy, we say. Add 
that we lose passion if nothing opposes us. This is autonomy in its other 
dimension: more than a condition having ontological implications—
exemption to some degree from determination by conditions distinct 
from oneself—autonomy is a psychological demand, one whose 
intensity varies with personality. Its measure is a continuum with social 
comfort at one extreme and the force and challenge of Nietzschean will 
at the other. Comfort implies safety, acceptance, and whatever benefits 
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derive from hewing to established practices. Challenge implies risk and 
the intensified clarity that comes with making careful decisions quickly.
These two are principal markers of the purpose that is agency’s keel. 
Every living thing is self-regulating, an aim augmented in humans 
by the desire to wrest some degree of control and direction from the 
homogenizing effects of nature and socialization: how do I emerge 
from the crowd if only to declare myself? Ideally, one sets and sustains 
a path of one’s own; but circumstances often divert us. Life is the trace 
of successive recoveries: control reaffirmed after one or more lapses. 
Or opportunities and resources oblige us to make tolerable bargains 
for others or ourselves. Resolutions of both sorts express the insistent 
demand for personal control. Imagine the torture of people permitted no 
degree of autonomy, then the blame and anger they turn on themselves. 
Social policy from Locke to Rousseau, Kant, Mill, and Dewey is thought’s 
healing response: each a way to make space for oneself. 
Autonomy expresses itself in thought, sensibility, and action. All 
are socialized, though socialization can’t ablate thought or sensibility 
because its means are inefficient—the “generalized other” can’t think or 
feel for me—and because individuals resist the uniformities it prescribes. 
Socialization reduces discord by bending us to common practices, but 
we resist crude uniformity. Dresses vary because women don’t believe 
that one style or color flatters all. Punishment has to be severe if people 
are to accept a regime that limits their powers. Rebellion is a moral or 
political response to repression, but also the will and animal spirits of 
people who won’t be caged. 
Purpose resembles uniform rectilinear motion, in the respect that 
intention, action, and cause are agency’s signature properties. The 
impulse is largely physiological, though encouraged or repressed by 
societies that sanction a range of acceptable aims. Its persistent strength 
is a measure of the force or reward required to satisfy or suppress it, 
though intensity isn’t always apparent because we’re easily distracted 
by status or material goods. One way of naming social pathologies lists 
the ways of suppressing autonomy by diverting purpose. 
Action’s social control has several expressions. Some are benign: geese 
in flight are self-propelled; geese in formation are socially constrained. 
Crowd control is another example: people move left or right because 
directed: we go as ordered. Other versions resemble herding but differ in 
122 Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will
the degree of latitude reserved to traffic agents. Their laws constrain the 
choice of vehicles (cars, not horse carts), without specifying the make 
of one’s car or its destination. Grammarians require that poets know 
syntax, rhythm, and an inventory of words, all of it restricting though 
the poem is one’s own. These are material, social limits on autonomy 
when a driver’s fantasy and a poet’s control of her thoughts and feelings 
are their contrary. Mill’s On Liberty speaks for the artist’s residual power 
to romantics who conflate initiative and self-control with unqualified 
freedom. Yet every child grows to maturity in a society and culture 
where skills are acquired in local pursuits. Cricket stars are rare in Japan 
because the game is isn’t much played there. 
Socialization enables collaboration: it exploits our differences and the 
autonomy they enable as we work together to produce complex effects. 
This is socialized autonomy; it has graded expressions. Consumers 
express their identity and independence by the things they buy or places 
they go. Control is sporadic; there may be little direction to impulses that 
come in no predictable order. Self-regulation is more demanding when 
single-minded careers never deviate from vectors established in work or 
school. Though we resist: we try to set a pace and direction of our own 
in contexts we don’t fully control. A job is taken or lost, one is pregnant 
without intending it; but there is autonomy in the ways that episodes are 
construed, coupled, and exploited. Who is fully autonomous? Ragged 
artists, unpublished authors, street musician playing their songs. The 
rest of us are compromised to some degree. 
4. Self-Identification
Choosing or declaring one’s identity would seem to be one of 
autonomy’s inalienable powers. Given the city, religion, or school of my 
loyalty, am I also empowered to decide who I am? The question is vexed 
because the basis for personal identity is contentious. Is it established 
by an array of contingencies—address, body-type, memories—or 
by the idea and feeling that I know who I am? Do I sometimes check 
the contingencies to confirm the accuracy of that self-perception? For 
people sometimes feel that the body they inhabit is false to who or what 
they are. Is identity fluid and changeable, adjustable or revisable as one 
chooses? These issues are often decided by sociality and convention: 
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we are as others see us when certain traits are thought to be definitive. 
Though there are surges of anarchy when people affirm an identity 
they’ve chosen. 
Is there a truth to the matter, or is identity a choice or aspiration? How 
tall is she? There’s one answer for a measurement in bare feet, another in 
heels. Why is one measure determining, when both are actual readings? 
Because we have a practical commitment to nature unadorned: male or 
female, appearance or reality. People falling between these camps for 
reasons of mixed parentage or biology are denied the comfort of rigid 
designation and words signifying their differences. What are they to do? 
Suffer ambiguity or invent language that signifies emergent identities. 
Confusion resolves if we acknowledge that personal identity has 
several elements: one part is material; another is social; a third is self-
declared; a fourth is aspirational. (The third and fourth conflate if the 
identity declared is the one desired.) Why should this matter if all are 
free to emphasize whichever element they prefer? It matters because 
of the discomfort aroused when the first and subsequent factors are 
decalibrated. Why are we bothered? Because consensus is comforting: 
we’re happier when hostility abates because all agree on the classification 
of types regarded as consequential: gender, race, or religion, for example. 
These are traditional social fault lines. Rigid expectations soften as 
some categories vaporize (because of intermarriage, for example). 
Let them go; let people choose partners and identities while old ideas 
molder quietly. Choices founded principally in transient enthusiasms 
may subside; they can be respectfully acknowledged while principal 
expectations fall back to stable differences. 
Let there be coherence in these two perspectives: my self-perception 
and—more difficult—my comfort with the idea others have of my 
identity. There will often be disagreement about one’s entitlements or 
moral posture, but people would be happier, less conflicted if they were 
perceived as they wish to be.
5. Collaboration/Contention
Most things we value require partners. For interdependence is the 
more accurate characterization of our lot; it qualifies the fantasy of being 
able to do all that we wish without companions. Choosing partners is 
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one of autonomy’s prerogatives, though committing to them limits one’s 
freedom of action. 
Collaboration is the sensitive middle ground where autonomy merges 
productively with socialization. There are many sites of attunement, 
all discovered by trial and error. We know some conditions for finding 
them: a corporate activity must have aims that are comprehensible 
and shared by participants; requisite skills must be coordinated by an 
efficient plan, then supported by appropriate resources and oversight. 
Collaboration works when participants who are skilled and mutually 
respectful know their aims and effects. They know when deviations 
are efficiently corrected; they’re gratified when effort is acknowledged. 
Singing in a chorus requires a trained voice and accommodation to 
others, hence the chagrin if a chorus member quacks like a duck in the 
middle of a song. 
People joined in pursuit of shared or complementary aims are Mill’s 
third region of liberty; their reciprocities structure the privacies Dewey 
described.1 More than things they do or make, those relations alter the 
participants. One is smarter for having to answer a partner’s questions, 
emotionally enlarged by having to consider his or her feelings. One needs 
only a single friend after the age of four or five to know that autonomy 
is qualified by caring for a friend while wanting his or her esteem. But 
this is true as well of one’s socialized aims. Descartes’ Passions of the 
Soul characterizes a thinker who always looks within for his bearings.2 
Compare the participants in Dewey’s privacies: they are centered while 
expressing personal attitudes that bind them to partners in undertakings 
they share. Parents amidst their families, team members in a game: all 
act autonomously when fulfilling their social commitments. Far from 
Cartesian isolation, this is resonant participation in communities one 
values, large or small. Collaboration is social glue: work is accomplished; 
people are transformed. Autonomy is compromised, in the respect that 
aims, information, and emotions—attachments—are altered. Will, too, 
may be subordinate to group aims—I do it because we do it—though 
conscience and self-regulation are a final defense against subordination. 
Socrates was exemplary: unable to defend either of the available options, 
1  John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Miami: Swallow, 1954), p. 15. 
2  See René Descartes, Passions of the Soul, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume 
1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 325–404.
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he would do neither: “[T]he other four went off to Salamis to arrest 
Leon, and I went home.”3
People vying for partners, resources, and opportunities are sure to 
provoke the resistance of competitors. There are two problems here, 
each with a partial solution: how to distribute resources in proportion 
to need; how to make opportunities visible to all when perspectives 
and interests differ. Add the competitive juices that excite competition, 
and the vanity that comes with success. Discord is one of autonomy’s 
principal effects. America celebrates freedom of choice and pursuit; 
discord and litigation are costs we’re slow to acknowledge. 
6. Regulation 
Regulation is distorted by the “no-harm” principle affirmed by 
Mill’s On Liberty.4 It seems benign in realms where agents have nearly 
infinite space to pursue their aims (the implication of Locke’s phrase: 
“when all the world was America”), though it’s naïve and reckless in 
cities where crowding, scarcity, and complexity make many private 
choices consequential for other people. What must be added if Mill’s 
formulation is to be viable in societies where people in close proximity 
adversely affect their neighbors without knowing it? Kant’s two-part 
answer emphasized inhibition and a principle: let everyone inhibit doing 
what all can’t do without subverting the possibility of that action; no one 
should steal because trust and cooperation would founder, chaos would 
ensue if all were to steal. He characterized this rule’s satisfaction as the 
supreme condition for social morality, but its actual purport is more 
spartanly utilitarian: this is the critical condition for practical coherence 
in a complex society. It requires that individuals be self-restraining 
when a thought experiment—universalization—shows that behavior 
of a kind (stealing) would sabotage productivity or communication if 
generalized. Though we invoke inhibition much more often than those 
times when a maxim is discarded because it can’t be universalized 
without contradiction: actions are inhibited (without this test) because 
their effects—violence, cruelty, or dishonesty—are plainly inimical to 
this or that person, or because there are better moral choices. 
3  Plato, Apology, 32d, p. 18.
4  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), p. 9.
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Autonomy is restrained in both these ways: inhibition and laws. 
Policy is canny when it chooses one or the other because of the problem 
to be solved. Inhibition is the choice of agents who foresee their likely 
effects; they prefer having the responsibility that goes with foresight 
and choice. Yet those defenses aren’t always sufficient: drivers need 
traffic laws because they often can’t see the complexity of the traffic 
through which they move. A visiting Martian might conclude that we 
can’t be trusted en masse to regulate ourselves individually. Though we 
do that unproblematically in most domains where societies require that 
behaviors such as dress or sexuality be routinized. Those are spaces 
where inhibition is control enough because of convention, personal 
discipline, and the fear of being ostracized. 
7. Oversight
There is no apparent way to release the talent and spontaneity of all a 
society’s members. Social complexity and our material needs guarantee 
that most people will remain cogs in an economic machine. Yet the 
interdependencies making us productive are altered by technology, 
social policy, and circumstantial changes in climate and resources. 
Clarity about our values gives us leverage when changes are made. 
Three such values are determining: i. control of one’s actions and effects; 
ii. freedom to enjoy the sensibility and skills that distinguish us; and iii. 
the coherence, productivity, and safety of our relations to one another. 
These values would be conspicuous in communities more like the trees 
in a copse or glen, but they are no less desirable in our hardscrabble 
industrial societies. 7i. Control of one’s actions and effects: Find ways to 
organize productive activity so that adults exploit their powers for 
self-regulation; anticipate and defend their resistance to overseers who 
ignore personal abilities and differences. Technology facilitates these 
aims by automating tasks that are arduous, boring, or demeaning; 
by distributing managerial authority to small affiliated bands of self-
organizing workers; and, when feasible, by enabling people to do their 
work from afar. Let people decide when and how to work, if they can 
quickly transmit what they’ve done to those needing to see it. Liberate 
workers from conditions that make them less productive by breaking up 
the routinized spaces where work is done. These are familiar solutions 
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to chronic problems.7ii. The discovery and expression of one’s sensibility 
and skills: Everyone has several or many talents, most of them unknown 
because there is no opportunity to discern them. How many potential 
musicians never learned to play an instrument because none were 
available? Expose children to opportunities, support them as they search 
for ways and means suitable to their abilities: know that everyone who 
speaks any language could have learned every other. Expose children 
to tasks and experiences that cultivate their tastes. Trust them when 
they respond to some things, never to all. Don’t assume that adults have 
outgrown their earlier enthusiasms. People too stiff and embarrassed 
to sing or dance may renew passions long forgotten. 7iii. The coherence, 
productivity, and safety of one’s relations to others: These are virtues that 
mustn’t be compromised by too scrupulous a regard for autonomy: we 
sacrifice some degree of self-control for these other values. But this is 
often a two-edged sword: lose yourself in regimented social bonds or 
retreat into an isolation that sucks one’s energy and self-regard. This is 
a puzzle created by our principal forms of employment: most of us can’t 
make ourselves financially secure without surrendering the autonomy 
we prize. Our industrial economies have run away with us; recovering 
control of them is a condition for having control of ourselves. But this 
isn’t news.
Where is oversight in this picture? It comes in two ordered 
thoughts: how do current economic and political organizations 
affect the lives of their worker/citizens; what would suit us better? 
These are the questions of every economic and political reformer 
since the eighteenth century. This book has a narrower focus: where 
agency implies freedom, what should count as stable expressions of 
autonomy? Three seem critical: discovery and cultivation of one’s 
principal talents and inclinations; ample chances to use one’s skills; 
and the opportunity to know and enjoy the collaborations of like-
minded people. Are these aims frustrated, sometimes strangled, by 
social and economic realities? Some people know these frustrations, 
and work to reduce them. It would be a good thing if everyone were 
mindful of the obstacles and committed to their reduction. But this 
implies social mobilization and action by people who are already busy 
and, in our time, not always unhappy. 
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8. In Itself, For Itself
One feels centered when activity is a personal choice unrestrained 
by rules or roles, though one may feel it, too, when satisfying a law’s 
requirements or a manager’s demands. How do we know that the sense 
of acting on one’s judgments and choices is an expression of personal 
autonomy, not the comfort experienced by satisfying laws, roles, or a 
superior’s approval? There isn’t a sure sign of the difference, though 
a reliable sign is the observation that family members, colleagues, 
friends, or neighbors have priorities and trajectories different from 
one’s own. Having made our choices, we go our separate ways. Yet 
autonomy—freedom to and from—is so avidly affirmed that people are 
convinced they have it when a closer look would show that our claims 
to freedom are often rhetorical. People who come to understand this are 
prey to political cynics. We want to save freedom from their suspicion 
that autonomy is a chimera, short of the heaven where On Liberty is the 
biblical text and duties to others are always limited and chosen.
Chapter Five:  
Moral Identity
Personal identity has several principal markers: the structure, look, 
and skills of one’s body; intelligence and sensibility in their several 
modes; purposes; and moral identity. Moral identity, absent free will, 
is the function of social roles and the accidents of one’s circumstances: 
the bills one pays. Acknowledge free will, and autonomy explodes: no 
longer the creature of my circumstances, I am responsible for roles I 
choose and for responses to situations I deplore. Kant worried that will 
is the only power one controls when intentions are thwarted by the 
complexity of the ambient world. But this is the burden of moral identity: 
each will shows itself as a distinct voice amidst the sea of contrary aims, 
inclinations, and deeds. Moral identity without free will is a mask one 
can’t shed; with it, the moral will is a force directing action. 
Moral postures drift over a range, with variations as frequent as the 
virtual points on a line. My concern is the difference made to this variety 
by free will, an issue complicated by the two perspectives from which 
it’s discerned: the self-perceiving subject and his or her observers. 
These perspectives are imperfectly aligned. Both see moral identity as 
it evolves, but their judgments may not cohere: observers formulate 
an idea of an agent’s behavior while inferring his or her intentions; the 
agent challenges their view with his own. Integrating memories of his 
motives and actions, he reconciles their effects with his values, telling a 
rounded story that excuses his faults. Subjects usually credit themselves 
with meaning well; observers aren’t so sure. 
We may suppose that moral identity is intrinsic, like height and 
weight, or that it’s assigned, like reputation. But neither is accurate. 
This chapter argues that we acquire it in four ways: i. by acting on 
behalf of one’s needs and interests; ii. by one’s choices and behavior 
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when duty-bound to others; iii. by choices and actions resulting from 
participation in a society’s tribal or public life; and iv. by an agent’s self-
appraisals. Which of the four dominates? How do they integrate and 
evolve over time? The chapter has four sections: one for each of these 
perspectives. The fourth reverts to the first: the perspective of agents 
assessing themselves while confused by moral ambiguity. 
1. Three Perspectives: Agents
Vulnerability makes us self-interested, but dependent on others 
for resources and conditions that make us secure. This dynamic has 
contrary tensions: self-interest can’t be altogether disentangled from 
one’s relations to partners and public concerns. Moral solutions are 
responsive to both, though the concerns of others sometimes oppose 
one’s own. 
1a. Moral will. Personal identity is established with a name, address, 
and (in the United States) a Social Security number. Self-interest, 
closer to one’s existential core, is a desire to live as needs, talents, or 
inclinations prescribe. Why call these interests moral? Because their 
expression is the authentic voice of the person having them, and because 
well-being is compromised when that voice is suppressed. Why is their 
expression a task for moral will? Because self-expression is, before any 
other function, will’s task. That role is disguised because personal traits 
and choices emerge in cross-currents where they encounter three other 
centers of moral gravity: the trajectories of other people, organizations, 
and established social practices. Agents’ responses to them are legible 
if they live in societies having well-established rules and practices: all 
of us observe the traffic code, but some cars are flashy and new; others 
are plain but serviceable. How much diversity is tolerable in a society 
that prizes coherence? There is an inclination to understand what 
other people want or do by seeing them in the context of standardizing 
rubrics. But what’s to be done if moral intelligibility founders for want 
of socially agreed styles or desires? 
Social confusion doesn’t confirm the moral value of laws or 
imperatives, though their absence is notable because anarchy is a likely 
result when agents are deprived of guidance. This is our quandary: 
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avoid incoherence, demand uniformity when moral ambiguity makes 
it likely that conceptions of self-interest will vary; or tolerate differences 
that defy rules or laws when circumstances and inclination provoke 
distinguishing responses. We’re generous when conceding that 
relationships vary; why not extend this freedom to individuals whose 
attitudes and practices vary from accepted norms while respecting 
Mill’s no-harm principle? For there is a middle ground: those who do 
no harm to others can safely be allowed to fulfill ideas of themselves, 
given our understanding that offense is not harm. Others need feel no 
right or obligation to impose their tastes or scruples on people having 
inclinations different from their own. These intruders may tell a story 
justifying their interference: it’s what their god requires. But this is a 
rationalizing excuse for their inclinations, however they’re explained or 
justified. For why, fear aside, should people tolerate those who hinder or 
abuse them if their actions are not harmful to others? 
Moral will, so construed, is the power directing one’s intentions so 
far as they express one’s interests, talents, and the rules establishing 
social coherence.  There is also this other understanding: it interprets 
moral will as an expression of self-identity and resistance. Often 
focused by vulnerability and grievance, it responds with anger or pride, 
given evidence that some personal aspect of race, gender, religion, or 
ethnicity isn’t acknowledged or respected. This is personal and moral 
identity as they pursue social recognition or esteem by way of political 
action. The coupling of diversity and democracy makes this demand 
justifiable and unavoidable, but my focus is different: it emphasizes 
moral will as the voice of agency. Grievance in the face of insult is one of 
its likely effects, but not its principal expression. That ground is agency: 
deliberation, choice, and action as they satisfy one’s interests or needs 
while expressing one’s intellect, sensibility, and duties.
1b. Judgment. Moral identity is a function of the judgments provoking 
choice and the will directing action. Declaring our needs, values, and 
reasons, we appraise our circumstances, choose our partners, and act. 
Judgment is quick if the cost of alternate choices is slight or if there are 
other choices to make and work to do; though responsibility is qualified 
when social values and interests supply convenient rubrics. Deliberation 
slows when choice is confounded by options that are mutually exclusive: 
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stealing is bad, caring for others is good; though Robin Hood’s moral 
standing was ambiguous because he did both. What is one to do if 
feelings of duty, guilt, or fear intensify because costs are considerable 
either way? Resolution comes with judgments that are safe because 
conventional, or with choices that promise bountiful effects though costs 
are high or unforeseeable. Both inclinations establish a moral profile: 
others safely predict what we’ll likely do, given that will is constrained 
by habit. Soft determinism acknowledges this developmental limit on 
choice without yielding to the harder version: judgment’s determining 
conditions form within the deliberating agent as he or she responds to 
evolving circumstances, not only to affects more ancient (DNA or social 
caste, for example).
Judge and judgment are two of those allusive mental action terms that 
are freely used but hard to substantialize: we often affirm or deny one or 
another aim or plan without knowing how mind/brain does it. Judgment 
seems unproblematic when events are sharply defined, emotion is plain, 
and social directives elide with personal norms. Though it often happens 
that reflection provokes conflicting emotions while exposing complexity 
in one’s interests or situation: the pity and terror expressing the moral 
conflicts and intellectual complexity of Greek tragedies are emblematic. 
Social practice eases resolution by supplying formulaic answers, but 
complexities multiply. Having few conventional rubrics but many 
problematic situations, each of us makes judgments that express his or 
her singular moral posture.1 
Moral posture is an agent’s cognitive-affective balance in its 
prescriptive, imperative mode: it develops over a lifetime of making and 
acting on one’s decisions, then appraising their effects. Yet history is not 
so determining that agents can’t deviate in ways confusing to observers: 
that happens because complexities evolve and because emotions change 
as we see and weigh them differently. Inclinations make us predictable, 
but insight is liberating. Altered gestalts impel altered judgments. 
Hume declared that reason is and ought to be a slave to the passions.2 
He ignored judgment’s context: the understandings (accurate or not) 
that provoke and disrupt emotional responses. 
1  David Weissman, Hypothesis and the Spiral of Reflection (Albany: State University 
Press, 1989), pp. 187–89, 195–96.
2  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1978), p. 415.
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1c. Privacy. Which actions are authentically one’s own when so 
much we do is determined by context, rules, and roles? There are 
principally three possibilities. First is Descartes’ affirmation—I am, I 
exist—a discovery repeated in the second couplet of a John Lennon-Paul 
McCartney song:
Would you believe in a love at first sight?
Yes, I’m certain that it happens all the time.
What do you see when you turn out the light?
I can’t tell you, but I know it’s mine.3
What is the sense of “me again” accompanying every experience? 
Is it direct access to mind’s formative power when creating experience; 
or is this the experience of resonant sensibility (hearing music, feeling 
the wind)? Is one of these two the authentic test of selfhood? Or is there 
no direct measure because self-awareness is always compromised. 
For I only know myself when discerning the degree to which I satisfy 
pertinent rules or roles. This would entail that “It’s mine” is always 
socialized; I know of myself only what observers know of me.
Lennon, McCartney, or Sartre4 wouldn’t agree. Each would likely 
insist that he is never rightly perceived by others. They hear a voice 
or acknowledge his vocation when all should look past the message 
when listening for the messenger. But what could that mean: are we 
looking for the existential core or the raw, unschooled sensibility? The 
core isn’t observable to third parties; even the person conscious of him- 
or herself can only say “me” or “me, again.” Are we nevertheless close 
to the existential truth if we imagine a person remade by a different 
education and circumstances, as if his or her untutored sensibility 
might be identified when abstracted from its historically contingent 
formations? The verificationist dilemma is here: what could we know of 
capacities and inclinations that would have emerged had education or 
opportunities been different? We turn away from innate capacities out of 
regard for the only evidence we have: namely, observable achievements. 
Presented with unschooled children, teachers make the plausible 
3  John Lennon, Paul McCartney, The Beatles, “With a little help from my friends,” Sgt. 
Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, Capitol Records, June, 1967, © Northern Songs Ltd, 
England. 
4  Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Citadel, 
2001), pp. 52–53.
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assumption that education will transform them as surely as water boils 
when heated. This becomes a strategy and doctrine: knowing little or 
nothing of our children’s unformed talents, we defer to education’s likely 
effects. Ignoring innate variations, hence the distinctive private spaces 
they condition, we forsake the idea that we educate raw capacities. 
Opportunity and motivation may expose talents that education ignored, 
but most students will never know what they might have done or been.
Our narrow focus seems reasonable because teachers don’t have 
access to student talents, apart from practices that hone student skills. 
But this is a narrow window, one responsible for our cramped perception 
of human nature, achievement, and satisfaction: we see what’s done, 
hence the skill for doing it, not what could have been done. We teach the 
average skills appropriate to effective social and economic roles; we’re 
careless with people having skills or imagination out of scale. People 
who could do more are suppressed or marked as troublemakers. They 
fight back or struggle, then capitulate. We say little about a student’s 
nature because nurture is the only way to reveal it. Closer analyses of 
DNA may fill this gap when its structure is correlated to practice and 
behavior, though our emphasis on conformity provokes a question we 
can’t answer: is deficient behavior evidence of insufficient capacity, poor 
training, or resistance?
Agency, properly extended, would signify unknown wells of capacity 
in the undifferentiated many. It would acknowledge people frustrated; 
those who believe that something of worth in themselves is unexplored. 
Why honor or nourish an unknown; why extend the idea of agency 
to acknowledge inferred powers unless circumstances are propitious 
to their cultivation and use? Our habitual response is careless; most 
cultures ignore the intelligence of women without acknowledging that 
anything valuable is lost. It’s easier to suppose that the uneducated 
are uneducable. But two costs subvert us while unacknowledged: the 
loss of useful skills, and the frustration of people who feel unfulfilled 
or cheated. Privacy is a sanctuary, but also a trap, a place to which 
one comfortably withdraws, unless it’s a site of grievance. People 
perpetually denied the opportunity to express themselves are rankled 
by disappointment, however well disguised. This is costly: calculate all 
that’s lost when fractions of a population are furious or demoralized 
when their talents are ignored. 
 135Chapter Five: Moral Identity 
1d. Idiosyncrasy. Kant assumed the affinity and good will of people 
who share values and circumstances; his imperative would reduce 
conflict among agents who may provoke it merely because of complexity, 
confusion, or competition for scarce resources or opportunities. But those 
are not the limits of our differences. How are agents to be cut from the 
same moral cloth when each has a character developed from a specific 
history, an intellect formed by certain challenges, and a sensibility 
cultivated in disparate cultures or domains? Why be surprised, given 
resources that qualify us for judgment, action, and reflection, that we are 
morally variable while satisfying society’s common tasks or loyalties? 
Why suppose that people who vary in either way will apply the 
categorical imperative with the same results? Is lying always the same 
violation; does it imply the same community-destroying effect if you 
construe it as purposively spreading misinformation, while I regard it 
as strategic subterfuge? Kant was aware that personal desires and moral 
perspectives diverge; his imperative would make them cohere without 
violence. The imperative needn’t be applied in ways that suppress 
variety because difference—wear clothes that suit you—doesn’t always 
provoke conflict. It doesn’t suffocate personal and situational differences 
until construed as the demand for a framework of universalizing rules. 
Never be late, no disloyalty, worship no other god; let everyone show 
his or her commitment to the local community by respecting its rules. 
This is good sense when the rules are traffic laws, though Kantian 
uniformities violate moral sense in other circumstances. Don’t feed this 
child, until everyone in your situation could feed whom? This child, 
some comparable child, or all children? 
Is there a common ground for morality when we abstract from the 
idiosyncrasies of people or their situations? Kant ignored variability 
and ambiguity by supposing that moral identity has a simple condition: 
wills are true to a rational standard—consistency universalized—if they 
satisfy the categorical imperative. Morality of this sort resembles a pure 
note, low-D or high-C, rather than an octave located somewhere on the 
scale between them. Why so many notes? Because moral identity is fluid 
as we move in and out of complex situations where significant aims and 
virtues conflict: choices have good effects while motives are confused 
and information is imperfect, or we’re clear headed and well informed 
though satisfaction of one value requires betraying another. Societies 
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cohere morally because participants agree about the values and aims 
appropriate to everyday affairs, not because all have the same response 
to situations perceived differently. 
What is the least society requires of me as I make decisions appropriate 
to my aims? Kant’s aim was a rule that inhibits choices and actions sure to 
sabotage the possibility of community, hence the freedom of individuals 
otherwise going their separate ways. Coffee or tea? Your choice because 
neither threatens community. His standard—adherence to a principle 
that would inhibit community-subverting choices—isn’t cogent if 
action is to be efficacious in two domains that don’t always cohere: the 
community where cooperation makes us productive and rules mitigate 
conflict, versus the private lives of that society’s participants. 
A law requires that one stop at red lights. Every Kantian would 
observe it, but what should a man do when driving his pregnant wife 
to the hospital moments before she delivers? Private interests are often 
threatened by universal laws; does a logical standard (consistency) 
override individual welfare, especially when inconsistency (violation 
of a universal) is the only cost? What good does the universal serve if 
not the distributed well-being of those it covers. If the driver collides 
with other cars when going through a red light, we have a disaster that 
focuses a moral dilemma; but if not, we have a logical conflict—the 
universal and its exception—misdiagnosed as a moral conflict. Does 
this imply that individual, situational choices always trump social/
moral universals? No, it affirms that universals have no moral authority 
apart from the instrumental value achieved by promoting stability and 
reliability when individuals negotiate social complexity at minimal cost 
to themselves, their partners, and neighbors.
This pragmatic test is sensitive to the variability of people, their 
capacities, situations, and attitudes. Violinists play together in a section 
that sounds as one when its virtuoso yields a little to the slower speed 
and articulation of his partners. Theirs is a difference of skill; moral 
variations have different conditions. Their bases are the coupled 
faculties—principally intellect, sensibility, and self-control—responsible 
for the moral identity acquired as we choose and act. Intellect 
discriminates and integrates; sensibility is feeling and taste, a cultivated 
power for perception and delight that responds as quickly to people, 
sport, or circumstances as to ideas, music, or food. Where all see or hear, 
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it is sensibility that explains what we look for and enjoy. Self-control 
is founded in habits and attitudes that routinize thought and will as 
they respond to ordinary tasks and circumstances. This is character, our 
stabilizer. 
Acknowledge this range of powers for discriminating one’s interests, 
feelings, needs, and aims, then consider the diversity of roles and rules, 
partners and circumstances where these powers are brought to bear: 
why is it plausible that this diversity of motives and circumstances 
should yield to Kant’s simple rule? Isn’t it too simple when everyday life 
requires the coordination of two sometimes conflicted aims: maximize 
social stability, while facilitating individual choice and well-being? Kant 
deferred to his rational ideal—universality and consistency—though his 
standard is crippled by contrary aims (save the young or save the old 
when you can’t save both) and by social interests at cross-purposes with 
individual needs and abilities. He rightly feared personal choices that 
sabotage the possibility of choices that are coherent when generalized, 
but societies are not defenseless: people know and discount their liars; 
banks raise interest rates to cover losses from borrowers who renege on 
their loans. 
Moral identity is the product of an unstable coupling: it emerges 
when personal idiosyncrasies are formed by roles, reciprocities, and 
vocations while disciplined by laws and traditions. A singer’s talent 
is formed by her teachers, then by her parts and partners. She learns 
scruples appropriate to rehearsals, performances, and critics. We might 
describe her ascent to universality with Hegel, but that would lose all 
the detail of her history: how could she sing any role without drawing 
on the particularity of moral intuitions acquired as a maturing woman 
in a culture that biases experience in ways peculiar to itself? Yet there 
are also countervailing, stylized, and generic forces. For much we do is 
learned, when established structures or traditions limit our choices. We 
speak our parents’ language, learn their virtues, and think largely as 
they did. Accessible vocations are those of one’s society, so one’s job is 
likely a variant of those common or familiar to one’s neighbors.
Roles one acquires entail a moral posture for which practitioners 
are responsible: being a lawyer, nurse, or lifeguard carries moral and 
legal duties specific to these roles. Does this imply that the impression 
of personal choice is an illusion? This isn’t the whole burden of 
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responsibility because every such duty is less than the weight of moral 
identity. Josef Mengele was doubly culpable: because he violated 
his oath as a doctor, and because conscience didn’t countermand his 
sadism. Moral identity is the inhibiting force that intercedes when roles 
or circumstances encourage behavior averse or abhorrent to morality. 
1e. Constraints. Rules, laws, or vocation give us social standing, 
hence some degree of respect, while disguising the anxiety—shared by 
all—that deference to rules is prudent because we are vulnerable and 
all the more fragile because competitive. We learn these two constraints: 
give everyone his or her due; live and let live. Collaborate when 
doing so is mutually useful; find viable bases for cooperation when 
interdependence is acknowledged. Are there discrepancies in nature 
or society that embellish some while degrading others? Rebalance life’s 
chances if the answer is yes. Finding causes but no justifications for 
these differences, finding them sustained by embedded inequities, we 
challenge or correct them. 
This is moral identity of the second order, moral identity as it amends 
the unregulated effects of the morality governed by rules or roles. 
People accepting this responsibility justify the trust of their fellows, for 
this is the posture of those who participate in Rousseau’s general will: 
it wills the good for all. We acknowledge that others want well-being as 
much as ourselves, and that many won’t likely achieve it if we are not 
personally and collectively self-regulating. There is no guarantee that 
altered practice, personal or social, will not have other malign effects, but 
it is practical wisdom that deliberation and experiment are conditions 
for altering the unintended effects of personal or social behavior. This 
is the morality of creatures whose lives are managed by their powers of 
self-control, not merely by whim, accident, or the unforeseen effects of 
complexity and conflict.
The morality described here has three constituents and an override. 
Inclinations are the point of reference: what do I want to do or be? 
How do I go about doing or being it? Next are my roles, their tasks 
and duties. Third are the practices, rules, and laws that constrain social 
relations. The override? Acquiring foresight; practicing inhibition. We 
modulate one of the three when its exercise distorts one or both of 
the other two: we relent, for example, when a partner’s vulnerability 
supersedes his or her role and duties. Which of the three is usually 
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determining? Ideally, there is balance among them: we are effectively 
socialized while distinctively ourselves. But this is smug when said, 
and easier said than done. 
1f. Interiority. Which duties are determining? Morality’s three social 
anchors (the relations of intimates, relations that are commercial/
vocational, or holistic) suppress autonomy in the name of affiliation, 
reciprocity, loyalty, efficacy, or safety. Resisting them makes one alien or 
an outlaw, yet individuality can’t form without psychic space. Nietzsche 
described its genesis in a passage quoted more fully above: 
Meanwhile the organizing ‘idea’ that is destined to rule keeps 
growing deep down—it begins to command; slowly it leads us back from 
side roads and wrong roads…it trains all subservient capacities before 
giving any hint of the dominant task, ‘goal’, ‘aim’, or ‘meaning’. 
Interiority is our sensitive core. Favored pursuits give it purpose; 
meanings and taste give it valence. Interests are common, though 
inclinations are personal: I’m at peace with myself when doing this 
well (whatever it be). “To thine own self be true” is advice from the 
center.
Where does interiority form? Farms or a town—Dewey in 
Vermont, Emerson in Massachusetts—are likely sites. Cities are 
oppressive to those who hate congestion, but they liberate initiative 
and experiment in people who prize anonymity. Urban complexity 
intensifies specialization and competition: one needs quick wit to 
discern opportunity, then education, connections, or money to seize it. 
Abilities are honed for specific tasks in law, finance, medicine, science, 
government, or education, but all who succeed are distinguished by 
intellectual and emotional autonomy. Communities of professionals 
are, in the best of circumstances, self-monitoring and self-correcting. 
Each of their commercial, industrial, or cultural spheres has a discipline 
where behavior is reliably safe and steady. But these vocations are loci 
of privilege and advantage, not the only sites where privacy resonates. 
No one escapes interiority, because human physiology guarantees 
it: everyone seeks a clear path through his or her near-world. Public 
policy is challenged because no social order of any scale does for all 
what cities do for some. 
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1g. Meaning. Personal identity is often fixed by the accidents of 
birth and one’s circumstances, though the array of identities available 
in principal cities is reminiscent of the masks and costumes offered in 
popup shops that open before Halloween: one chooses what to do or 
be from an array of personas. Trajectories that were once unimaginable 
are now familiar and tempting. But duties are askew, moral identity is 
unstable when core loyalties are misaligned. Before, character, church, 
and commerce assured that people would have habits and expectations 
likely to change slowly, if at all. Now, when irony or cynicism makes 
commitment less assured, we do what we’re afraid not to do, or we do 
it because it’s advantageous. Where commitment is shallow and willed, 
we use laws and inducements—money, status, or threats—to enforce it. 
What explains this shift from disputes about practical priorities—
pay the grocer before paying the electric bill—to seismic shifts of 
attitude regarding one’s obligations to families, work, the church, or 
state? A principal reason is that practical interests aren’t a sufficient 
basis for distinguishing the zones of moral concern. More than life-
preserving, each taste or affinity is also life-affirming, because infused 
with meanings that justify or explain one’s commitment. Why be loyal to 
this spouse or team? Because each positions the agent in a firmament of 
meanings. Loyalties would be unintelligible or unworthy without them. 
For meaning is one of the two ways we locate ourselves in the world: is 
this Jerusalem, Riyadh, or Rome; a city with a mayor and a street plan, 
or the place where human history acquired significance? Visitors from 
Mars need warning signs or maps; but there are no maps for people 
who have lost their faith. Where do they go when the signs of personal 
and moral identity have altered or lapsed? 
Meanings, like practical needs, color-code our circumstances: this, 
not that—apples, not stones, are edible; this, not that, is my child or 
church. Moral identity is an array of vectors illuminating the people, 
things, practices, or tasks we value. Their worth is often doubled: eating 
is a devotion, an opportunity for thanking our god for his beneficence: 
work, as in medicine, is the duty of care. But this balance—need or 
significance—is unstable. We dress for warmth and propriety, with 
or without regard for style. But fashion may be our over riding aim, 
so we’re careless about discretion and safety: she wobbles on six-inch 
heels. 
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2. Three Perspectives: Nodes
Nodes are steady sources of effects that create, sustain, or affect other 
things. Agency is nodal because human alliances make us dependent 
on one another, but also responsible to and for one another. Systems 
too are nodal: families, businesses, and states have consequences 
for constituents, others, and themselves. Socialized autonomy, zone 
morality, and tradition are three venues where nodality is morally 
consequential.
2a. Socialized autonomy. Morality is often construed in either or both of 
two ways: one makes regulation personal and private by pitting reason, 
judgment, or discretion against impulse or appetite; the other uses law 
and punishment as a guarantor of acceptable behavior when self-control 
isn’t reliable. These strategies have converging aims: subordinate desire 
for the sake of personal discipline and public order; enhance safety and 
productivity by regularizing individual actions and their effects. We 
justify our rigor by saying that people are often reckless. 
This, number twenty-two of Jonathan Edwards’ Resolutions, is a 
sample of attitudes that may have been common in 1723 when America 
was mostly a frontier:
Resolved, to endeavor to obtain for myself as much happiness, in 
the other world, as I possibly can, with all the power; might, vigor, and 
vehemence, yea violence, I am capable of, or can bring myself to exert, in 
any way that can be thought of.5
Self-love was familiar to Augustine, Descartes, and Spinoza. All 
affirmed it as a universal instinct, though Edwards reduced sensibility 
to grievance and self-assertion. This is autonomy unmoored from 
the reciprocal causal relations that sustain productive activity. They 
embody negative feedback: argue too forcibly and friends ask you to 
stop. Hence the equilibrium where interiority—deliberation, judgment, 
and choice—defends autonomy while acknowledging shared aims and 
one’s partners.
5  Jonathan Edwards, Resolutions: and Advice to Young Converts (Philipsburg: P and R 
Publishing, 2001), no. 22, p. 2. 
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The analogy of a previous chapter—woods or a copse—is useful here. 
Each tree has roots, trunk, and foliage. Each is physically autonomous 
and responsible for effects on things of the sphere it creates and sustains, 
but all owe some part of their well-being to the environment established 
by the ensemble. Extrapolate to people in social environments: 
individuals establish families, neighborhoods, businesses, or states that 
nest and overlap, creating environments where individuals are relatively 
autonomous while mutually sustaining. 
This contrariety—autonomous but mutually affecting—expresses 
off setting pressures. We know and hardly disguise our personal 
aims and frustrations, but all is discounted when familiar accounts of 
social activity emphasize standard responses to generic circumstances. 
Individuality is only numeric difference: we are young or old, buyers or 
sellers. Vocations, genders, and fads have a similar effect when invoked 
to classify us indiscriminately. This isn’t foolish if similarity is all that 
matters, though the effect is pernicious—idiosyncrasy loses relevance—
when individuals are stripped of all but generic agency: I am whatever 
marketing reports say of me. But is it true that my aims and values are 
only those of my kind?
We may blame that implication on laws and the conditions for social 
coherence, but they don’t, in themselves, justify this Procrustean bias. Laws 
that coordinate complex activities are essential facilitators; traffic laws, 
for example, separate moving cars for their mutual safety and efficiency. 
There are many such techniques for separating agents having an identical 
aim: different keys for the locks of different homes. Yet separation and 
safety, like traffic lights, are means, not ends. Every individual has an 
essential devotion to his or her well-being, but also tastes, inclinations, 
and signature ways of satisfying common aims. Each is a node from 
which multiple effects ensue, some intended, not all controlled. 
Trees in a wood are overlapped by the roots and canopies of their 
neighbors. Effects proliferate because reciprocity relates each node to 
some or many others. There are opportunities for doing as one likes, but 
sometimes the whole is a plenum where each space is confined by other 
spaces and their occupants. Late for an appointment, I stop a cab that 
stalls in traffic: autonomy languishes because qualified by events. No 
agent fully controls him- or herself, because all respond to circumstances 
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and other agents. Each has a trajectory; but all are encumbered by genes, 
history, aims, and circumstances. 
Psychic posture is the social product of these powers and constraints. 
It has character, attitudes, intellect, and sensibility, but its shape is 
elusive; like a rough surface, it reflects light in several directions at once. 
Steady when seen from one perspective, it has a different cast if one 
steps left or right. This variability is apparent in communities of every 
size, though most conspicuously in cities, because their complexity 
enables diverse choices while restricting autonomy. Each precinct is 
a complex of niches where choice is qualified by restrictions imposed 
by partners, neighbors, rules, laws, or local customs. Residents usually 
restrict themselves to the familiar streets of home and work, though local 
transport facilitates ventures into neighborhoods where they encounter 
people whose attitudes and expectations differ from their own. Nothing 
untoward usually happens because public encounters require behavior 
that is reliably benign throughout the city. Suppose, however, that a 
rider mistakenly leaves a bus or train at a stop different from his own. 
The neighborhood is unfamiliar, people are different. Uncertain that 
the attitudes and look of his local neighborhood are acceptable here, he 
treads carefully. If diffidence is a bad idea, swagger would be reckless. 
How do we bind disparate neighborhoods and tribes if one travels 
abroad merely by taking a city bus?
Is moral identity always local, so postures amicable in one precinct 
look belligerent when addressed to visitors from another? Several 
responses soften apprehension and avert conflict. One is repression or 
disguise in people who are careful not to betray their differences. Are 
they guarded out of respect for others; because difference is punished; 
or because one represses traits that elude social approval? Conflicts 
are sometimes provoked by the reasonable fear that opponents would 
deny us life or the means to live, but one may be prudent without being 
defensive or belligerent. Why not acknowledge that otherness is usually 
benign; grant what others need to live, then consider issues that still 
divide us? Many disputed interests assure that conflicts will be hard 
to solve or never solved, but this attitude would mitigate disputes 
if conscientiously practiced. It isn’t encouraged because of fear, and 
because we imagine that a first strike will devastate the other side. 
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Though usually it doesn’t, so conflict intensifies until we destroy one 
another. States and corporations do this to one another; people do it too.
Conflicts are envenomed by personalities whose self-esteem requires 
their control of others. There isn’t always redress for the worst of them, 
because their victims are intimidated or seduced. This too is socialization, 
though its pathologies are complementary: the autocrat needs 
deference; his admirers find courage and standing by identifying with 
their shameless guide. Their relationship is the inverse of agent-health. 
The autocrat’s psychic autonomy is often crippled; he’s desperate for 
admiration. His admirers want self-esteem but can’t achieve it without 
attaching themselves to one who sees evidence of his worth in their 
rapture. Compare contrarians or conscientious objectors; both reject the 
autocrat’s blandishments because they dislike thoughtless consensus. 
Contrarians reject views that may seem plausible, because they feel 
entrapped by collaboration. Conscientious objectors reject affiliation 
because they’re offended by ideas or practices that seem false or perverse. 
Neither can tolerate an autocrat’s wiles. Yet socialization is, quixotically, 
one of autonomy’s conditions: we’re free to be ourselves, doing whatever is 
distinctive about us, in the company of people with whom we collaborate. 
2b. Zone morality. Zone morality signifies moral interests and codes that 
apply in four domains. One is the zone of autonomous moral agents; the 
three other zones are morally consequential social relationships: systems 
that are core, vocational/commercial, or holistic (civil, statist, or tribal).6 
Each is a node, hence multiply consequential; every agent participates 
in zones of all four kinds. Core systems are families and friendships. 
Interactions are regular; members are mutually familiar. Roles are well-
defined but supple and diverse: one is a younger sister, parent, or friend. 
Transactional relationships—in stores, work, or school—are normalized 
by formalities specific to a task: student and teacher, customer and 
clerk. Each responds to the other in ways appropriate to his or her roles. 
The relationships of totalizing systems—states or religions—are more 
detached: there are civic, criminal, and commercial laws, religious rules 
and rituals. 
Every such relationship is moral by virtue of its fulfillment conditions: 
namely, the causal reciprocities that bind a relationship’s participants. 
6  See David Weissman, Zone Morality (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2014).
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These are systems that embody the two kinds of feedback: negative 
and positive. Negative feedback implies both a range of viability, and 
a response by one or more of a relationship’s members if that range is 
exceeded. So, buyers and sellers continue to do business while prices 
rise or fall within a range, though business is disrupted if prices exceed 
that range at either end: buyers stop buying if the price of goods exceeds 
their limit; sellers stop selling if it drops below a limit. Each advises 
the other if the rise or fall exceeds their tolerance; business resumes 
when the price falls or rises to a range that is viable for both. The 
control on positive feedback is steady satisfaction: people pour into a 
rising stock market, as miners rushed to California when there seemed 
to be endless gold in mountain streams. How is morality embodied 
in causal reciprocities? It establishes the satisfaction conditions for a 
relationship’s members: this (whatever it be) is what each participant 
need do to maintain an exchange relation to his or her partner.7 Each has 
the same message for the other: be honest and consistent; give me what I 
need to maintain our relationship. Disappointed expectations—no more 
gold—quash feedback of both sorts. 
Core systems satisfy basic interests and needs. Moral demands 
vary among families or friendships, but certain duties and attitudes 
structure the feedback relations common to all: receive support but take 
care that you also give it. Commercial or vocational relationships are 
narrowly functional: their efficacy requires that participants satisfy their 
roles: buyers and sellers, students and teachers. Obligations are stark: 
work for a salary; study for a grade. Corporate—holistic—relations are 
typically prefigured by its rules or laws, then expressed by its practices. 
A strong church or central government reduces conflict by imposing its 
rules. A democracy responds by encouraging participation in forums 
where competing claims are argued and negotiated; its legal procedures 
promise fairness. Systems of both sorts encourage the consistency 
that promotes social stability and predictability: coordination is eased 
because actions required are those expected. 
Imagine that nothing breaks the rhythm of a small community: 
population and resources are stable; people are productive and mutually 
respectful. Members are predictable and safe when circumstances are 
7  David Weissman, A Social Ontology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 
50–52.
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benign because all defer to the mores prescribed by local stories and 
rituals. But this isn’t uniformity. Members acknowledge their different 
interests and attitudes: young and old, men and women, shopkeepers 
and their customers. Variability expresses the paradox that stability is 
fluid to some degree as practices alter with circumstances, meanings, and 
one’s perspective. There is diversity, but social diversity, like that in art 
or music, can generate harmonies or dissonance: practicalities cohere, or 
they’re mutually inimical because of scarce resources, political discord, 
cost, or inefficiencies. Shall our town pay for schools or transportation; 
unable to agree, we do neither.  
What is stability’s ground: its structured zones—families, businesses, 
the state—or the autonomy and discipline of its citizens? Abraham 
Lincoln, or the Union Army? The answer is surely both: no stable 
systems in any zone without people to sustain it. What percentage of the 
population does it require? Numbers vary with circumstances, but we 
know when the number is too low because basic systems are degraded: 
schools, marriages, or businesses can’t fail everywhere without affecting 
every system coupled to them. Now consider that the practical foci of 
social zones are augmented and distorted by the personal zone. Its focus 
is oneself: what do I need or want? Practical decisions that were fraught 
when social zones were the only focus—work or family—are intensified 
by guilt or lust. Which has priority if I want an expensive dinner when 
my children, or the neighbor’s children, need shoes? We may allege that 
choices are principled, though evidence usually reduces to the practices 
historically favored by the local community. Does local sentiment affirm 
that neighbors are responsible for the welfare of other people’s children? 
Because if not, one isn’t blamed for ignoring them. 
The four zones fill most of the space where morality is invoked, 
but not all of it. There are, for example, casual or chance relationships 
that seem to fall beyond all the zones: someone trips on a leg carelessly 
extended; cars drench a pedestrian when turning a corner in the rain. 
But these are not anomalies; they fit the corporate, totalizing zone 
where reciprocity requires the recognition of others’ dignity, and a 
standard of behavior like that of Mill’s no-harm principle. For we are 
often in mutually affecting relationships with people who are otherwise 
unknown. Those occasions provoke the obligation of care: knowing that 
we may affect people adversely, many of them unknown, we control 
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what we do and how we do it. Discretion at these extremes expresses our 
tacit self-regard. For we, like Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Mill, ground 
morality in an idea of ourselves and our deserts before generalizing to 
all who are like us. This, like the idea that we are souls made in the 
image of God, expresses the secular hope that there may be empathy 
and safety in the presence of difference. 
2c. Tradition. Tradition is history learned osmotically: we absorb its 
beliefs and practices while hearing its stories and performing its rituals. 
Its lessons and meanings tell us who we are; its history distinguishes 
us from those who are alien because they don’t share our memories. 
This is tradition from the inside, the warmth and comfort of the tribe. 
But tradition is fragile. Clothes, haircuts, or sociality distinguish sects 
in secular cities where other visible differences have lapsed. Nor does 
history survive in many people beyond loyalty or aversion. This is a 
significant loss to societies where traditional stories and practices were 
the moral glue infusing young and old with standards, permissions, 
and prohibitions. Communities reduce to aggregates; the analogy to 
forests of separate trees is ever more accurate when anomie8 pervades 
us. We reduce to ourselves, hence the vulnerability of people having 
free will: responsible for what we choose and do, we can’t hide behind 
social identities we’ve renounced. Women once expected men to open 
doors for them; men expected patience from women less tolerant of 
their foibles. Each is somewhat disappointed in the other; many of both 
won’t defend the old way
3. Three Perspectives: The Whole
Agents perceive that each is one of many, and that the whole is 
an interest distinguishable from those of individual agents, core and 
intermediate systems. All are helped or hurt by totalizing interests: 
divine grace or climate change, for example. 
3a. Kant and Hegel. Kant’s emphasis on will’s autonomy pries 
individuality from the tide of unconsidered choices. Sovereign wills 
exhibit their freedom by withholding assent from practices that can’t 
8  Emile Durkheim, Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973), p. 145. 
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be universalized without contradiction: pay your bills, don’t lie. Kant’s 
intention was sober: limit diversity at the point where it subverts order 
and productivity. He knew that people go different ways, but Kant is 
ambiguous: which has priority in his thinking: order and uniformity, or 
freedom and difference?
This uncertainty is intensified by several dubious assumptions: i. Kant 
assumed that contexts where decisions are made are often enough alike 
to be considered identical for the purposes of universalizing a maxim 
(a rule or plan for prospective action). But are they identical beyond 
a superficial inspection? Imagine three people waiting on a station 
platform when there is space for just one additional passenger on the 
arriving train. What’s the next step: should no one board; should all the 
current riders descend because only one can board? Which of the three 
should have priority—the person going to work, another to a movie, a 
third to a doctor—if urgencies differ? This example is no problem for 
Kant, you say, because these differences disqualify their situations as 
identical. Alright: suppose each of the three is going to a doctor, though 
for ailments of different severities. Still not identical? Refine them more: 
each suffers the same illness to the same degree, but in different parts 
of the body. Identity is elusive. Is it secured by considering candidate 
mental states; are agents enough alike to be considered identical when 
comparing their aims, values, and history? Surely not: the interests and 
motives of one may be unlike any other. Circumstances may never be 
the same. ii. One may never have information sufficient to know that 
an action would satisfy Kant’s imperative, because observable effects 
ramify forever, while others, some immediate and nearby, are never 
observed. I don’t know the totality of my effects, pernicious or not, when 
testing a maxim. iii. Kant’s test for consistency is too simple: do nothing 
that everyone in situations of a kind can’t do without contradiction. You 
order chocolate, I order vanilla: this seems coherent, though conflict is a 
short distance away if the choice of either entails bankrupting costs for 
the other. iv. Kant’s examples—credit and lying—mislead because they 
are narrowly chosen. Imagine a culture where people hesitate to marry 
anyone their parents oppose. Would the culture teeter if one person 
were to violate parental wishes? Would confidence plunge were five to 
do it? Would credit or honesty cease if several or many were to cheat or 
lie? We know that doesn’t happen, because credit and communication 
persist though some people ignore Kant’s imperative. 
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Kant’s argument for withholding assent derives from Descartes’ 
fourth Meditation: don’t affirm any maxim that can’t be consistently 
universalized by everyone in circumstances like those of the agent; 
inhibit the will until reason is satisfied that all the implications of a 
proposed action are clearly and distinctly perceived.9 That formulation 
frees will of its immediate social burden (other people’s expectations) 
when its freedom of action is reduced to two possibilities: don’t choose 
because the categorical imperative isn’t satisfied (a maxim’s implications 
aren’t clear and distinct), or affirm a choice that satisfies the imperative, 
however banal (everyone breathe).
This outcome evolved when Hegel evoked reason to control sensibility. 
Kant required only that the cacophony of desires be regimented by 
employing the imperative to eliminate the maximally destructive effects 
of contradiction: no trust if all can lie, therefore, no collaboration. This 
could be elaborated with a series of ad hoc prohibitions, each alleging a 
risk to social coherence if generalized: no gambling, no adultery, no fast 
driving. But social control requires measures more systematic. Hegel 
supplied the rationale: reason should introduce a suite of laws, rules, 
and roles.10 Max Weber’s efficient bureaucrats were Hegel’s clerics: they 
could be trusted to rationalize any public service that seemed disorderly.11 
Kant (like Mill) tried to honor the autonomy of individual moral wills; 
let them do as they wish up to the point of violating the categorical 
imperative (or Mill’s no-harm principle). Hegel supposed that we are 
imperfectly moral or free until private wills have achieved the perfected 
coherence, the righteousness of the Absolute: moral laws are to conduct 
and conscience what natural laws are to nature. The latter are known; 
the former are willed. Nature is created as the Absolute entertains and 
affirms ideas that nature embodies; we internalize the moral law by 
affirming and applying it. The convicted murderer is elated on the way 
to being hanged because he acknowledges that this sentence locates him 
accurately in the moral order of being; there is no gap, no discrepancy 
between his desert and his will. This is theology repurposed as ethics: 
9  René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in: Discourse on the Method and 
Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. David Weissman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996), pp. 84–90.
10  G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. G. B. Baillie (New York: Harper, 
1967), pp. 384–89.
11  Max Weber, Economy and Society, Volume 2, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1381–461.
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human consciousness loses its finitude by rising to the consciousness of 
the Absolute; will is relieved of moral error when godhood is achieved 
by consciousness thinking itself: I desire only what reason and a god’s 
law would have me desire. What is moral autonomy in our less exalted 
human domain? Just the affirmation of laws that socialization prescribes: 
the Ten Commandments, for example. 
Kant might have deplored Hegel’s coercive morals and their 
implications for personal differences and freedom, though their shared 
emphasis on the universal applicability of mind’s transcendental 
faculties is reminiscent of Plato: normative reason ought to prevail over 
ephemeral personal impulses. Kant’s divided account of mind—an 
ego that is empirical and/or transcendental—entails that will, too, is 
ontologically complex: one part is responsible for motor action; the other 
makes decisions from outside space and time. That dualist formulation 
(one that locates mind both in the world and out of it) obscures the 
circumstances of people having scanty information and imperfect self-
control but demanding partners, exigent duties, and scarce resources. 
His emphasis—reason is noble, desire is base—loses its categorial force 
if reason is understanding, a faculty that sorts, organizes, and appraises 
information through the narrow window of need and opportunity. 
Kant’s holistic emphasis—what all should do—is an aristocratic interest, 
one that abstracts from the urgencies and vulnerabilities of improvident 
people. He left no moral space for those whose choices are forced. 
3b. Justice. What can justice be to those for whom autonomy is a 
principal value? Does self-love trump justice? For everyone is self-
concerned: all have memories and plans focused squarely on themselves. 
What’s to be made of other people, if one’s purposes are foreground, 
while their concerns recede into obscurity? Where is the middle way 
between Hegel’s absolutes, and the variability of inclinations, priorities, 
and states of affairs?
Justice requires perspective: all can say, with Descartes, I am, I exist. 
Each has a claim on resources needed to satisfy wants and aims; their 
satisfaction usually requires the competence and support of other 
people. We come to acknowledge that each person has duties and aims 
comparable to one’s own, and that cooperation is usually the only way 
to satisfy all. Mutual tolerance is nevertheless slow to gel if every day 
is a competitive struggle for partners and resources: Live and let live 
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isn’t compelling while defending oneself from someone who doesn’t 
believe in it. Forbearance comes more easily if one starts with ample 
opportunities, and a network of family and friends. There, where 
collaboration is assumed and empathy is generous, distributive justice 
seems easy because partners are recognizable versions of oneself. 
Is it preferable that we cite empathy rather than prudent self-interest 
when defending the laws and practices of a just society? Fellow-feeling 
is critical to its emotional tone; but implementing a just distribution 
of rights and resources doesn’t go well if equity is widely resented. 
Distributed rights and benefits are resisted where factional advantages 
make Kant’s starting point—the Kingdom of Ends—unintelligible. 
Rousseau made unanimity—an equal voice for every participant—a 
condition for founding a society that originates in the general will 
and a social contract.12 But people preoccupied, vain, competitive, or 
tribal don’t accept the equalizing implications of saying “I am, I exist.” 
Distributive justice is their bête noire because agency is solipsistic: 
one doesn’t see beyond the clash of people opposing one’s anxiety or 
indulgence. Or a circle of entitlement founded in tribal meanings—of 
loyalty, purpose, or belief—establishes the only reality acknowledged. 
Injustice is endemic. Why is it tolerated? Because of solipsistic 
fantasies, greed, and the pleasure of controlling other people. But also 
for this reason: corporations, schools, or teams are organized for the 
efficient production of goods or services: not everyone is qualified to 
play third base. Is it good enough that outcomes are unequal because 
talents and opportunities aren’t equal? Marx was prescient: “From 
each according to his ability; to each according to his needs.”13 This is 
contentious at times of scarcity. But suppose that productivity is ample, 
and that education and opportunities inspire discipline and deter free 
riders. Why isn’t this a reasonable policy in favorable circumstances? 
Why on this condition would we, why do we, tolerate the indulgence of 
some at cost to many? 
4. Reflection. Ardor and frustration are well distributed at all three 
levels: individual, nodal, and the whole. Failure is sometimes useful if 
one acknowledges complexities we can’t avert. 
12  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 57.
13  Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program (Rockville: Wildside Press, 2008), p. 27.
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4a. Self-regulation. Kant had emphasized that action’s effects exceed 
will’s control. Moral responsibility starts here, where agency is causality 
and causal power includes self-control. Others hold me responsible for 
acts chosen and performed when I could have acted differently, or not 
at all. I am, on these occasions, praise- or blameworthy for effects that 
accrue (absent extenuating conditions: “you couldn’t have known”).
Learning to play the piano requires self-control: where do my fingers 
go? Roles in businesses and families require it, too: we learn what to 
do, with whom, where, and when. Many tasks are difficult, but each 
has lesson plans or directives that ease the way. The self-regulation 
appropriate to moral identity has heuristics, but no book of instructions; 
rules are generic, though moral perception is specific and nuanced. We 
learn it by considering action’s effects, their costs, and beneficiaries. The 
surgery was a technical success, but the patient died: was it worth doing? 
This isn’t a calculation for which there are a priori answers. Appraisals 
inform a discipline’s procedures, as they’re improved or proscribed. 
But equally, each is a moment of self-reflection in the negative feedback 
loops that monitor individual choices and actions: is this a procedure I 
should be doing? 
Self-regulation is capacity and opportunity disciplined by 
oversight—inhibition, deliberation, judgment, and choice—given 
information about partners and resources, costs, and benefits. Most 
choices are made without this conscious inventory, though we imagine 
being able to justify our aims and values. Hard determinists suppose 
that this persuasion is window-dressing; we may be self-inhibiting 
for historical reasons, but not because self-regulation is a response to 
opposition or opportunities discerned as we assess a problem. This 
was the question of Chapter Two: do acquired abilities enable us to 
address novel or surprising situations; or is every solution conditioned 
by the tide of previous responses? Oversight and control are a test of 
this dispute because they exploit skills acquired as we learn to regulate 
ourselves in distinctive circumstances: learning the skills has a history, 
though any occasion for applying them may have no precedent in one’s 
experience. Why did you turn left? I saw a gas station. 
Deliberations provoked by oversight are three dimensional: forward, 
current or lateral, and past. What is our aim, and the plan for achieving 
it? How do we mark our progress? All this is prospective. We also 
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look to the rear: what have we learned? Reflection spreads laterally as 
we consider the complex webs of mutual dependence that condition 
progress: what are we doing, how, and with whom? We know the 
partners directly engaged, while ignorant of supply chains unknown 
and unimagined. Are there duties owed to partners more remote, debts 
we don’t recognize or pay? Oversight enhances efficiency; it covers these 
bases to some degree, while reducing costs to those affected, near or far. 
Regulation appears in a different light when oversight is contrasted 
to stubborn persistence. Peirce described four methods for fixing 
belief.14Authority, a priori intuition, and scientific method prescribe 
or correct private opinions. Tenacity, the most primitive of the four, is 
fiercely personal. Adherents resist revision or correction because they 
know or imagine no better way, though tenacity needn’t be crude: 
Edwards’ “vehemence” and Napoleon’s mastery were memorialized 
in William James’ “The will to believe.”15 Persistence sometimes works: 
circumstances are transformed, facts on the ground are created when 
tenacity is allied to initiative and imagination. Notice too that action 
sometimes resists oversight, and that tenacity is action unadorned by 
prudence and regulation. For their relation expresses the suppressed 
tension between action and its control. We discount the pleasure children 
have when banging on a piano’s keys; we want them to learn how to 
play. Yet we’re aware of a competing interest: regulation is inhibiting; 
we lose spontaneity and power. This is tenacity’s beauty (and often, 
its abuse): it sets agency—unrefined, honest, and bold—apart from its 
critics and controls. 
4b. Responsibility. Consider the phrases responsible for and responsible 
to. Every agent is responsible mechanically for causing its effects. 
Responsible to has the additional implication that agents are responsible 
to those requiring justification for one’s choices and actions. Demands 
and responses would be rhetorical if hard determinism were correct, 
because there would be no preventing the effects of a causal lineage. No 
one would be responsible for his or her effects, or responsible to anyone 
14  C. S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes 
1-V1, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1934–1935), paras. 377–87, pp. 223–47.
15  William James, “The will to believe,” The Writings of William James, ed. John J. 
McDermott (New York: Modern Library, 1968), pp. 717–35.
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for justifying them because we, no more than wind or weather, would 
have freely chosen them. Yet there are forks in the road, situations large 
and small that may go different ways. People discern and seize these 
opportunities, making choices undetermined by their causal histories. 
Morality enters the flux of causal activity when effects are determined, 
all or in part, by our intentions, actions, and the range of our control. For 
then, there are questions: Who is affected, how? What are our duties 
to them? Answers simplify our judgments of people and their conduct 
when perfect overlap—doing effectively what is beneficial, reasonable, 
and prudent—would be perfect virtue. Yet this is an unreasonable aim, 
given that it requires finesse, appropriate resources, and omniscience 
about the character and range of one’s effects. 
Tornados are responsible, but not culpable, for their effects. We are 
both: being responsible, we exhibit our moral identity by regulating 
ourselves. But there are ambiguities. Here are two sets of questions—
distinguished as 4bi-viii and 4bix-xiii—and possible answers. The 
first set is pragmatic: i. What are intention’s morally legitimate aims 
and concerns? ii. Which effects should we foresee? iii. Do available 
controls prevent unwanted effects? iv. How should we choose when an 
intended action will probably affect other people or things in disparate 
ways, some to their disadvantage? v. What are agents’ duties to those 
adversely affected? vi. Effects ramify; how far does responsibility extend 
into remote, unforeseeable effects? How far should it extend? vii. Should 
we limit intention or action when foresight and control are known to 
be insufficient? viii. What is one’s responsibility for social behavior one 
doesn’t approve and can’t prevent? 
My responses tilt in the direction of prudence and responsibility. 
This is a consequentialist inclination, one sensitive to effects that ramify 
unforeseeably in complex situations. Reckless behavior sometimes 
punishes many people, including the agent responsible. Cooperation 
and the general will require the personal discipline that would reduce 
these effects. 
4bi. What are intention’s morally legitimate aims and concerns? Actions 
that enhance well-being or minimize harm to those affected.
4bii. Which effects should we foresee? Those normally resulting when 
people act as intended in familiar circumstances. We also extrapolate: 
what could happen?
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4biii. Do available controls prevent unwanted effects? Some controls—
inhibitions—are internal; other—laws, circumstances, or unwilling 
partners—are external. Acting many times a day, often carelessly, we 
assume that conditions are amenable to the actions intended, and that 
adequate controls are in place. But we aren’t surprised that action 
misfires for want of personal care, or that circumstances weren’t suitable 
to choices that seemed reasonable when made. 
4biv. How should we choose if a considered action would likely affect other 
people, things, or ourselves adversely? We drive cars knowing that the 
pollution they cause is bad for us and the climate. We choose a short-
term advantage—easy transport—for a long-term cost to health and 
the environment. Prudence would have us make other arrangements, 
though individual drivers aren’t equipped to alter large-scale solutions 
(roads and cars) for distributed private advantages (driving as one 
chooses). Measures of harm for personal choices (opening an all-night 
bar) are often shallow and self-interested. A tolerance for pain and 
disruption—for oneself or others—is partly cultural: the more we value 
initiative, the less we calculate its effects. 
Why are we reckless? Partly because action leaves so much 
unchanged, and because we lack graphic evidence of middle- and 
long-term effects. There are no pictures of cancerous lungs on cigarette 
packages sold in the United States. Tobacco companies don’t want us 
to see the risk.
4bv. What are agents’ duties to those adversely affected by their actions? 
Foresee the damage, when possible. Repair or compensate for it when 
foresight was too little or late. Courts and insurance companies have 
rough measures of the compensation appropriate to damaged people or 
things. Action is careful in proportion to the knowledge that agents will 
pay for their carelessness. But this is legalistic rather than principled: 
foresight and actions based on reasonable assumptions are a more 
stoutly moral defense
4bvi. Effects ramify; how far does responsibility extend to unforeseeable 
effects? How far should it extend? Every action has effects that exceed our 
ability to track them, but that isn’t an excuse for ignoring the likelihood 
of effects we can anticipate. What happens if children aren’t educated? 
Nothing grave tomorrow, but severe costs for days to come. 
156 Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will
4bvii. Should we limit intention or action when foresight and control are 
known to be insufficient? What should be done when future effects are 
undecipherable? Socrates advice was plain: don’t act if you can’t see 
far enough ahead to confirm that action’s implications aren’t malign. 
But this advice falters when the effects of inaction are unacceptable. A 
patient needing surgery dies on the operating table: should the doctors 
have proceeded? The risks were known; there was no good answer. 
4bviii. What is one’s responsibility for communal behavior one doesn’t 
approve and can’t prevent? What is one to do when society has policies 
or practices one opposes? This is sometimes the effect of being a 
minority when the majority prefers a different course. One may be 
patient: experience and judgment may alter opinions when the issue 
is next considered. Though decisions may never be corrected because 
the majority always favors what was done or because it never considers 
that its actions have effects that are pernicious and irreversible. Personal 
responses may be no stronger than irritation; but what if they rise to moral 
outrage: what should such people do? Demonstrate; try to rouse others. 
But what if those who respond lack the social or political influence that 
would alter policy or practice? Is there a point at which moral outrage 
may be regarded as protest enough? Is one excused of responsibility for 
practices one opposes if one has expressed indignation? 
Dispersed individuals, vulnerable, and afraid alienated but mostly 
passive, are no challenge to complex systems acting for reasons that are 
tribal, economic, or political. Organization alone may frustrate moral 
judgment, as tyrannies and slave states do. But organization alone is 
not always the issue: America abuses immigrants at its southern border 
despite being democratically organized. States and societies of its design 
are more consistently benign because their procedures were designed 
for equity. Yet government and bureaucracy are moral agents of the 
second order. Designed to minimize the harm they do, they regulate 
but can’t always control people responsible for official choices. Does 
the state do horrible things in our name because of officers protected 
constitutionally from our strictures and remorse; are we complicit in 
their crimes whatever our reservations? We’re trapped in a political 
system designed for good will and self-correction. That design betrays us 
if elected officials and constitutional controls are too lame to withstand 
willful leaders.
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Questions of the second set are more theoretic: ix. Am I responsible 
for anything I choose to do or be, given that DNA, circumstances, and 
educational history are decisive for all I do? x. Is moral responsibility 
additional to causal responsibility? Is the moral burden incrementally 
different from the causal burden? Are there are extra-material 
principles—whether natural or conventional—supervening on our 
actions such that the morality of an act is founded in the satisfaction or 
violation of these principles, not merely in the act or its material effects? 
xi. Moral responsibility is uncertain when circumstances are complex. 
A first cause is sometimes hard to identify. Who started the quarrel that 
eventuated in a death; for what reason? xii. Are we praise- or blame-
worthy for a moral difference if we haven’t chosen it? Stepping in front 
of a car saves a child’s life, because the driver sees me, the adult, when 
he hadn’t seen the child. But I, too, hadn’t seen the child or acted on 
her behalf. Do I earn moral credit, or only recognition for my causal 
role? Is choice the desideratum: the act is moral only if chosen when its 
effects are foreseen? xiii. Is moral education additional to education that 
prepares one to make causal differences? xiv. One defers to authorities 
because of their power. Is that because power is their right; because 
power is intimidating; or because we believe that authority is virtuous?
These are questions that might be asked of any intention, action, or 
effect. The range of possible answers is indeterminate because each of 
the variables has a range of finely differentiated values. We are saved 
these large numbers because circumstances, partners, resources, and 
laws usually reduce to the small range of values acceptable within a 
culture or tradition. Stray outside approved values and you risk slipping 
into zones of infinite reproach. You didn’t know that your mother-in-law 
was allergic to scotch? Should you have asked? 
The diversity of variables and their values is not the end of moral 
trouble, because choices and actions are complicated by layered contexts 
of zones and meanings. Two are conspicuous: contrary demands are 
made by two or more of the core, vocational, or civic zones, or by the 
interpretive frameworks (church and school, for example) that infuse 
choice with significance. One yearns for simplicity when actions 
approved in one zone or framework are condemned in another. Kant 
supplied direction, but his imperative is not the solution when zones 
or meanings are mutually confounding. Not every conflict is resolved 
when all participants tell the truth. 
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4bix. Am I responsible for any part of what I am or do, given determinist 
strictures? This issue resolves in two ways: hard determinists believe 
that there are no free choices; the soft version affirms that information, 
values, and interests—not ancient precedents—are determining when 
emergent capacities for imagination, thought, or language address 
situations for which history has no responses. Why call ahead when 
late? To alert someone waiting for me. But why is she waiting? Because 
we agreed to meet, not because our meeting was foreseen and arranged 
in ancient times. The hard alternative requires that every agreement 
between independent beings express a synchrony established at the 
beginning of time. We’re to believe that history perpetually resolves its 
complexity, all its parts in harmony. If I call, she’s forewarned. Though 
hard determinism implies—when conflated with Leibniz’s internal 
relations—that I needn’t bother to call because, consciously or not, she’s 
alerted already. 
Purpose and responsibility might be adult fantasies: make life 
significant by instilling a sense of duty and contingency; encourage us 
to believe that what happens is up to us. But this explanation is more 
troubling than reassuring: designing and executing nature’s harmonies 
would be enormously expensive in attention and effort. No agent less 
powerful than an omnipotent god could do it. Agree with Descartes 
and Leibniz that a god is the only cause, and there is no obstacle to 
saying that we have no responsibility for anything. The alternative is 
less theological: it explains our adaptation to current circumstances 
by citing emergent powers, current circumstances, and each person’s 
intentions, skills, information, and scruples. They enable the choices 
and actions with which one responds to the ambient world. Are we 
deceived by trying to master time, circumstances, and our nature; 
why believe that we live into the future if all of us are playing out a 
history we can’t override or redirect? These are silly illusions if each 
of us is a complicated windup toy. But we resist the idea that every 
current causal relation is the present moment in trajectories that meet 
or diverge because of a cosmic design or its determining natural laws. 
There is this simpler explanation: interventions in situations unforeseen 
are calculated, controlled, and often effective. All are enabled by agents 
who do or can inhibit responses while calculating the action most likely 
to satisfy partners or themselves. 
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4bx. Is moral responsibility additional to causal responsibility? Is the moral 
burden incrementally different from the causal burden? Local peasants catch 
rabbits on the lord’s estate. The groundskeeper does it, too, but they’re 
guilty of theft; he does it with the sanction of his job. Is this a conventional 
difference founded in social norms, or a qualitative difference in the act, 
its performance conditions, or its effects?
Probably the greater part of moral activity is in the habitual 
performance of one’s duties. There is no difference between the moral 
and causal aspects of choice and action in these cases: parents care for 
their children; people work as colleagues or partners expect. Seeing 
one or the other, causation or duty, in the work they do is a function of 
perspective. Though a difference is sometimes visible: effects fall short 
of an agent’s duty, because childcare is haphazard; or discrepancy goes 
the other way when friends or neighbors exceed reasonable standards 
of care. Actions often satisfy social norms because people learning what 
to do typically learn behavior prescribed by a norm. They may hardly 
register that standard behavior is also the standard for satisfying one’s 
duty. Social norms are usually sufficient to achieve desired effects—
children are nourished and schooled—though effects like these aren’t so 
elevated that morally committed agents can’t do better. 
This issue—the relation of moral to causal responsibility—is also 
pivotal in discussions of free will. Causation acquires its moral face 
when voluntary action or inaction affects people or goods they value; the 
moral side is effaced if the two elide. Theologians exculpate God when 
explaining evil by supposing that finite souls have free will; more than 
causes, we have judgment and the ability to discipline our passions. Evil 
is our fault.16 What would be implied if we didn’t have free will? There 
would be no distinction between actions and effects that are causal, and 
those which are both causal and moral or immoral, because we would 
have no power to intervene in the causal tide. Hard determinism would 
befall us. Hence the challenge of Chapter Two: confirm the distinction 
between causality, simpliciter, and moral causation without invoking 
immaterial souls or Kant’s transcendental ego.
Someone feeling himself pushed accidentally inhibits the inclination 
to push back when all are standing in a crowded subway car. Live 
16  Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, ed. Timothy McDermott (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 286–316.
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and let live, we think. This is the vow of people competing amiably 
for resources, opportunities, or space; though mutual hostility is also 
possible, and sometimes expressed. Which is the viable response? Either 
may seem appropriate given one’s circumstances, but neither is extra-
material because each is a coping strategy designed to maximize one’s 
advantage now or over time. Nor is the choice immaterial if judgment 
is mistaken: you respond to an elbow without retaliating only to be 
knocked down. We make decisions based on information and values 
that include safety and well-being. Self-defense—a moral power and 
cause—is their adjunct. Morality sometimes rides on the cause.
4bxi. Moral responsibility is uncertain when circumstances are complex. 
Moving toward the exit, you step on someone’s foot. Was there space 
to avoid her; were you being careful? Yes, I lost my balance when the 
bus stopped abruptly. Fixing responsibility is straightforward when 
an effect has one sufficient cause—”You called”?—though not when 
several or many causes would have been sufficient to produce an 
effect to which one’s action contributed. Uncertainty is challenging for 
agents who take responsibility for making the difference at issue; it’s an 
opportunity for those who wish to disguise their effects. We limit these 
ambiguities by reducing choice, hence responsibility, to rules: what do 
they require; what was your role; did you act as the rule prescribed? 
Discerning what was done under the aegis of rules enables us to 
assign responsibility to the participants, though most tasks engaging 
several or many agents are accomplished with discipline, but without 
rules. People shopping in a busy market go their separate ways while 
employees stock the shelves. Who is responsible when people slip and 
fall because customers tracking slush from outside have made the floors 
slippery? Not individual customers? Not the management that mopped, 
and spread sawdust? Moral responsibility isn’t easily apportioned when 
there is no rule for dividing it. Three issues stand out in circumstances 
where any judgment or choice is plausibly challenged: bxia. judgment; 
bxib. duties near or far; and bxic. inhibition: 
4bxia. Judgment: Everyone is active to some degree in situations of 
various kinds. Some actions and effects are morally indifferent, but all 
may have consequences that are morally sensitive. Those are effects 
on people, their interests, or the environment. What’s to be done, or 
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averted? We appraise our circumstances, consider our values, and rank 
our priorities. Choice and action are quick because habitual, or slow 
because we deliberate when circumstances are complex.
Practical experience values safety, predictability, cooperation, and 
mutual respect. Rules and rule-bound practices defend these values; 
behavior is moral to the extent that it satisfies them. Many such rules are 
formulated and imperious, but many more—thanking a cashier, holding 
a door for the person behind—are subtle and familiar, but uncodified. 
Deontologists want us to know that rules of both sorts may have few 
or no exceptions, yet there seem to be no occasions when one or more 
values aren’t compromised in situations where two or more conflict: 
sustaining one, we concede the others.
Rules are the standards on which we rely when deciding what is 
permissible, but how do we decide what to do when applying a valued 
rule would violate a valued practice (telling the truth at cost to an 
honest man)? This is the task of judgment: having learned relevant 
values and the means for satisfying them, we rank competing interests 
or values. Is this determination any kind of demonstration? No, 
other people, with other interests, would decide differently because 
they disagree about circumstances or likely effects, or because they 
rank interests differently. Acknowledging this variability, respecting 
other choices, we make our judgments and act accordingly. This is the 
“situation ethics”17 disparaged by people who prefer the severity of 
exceptionless rules: they never lie. And one agrees: truth-telling is a 
condition for cooperation, efficacy, and social stability. Yet there are 
other values. Hence the ambiguity of moral choice: what is best to do 
when serving one value violates another? 
Evolution is slow, but change is often quick: will is free to experiment 
within the domain of elastic rules at the frontier, where circumstances are 
uncertain or unforeseen. This is morality in a Nietzschean space, where 
agency creates, tests, and justifies its choices. Old rules are adapted to 
new situations; or we adapt to circumstances of our making when new 
practices stabilize our altered conduct. Consensus forms, most of our 
life-sustaining values survive, but we’re unsteady. How much change 
can we anticipate; is it likely that the remote effects of current actions 
17  See Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox, 1966).
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will be appraised with material, moral, or aesthetic values like those 
approved today? Will our heirs rue effects that seem desirable to us? 
4bxib. Duties near or far: Agency is moral in the respect that intentions 
and behavior are responsive to the interests and well-being of others and 
oneself; purpose is steady as we try to make circumstances favorable 
to partners, duties, and our interests. Most tasks are common to all; 
crystallized norms—rules, laws, roles, or traditions—stabilize behavior, 
while making it predictable. Yet solutions vary with circumstances and 
change with technology and aims. Choices appropriate at one time, 
in one locale, may be unsuitable later or at any time in another place. 
Are there also duties to people and things remote in space or time, 
duties incurred because they or their interests are helped or harmed 
by things we do? Uncertainty about this moral burden is a reason for 
agency’s variable focus: here and there, short term and long. We may 
try to anticipate our long-term effects but doing that effectively requires 
knowledge of circumstances that may not resemble any we know. 
4bxic. Inhibition: Some things shouldn’t be done because rules, roles, 
or traditions preclude them; learning what to do and how to do it, we 
also learn when not to act. This is the essence of Kantian morality: do no 
harm to the conditions for sustaining community. There is also a margin 
for choice where care and control—prudence, respect, or discretion—
override inclination or opportunity. Which is suppressed: action or the 
thought or desire motivating it? None but the agent may know which is 
inhibited or why. 
4bxii. Are we praise- or blameworthy for a moral difference if we haven’t 
chosen it? Imagine that a careful driver strikes a pedestrian who runs 
into traffic without warning from behind an obstacle making him 
invisible to traffic. The driver is a cause of the accident, though he 
bears no moral responsibility for it. This is an example of the difference 
between agents and agency. Agents are causes, whatever their character 
and whatever the character of their effects. Agency is causation with 
purpose, responsibility, and control. The driver had no intention of 
causing an accident; driving carefully with no control of its victim, 
he had no responsibility for hitting him (though vehicular law rules 
otherwise).
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Kant warned that one never controls the effects of one’s choices, 
hence his belief that will is the only power we control.18 This ignores the 
considerable evidence that agents often produce intended effects. For 
we are nodes: rightly praised or blamed for our intentions, choices, and 
actions.
4bxiii. Is moral education additional to education that prepares one to make 
causal differences? Military training is the inverse of medical education. 
The Hippocratic Oath infuses action with moral concern for those 
whom doctors treat; military education reduces concern for enemies. 
This difference expresses the contrary values that frame human interests 
and action. We educate for this diversity: doctors to heal us; a military 
that defends us. Fact and value seem fused; students and trainees are 
discouraged from distinguishing them. But one can distinguish them: 
soldiers herding prisoners, like doctors working for violent regimes, are 
encouraged to avoid excess. But moral discretion is fraught: how does 
one inhibit the dominant impulse required by the work one is recruited 
to do? There may be no recourse short of refusing the job. 
4bxiv. One defers to authorities because of their power. Is that because 
power is their right; because power is intimidating; or because we believe that 
authority is virtuous? Constitutional authority is assigned to people 
filling offices within the system of relations prefigured by a state’s 
foundational laws. Their authority extends only to the particular duties 
of their respective offices; it terminates when they leave office. The 
character of their authority—its force and applications—is manifest 
in the founding plan or its elaborations. It may have been designed 
with the purest of intentions; though a state’s officials sometimes 
misconstrue their authority as a right to interpret its applications in 
ways that violate its aims. We the citizenry hesitate: we’re respectful 
of the state’s authority; we don’t want to believe that its officers are 
outlaws abusing their positions. But we’re skeptical: we know that 
authority is not essentially virtuous. We need to be willing and ready 
to use constitutional means to control or terminate officials who believe 
that legal authority is a weapon defending personal interest. 
18  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1965), pp. 474–75.
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4c. Empathy. Relating to other people often feels mechanical; there’s 
something to be done, little time to do it. Partners are utilities: work 
goes better because they’re efficient; or we’re annoyed because they slow 
it down. But there is a contrary impulse, one that may hardly show: 
we’re sometimes attracted to other people out of affection, sympathy, or 
respect. Emotionally binding responses are an evocation of core relations 
to family or friends. Some people believe that this response is prefigured 
in every mortal’s deference to his or her god. Though explaining it 
doesn’t require an appeal to the supernatural: one is more likely to 
recognize feelings in others if comfortable in oneself. Some cultures 
formalize warmth for others in the salutations exchanged between 
buyers and sellers when entering or leaving a shop: each acknowledges 
that the other’s dignity is more significant than a possible sale. People 
dismayed by the harshness of city or business life often look for ways 
to intensify the exchanges of feelings; this is the “spirituality” of which 
they speak. One achieves it with others, but equally when it’s provoked 
by nature, music, or poetry. 
Sentiment is the moral engine of Mill’s Utilitarianism, though empathy 
is purged as a moral motive in Kant’s Groundwork and (for all but its 
dedication) in Mill’s On Liberty. Judgment is its necessary condition, 
given the risk that sympathy will be perceived as naive or weak. 
4d. Conscious/unconscious. Self-awareness is often missing when 
choices are made and action ensues, but should we infer that our 
frequent experience of choosing because of intending or acting because 
of deciding is always illusory? Careful studies suggest that consciousness 
is incidental to many actions and their initiating decisions.19 But it 
would be odd if this were always true. Conceding that introspection 
is an imperfect lens into mental functions, granting that its evidence is 
often misdescribed, is it sure that consciousness is always misleading or 
incidental? Does evolution usually do things in vain? This question isn’t 
evidence or an argument, but it should make us suspicious of claims 
that introspection is always unreliable. Is that also true of percepts, 
dreams, and headaches?
Moral identity is precarious because it’s suspended between motives 
that are often unconscious and one’s awareness of rules, roles, or 
19  See Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).
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laws. One recalls Plato’s characterization of the man who feigns good 
intentions while having no interest in any benefit but his own.20 Social 
harmony requires that he be controlled, though moral identity is 
cosmetic if appetites control him while he feigns submission to social 
rules and practices. This tension is identical to the one that unsettles 
autonomy: does moral identity pivot on attitudes and behaviors society 
prescribes; or is it qualified and revised by each person’s understanding, 
sensibility, and interests? 
Freud’s three-part distinction—Id, Superego, and Ego—tracks 
this dilemma. Id signifies subconscious drives and desires that 
would sometimes be destructive if expressed; Superego indicates their 
controlling social constraints; Ego implies acquired powers for self-
regulation.21 These three trace a Hegelian triad: thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis. But the progression implied is too facile if conceptual only: 
for how does Ego achieve autonomy if independence is suppressed 
by mechanisms of social control? Freud also alerts us to another issue 
central to moral identity. The story I tell of my moral posture is an 
aestheticized summary of my history; one that reconciles and justifies, 
often without acknowledging costs, fault, or motives. How accurate is it 
to the unconscious motives and passions that energize my choices and 
actions? 
It isn’t surprising that disagreements about selfhood are 
commonplace: self-perception (self-persuasion) may vary considerably 
from the motors of agency. There is, however, this control on a story’s 
accuracy: does it square with the evidence known to observers? How 
close is one’s impression of his or her moral posture to theirs; which is 
more accurate if there’s a discrepancy? Conflicts are frequent: others see 
my actions and effects; I counter by citing my intentions. But disputes 
can be resolved when actions misfire if there’s accord that agency is a 
cause having effects: what went wrong: plans or motives? We learn what 
to fix, what to avoid. 
How accurate is the perception of one’s moral identity when many 
of its triggers are unconscious? The discrepancy seems reduced as 
one ages: there’s less one does that’s surprising. But the implication is 
alarming: selfhood is real, but elusive; we have moral identity, but only 
20  Plato, Republic, 364a-365b, pp. 611–12.
21  See Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere (New York: Dover, 2018).
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a distorted idea of the attitudes and values provoking us. Hence the 
persuasion that moral identity resembles an unbalanced three-legged 
stool: one leg is the characterization of people who accurately predict 
what I’ll do, given situations like those previously observed; another is 
the rounded moral story—the apology—I tell of myself; a third is the 
uncertainty of future behavior given the unpredictability of responses 
that elude repression in situations that surprise both myself and those 
who observe me. 
4e. Equity. Anger and alienation are often the effects of having talents 
but no opportunity for discovering what they are, or how to use them. 
Compare the many people educated to high standards. Ambitious 
and capable, neither threatened nor angry, they relate amicably to 
others while pursuing aims for which talent has prepared them. Marx 
imagined the initiative and autonomy of medieval craftsmen. We learn 
as much by watching someone carrying a double-bass down subway 
stairs; doing it is clumsy, but he knows where he’s going. Self-alienation 
would be minimized if talent and training were matched by opportunity. 
Frustration would be reduced because personal depth, initiative, and self-
regard would be cultivated and acknowledged. No economy we imagine 
can be as productive as we desire while responsive to the particularity of 
all its members. But the burden shifts: how do we compensate the many 
people whose autonomy is sacrificed to the organizational features 
of the economies we have? Are there no substitutes, no supplements, 
for goods, stories, and games? Is the unconscious a sink where Ego 
atrophies because punished, bribed, or afraid? 
Would we be bland if all were saved from the distress and confusion 
that come when talent and purpose are blunted or denied? Only a little. 
The opposition prefigured in Freud’s dialectic—Id or Superego—would 
be largely drained, but life might seem too generous, too forgiving. 
Less ambition might entail less discipline, with no guarantee that one’s 
judgments or choices would cohere. 
4f. Self-appraisal. How well am I doing it; how do others see me; is this 
what I should be doing? Commentary may be distracted and forgiving 
or careful and severe. It’s impelled by a desire for well-being or by the 
anxiety that one’s actions are substandard or damaging to others; let me 
see what I’m doing, the better to control it and myself. 
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People lacking self-awareness seem decorticated; they resemble 
windstorms with no measure but their impact. 
Aristotle construed well-being as happiness:22 one achieves it by 
tempering appetites, establishing viable relations to other people, and 
using one’s skills. The result is eudaemonia, a steady feeling of well-being. 
Discovering and educating one’s talents seems a topic better suited to 
morale than morality, though both are relevant, because well-being 
is a perpetual aim, a duty to oneself and a hope that’s slow to yield. 
Happiness is often conflated with pleasure for the good reason that the 
words signifying them often have the same referent: “Are you happy? 
Yes, I’m pleased.” But the two are sometimes distinct. Imagine a parent 
awake all night with a child whose temperature rises inexorably. She 
prays for relief until it comes: his temperature falls quickly; he stirs. His 
mother would be exultant if she weren’t so tired. 
John Stuart Mill distinguished three kinds of happiness/pleasure: 
animal, intellectual, and moral.23 Animal pleasure and its sources are 
familiar to all. Intellectual pleasure is different in kind. The pleasure 
that comes with sugar or drink is intense, addictive, distinguishable 
and separable from its sources. Intellectual pleasure is lambent, hard to 
isolate, and always dependent on the continuing support of the activity 
promoting it. Do you like algebra or poetry? You don’t get the pleasure 
they provoke without engaging them. Moral pleasure is, again, different 
in kind: there is no pleasure, Mill wrote, like that of taking responsibility 
for the well-being of another person.
He ignored two other sorts of moral happiness, both implied by 
Aristotle’s remark that happiness is the accompanying tone of activities 
that use one’s faculties appropriately. Powers include those common 
to all—perception, thought, feeling, and will—but also one’s talents. 
Athletes are never so alive as when playing their favorite game; but 
that is also true of card players and pilots. Hence this other source of 
happiness: imagine a nurse who dreamed since childhood that this would 
be her working life. Doors opened, chances fell in line, and now, close 
to retirement, she looks forward and back declaring herself content, no 
regrets, the ego ideal of her childhood long ago realized and sustained. 
22  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York: Random House, 1941), 1095a, p. 937.
23  John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), pp. 7–12.
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The well-being Aristotle described brightens her days and relations to 
other people. She’s happy; they see it. Animal pleasures are episodic; 
they come and go. Happiness of this sort abides. But this isn’t everyone’s 
state of mind. On Liberty is oddly abstract; there is hardly a phrase that 
evokes fellow-feeling or responsibility. Yet there is an exception: Mill 
dedicated the book to his late wife in paragraphs having a confessional 
quality all but unknown in modern philosophy.24 Death is deplored 
for many reasons, but one most affecting is the wound to happiness: 
there will be no personal renewal in the presence of a beloved child, 
partner, or friend. Why is it moral? Because one is diminished: grieving 
for another, but also for oneself. An agent reasonably asks of himself: 
Am I happy? The answer depends in part on the perception of his moral 
posture. How is it appraised; how does one measure the morality of 
his intentions, or the actions they provoke? There are two criteria, one 
social, the other personal and private. The answer is a function of the 
two, though their sum is problematic because their separate estimates 
don’t always cohere.
4g. Guilt. Moral identity is also weighed by this other variable: how 
are others affected by my aims and actions; am I virtuous? Granting 
that plans don’t always go as intended, how much guilt lodges in the 
design of my aims and their likely effects? We’re saved embarrassment 
because conscience is often rigorous: guilt or inhibition flashes stop 
when passion, advantage, or one’s job says go. Descartes’ Meditations has 
a complementary emphasis: suspend beliefs or practices whose truth or 
cogency is unsupported by evidence; are they accepted as true or moral 
merely because one affirms what others say or do? Descartes refined 
his warning in three words: doubt, deny, refuse.25 Renounce laws and 
practices that make life predictable, while having no other justification. 
Skeptics make others uncomfortable: what motivates them? 
Contrarians predictably oppose whichever thought or practice draws 
their attention. Conscientious objectors are more detached: unmoved 
by innocuous things, they challenge whatever violates their principles. 
The rest of us are stolid; we honor personal scruples and social duties 
without excessive calculation. A question that objectors might put to 
24  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), p. 2.
25  Descartes, Meditations, p. 66.
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the rest of us is the inverse: what would we have to do—what must 
be done in our names—for us to grieve or feel guilty for harms others 
suffer? This is two things; how to accept public responsibility—how to 
be known—for acts harmful to others; and how to let that responsibility 
penetrate one’s sensibility—I helped do this. Public responsibility is 
easier because no one is likely to turn on a neighbor and blame him for 
effects ascribed to both. We take cover by hiding in crowds, where guilt 
or grief seem reduced because each is saved from feeling the weight of 
the moral burden, a load further reduced by face-saving confessions of 
weakness. How guilty could I be if I had no power to prevent the event, 
and have no way to avert its recurrence? Distress intensifies in people 
who dare to stand alone; those are the conscientious objectors who feel 
guilty merely by virtue of living in societies responsible for effects they 
deplore. 
4h. Moral ambiguity. A will is moral, whether its effects are good or 
bad, when it controls a person’s aims and actions. An effective moral 
will is, accordingly, the measure of one’s moral identity. What does she 
want; what does he do; where, when, with whom, and why? Answers 
may vary, as when turning a kaleidoscope radically alters the display. 
There may be several reasons for the change. Four are principal: i. Rules 
or laws sanctioning behavior may be inconsistent. Endorsing one bars 
the other: be generous, except to enemies. Conflict is apparent in the 
relations of the various zones: respect for fellow-believers; scorn for 
those who don’t share our beliefs or practices. ii. Autonomy differentiates 
agents who satisfy the same rules or practices: some people drive slower 
than others, because of their concern for the safety of all; others do it 
to frustrate the drivers behind them. iii. Intentions change: I no longer 
want the car I thought I needed. iv. Altered circumstances provoke the 
realignment of interests and values: diminished health makes one more 
tolerant of others moving slowly. 
These are independent variables. Their complexity doesn’t foreclose 
prediction; agents are typically consistent or regularly inconsistent. But 
they do complicate an observer’s expectations. Does she know better 
than I what she’ll do? How pressing is her aim; will she compromise a 
principal value in order to succeed? Moral ambiguity is sometimes the 
guise of people whose self-interest is their dominant value; other values 
shift opportunistically with circumstances and the promise of personal 
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satisfaction. But ambiguity is also characteristic of those whose respect 
for others is unqualified; they, too, choose and act in ways that alter with 
circumstances and changes in themselves. 
We live amidst the moral anarchy that comes with dislocations of 
family and local life, opportunist business practices, and bad luck. What 
would I do if the local police began beating the homeless or arresting 
law-abiding immigrants? I’m not sure. A simple formula—Kant’s, for 
example—promises virtue at the cost of relevance: don’t do anything 
that everyone in your circumstances couldn’t do without contradiction. 
Never lie; never sabotage the likelihood that you will be believed when 
telling the truth. What if I sometimes want my lies to be construed as 
truths? One never knows—to the point of logical certainty—the actions 
Kant’s rule would approve, given the conflicting demands of overlaid 
moral zones, and the obscurity of effects that trail off in several directions. 
Not having an a priori rule to direct us, we revert to modest 
declarations of practical wisdom. Live and let live is a principle of charity: 
others, too, have interests; don’t subordinate them when pursuing 
your aims. To thine own self be true declares that responsibility can’t be 
extenuated: do nothing that would violate your sense of right. This 
formula is aspirational: it assumes a degree of self-knowledge, rectitude, 
and control that eludes us when virtuous motives conflict: help others, 
help yourself. Join the two, and we have attitudes favorable to social 
peace. But notably, these are slogans directing us in situations for which 
we have no a priori cure. 
The solution for social complexity is Darwinian and adaptive, not 
Kantian. Solutions arise when choices and actions satisfy consequentialist 
calculations: where accidents are bad for all concerned, we settle on 
efficient ways of averting them. Ambiguity acquires its second-order, 
conceptual gloss when philosophers comment on established societies. 
Compare, for example, the ideas of freedom and responsibility in 
Rousseau’s Social Contract and Mill’s On Liberty. Both assume that 
societies do or should operate within a framework of rules and rights 
established by the democratic processes regulating assemblies of free 
people. Their disagreement about the moral identity of a society’s 
members is, however, a point of confusion among us. Are we free 
because we participate in communities that enable the formation of 
specialized talents: musician, cook, or surgeon? Or because we are social 
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atoms liberated to do as we please up to the point of harming others? Do 
we imagine being unencumbered by duties to others, or regard partners 
as the necessary adjunct to needs and talents we’re ardent to satisfy 
and express? We could disperse for lives uncompromised by duties to 
others, but wouldn’t that frustrate the wish to be a parent or spouse? 
Autonomy wants a solution to these contrary impulses and ideas. 
We don’t expect it will be cheap: freedom without community, liberty 
without duties. There will often be occasions when judgment is stymied 
by having to adjudicate between duties to others and duties to oneself. 
Observers are confused if we do one or the other in no predicable 
sequence. But this is judgment, decision, and will showing themselves 
in complex situations where one has multiple interests and duties. Like 
muscle, they atrophy without use. 
4i. Truth. Two notions of truth have implications for morality and 
identity. A sentence that’s meaningful because it signifies a possible 
state of affairs is true if the possibility obtains: ‘There’s a cat on the mat’ 
is true, if there is a cat on the mat (abstracting from the context of the 
utterance: when and where). The sentence is satisfied by a state of affairs 
correctly represented by the sentence. The other notion—being-in-the-
truth—requires an interpretation that bestows significance or purpose 
on a belief or practice: idealizing one’s family or school, for example. 
Everyone invokes truths of both sorts; we value our friendships, and 
dress for the weather. Yet these notions are sometimes acutely opposed. 
That happens when all of reality is consumed within the meaning-
bestowing narrative of a social class or nation. The schism is plain when 
religions, like philosophy, ask basic questions: what am I, or what are 
we; what is the character of the reality we address, and what is our place 
within it; what is it good or bad to do or be? Religions are cosmologically 
and ontologically ambitious, so it matters that religious narratives 
provide a context for all reality. God did it is an all-purpose explanation. 
Moral identity may be grounded in truths about our material 
circumstances, and commitments to valued others; or in truths expressing 
one’s dedication to tribal or religious beliefs or practices. Neighborly 
relations may be moral in either way: because of interdependence 
and mutual regard; or because our orienting story requires that we 
respect one another. Yet agents may be confused: where should they 
look for information or guidance when performing practical tasks: to 
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circumstances and people experienced at solving problems, or to those 
who interpret our meanings? Is pregnancy a biological function, with 
deep personal significance; or is its meaning enlarged by the prospect 
that a god has created another soul? Is farming a practical art requiring 
persistence and skill; or one best achieved with prayer? Both, you say. 
But which of the two is less reliable? 
Why say that identities of both sorts—practical or pious—are moral? 
Because each enables agents to appraise their choices as good or bad, 
right or wrong. Yet the two seem categorially different. Being-in-the-
truth expresses one’s estimate of the moral equilibrium in a god’s world, 
and the steps required to honor or sustain it. Truth as satisfaction or 
correspondence seems bloodless and aloof by comparison. An array of 
truths tells us where we are or have been, while seeming to have no 
implications for moral identity: acknowledging someone’s pain is not, in 
itself, an offer to reduce it. But this persuasion mistakenly supposes that 
the moral transparency of being-in-the-truth—gods want good works—
is also required of truth as correspondence. Its moral implications are 
not so close to the surface. 
Peirce understood truth as the successful outcome to inquiries that 
test hypotheses: a sentence or belief is more likely to be true if there is 
empirical evidence of the effects predicted. We alter failed experiments; 
mistaken hypotheses are reformulated or abandoned. Why do either? 
Because truths reporting actual states of affairs are the steady condition 
for effective engagements with other people and things. Action is 
contrary to intention if misinformation about partners or resources 
motivates behavior that violates morality because detrimental to them 
or oneself. There was once a popular song: “I didn’t know the gun was 
loaded.” 
Truth as correspondence is instrumental; we can’t negotiate our 
relations to other things without it: a call for help draws me to the 
person calling, not to a Ouija board. It is unsettling that that so many 
of the “truths” we affirm and defend are dogmas having no cogency 
apart from the beliefs and practices commended by their supporting 
stories. It is morally significant and causally effective that I know the 
loyalties constraining belief and behavior in my community. But there is 
also an overriding moral interest in the character and existence of things 
independent of anything said or thought about them: the health of one’s 
children and friends, for example. 
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Truth-telling of both sorts has a social context. William James 
imagined an ethos where every individual is free to imagine and commit 
himself to a cosmic story of his or her invention: see, for example, his 
Varieties of Religious Experience.26 Doing this exhibits our liberty, though 
it requires vast tolerance because it makes us mutually unintelligible. 
Truth as reality-testing has a different social sanction, one apparent when 
people coordinate their aims and work. That’s not possible if we don’t 
agree about the facts at hand, because collaborations are embedded in 
testable, mutually acknowledged assumptions about matters relevant to 
our tasks. We trust the speeches of people who regularly tell the truth 
because that coheres with our knowledge of them, and because truth 
facilitates the ordinary pace of communication and practice. We’re 
disoriented by talk laced with error: what is there to do when every 
other assertion misdirects us? And equally, cooperation is disrupted 
when partners disoriented by one another’s world-views struggle to 
identify aims and states of affairs about which they agree. 
Collaboration is perpetually sabotaged by our inability to distinguish 
these notions of truth. The flag is raised, we sing the national anthem: 
thinking of our history and ideals, we affirm our solidarity. Anyone 
feeling otherwise shouldn’t be here. A church’s congregants and fans of 
a team have similar feelings. All share a commitment to a practice, garb, 
song, or prayer. Responses are true to their feelings or beliefs; but why 
speak of it as truth? Because meanings locate believers in sentiments and 
expectations where many things are plain: I know who and where I am; 
what it’s safe to do and be; my allies, hopes, and prospects. A newspaper 
reports that a team’s fans are less affected by wins than losses. Hopeful 
already, fans suppose that victories vindicate their loyalty: all will go 
well. Losers feel sabotaged: things aren’t going well; events aren’t as 
they seemed or promised. 
These two ideas of truth are prefigured by a passage in Plato’s 
Euthyphro: “Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do 
they approve it because it is holy”?27 The first implies being-in-the-
truth because one defers to the preferences of the gods, an authority 
such as a priest, poet, or statesman. The second invokes truth as the 
outcome of inquiry, be it the inquiries of the gods or the reality-testing 
26  See William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Penguin, 1982).
27  Plato, Euthyphro, p. 178.
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of people who coordinate their work while sharing an aim. Morality 
for people who acquire identity with a belief or practice can be many 
things: perhaps loyalty to a city or team. Religions and ideologies are 
more comprehensive: each prescribes right practices and a conception of 
reality. There are books to learn, but also ideas to quarantine, attitudes 
to disparage. How do believers justify their beliefs and practices when 
nearby alternatives are familiar? By citing people who believe and act 
as they do. Why is this a decisive test? Because conviction intensifies 
when mirrored by others. Why trust them? Because other believers are 
an objective measure of my beliefs: that others see what I see is evidence 
for the truth of beliefs we share. 
Is there no middle ground between the truths of reality-testing and 
those postulated by meaning-bestowing interpretations? There may 
be accord about actions encouraged or proscribed, though reasons 
diverge. All is sacralized—murder and theft offend the gods—or laws 
and rights are conventions justified by their effects. The first encourages 
reverence; the other expresses the practical history of people joined by 
their deliberations on social comity and its conditions. One construes 
law as divinity’s plan for creating order; the other sees order as the effect 
of prudent management.
Which is the preferred idea of truth when moral identity is its focus: 
truth as a set of favored meanings; or truth as an accurate characterization 
of what one is and does? Meanings may be flattering but unreliable: this 
devoted fan tithes his income and knows all the words to the national 
anthem. Compare truth as correspondence: it promises honesty 
without comfort. We prefer that weather reports be accurate; we’re less 
comfortable with unvarnished accounts of ourselves, though sobriety 
requires it. Why be sober? Because, by and large, we want accurate 
information about ourselves and our circumstances. Though “by and 
large” doesn’t cover everyone. It may not cover anyone all the time: 
self-perception is often self-persuasion. But is it acceptable that stories 
informing one’s identity are false? 
 Agency falters without the resistance that nature and society provide. 
But that is not the lesson philosophy has drawn. Its principal voices in 
modern times were romantics: Mill’s On Liberty largely removed us 
from society after Descartes had expelled us from nature. Freedom 
was the prize, after centuries of ecclesiastical and political oppression; 
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imagination would be our free space. But that was a mirage; too many 
fantasies lack substance or coherence. There are many things we can’t 
do, and don’t imagine we can. Immersed in a world of other people and 
things, we act in concert, often to avert having to act alone.
Why should anyone care about this subjectivist romantic tradition, 
philosophy teachers apart? Because the existence and character of the 
opportunities and obstacles we encounter are the everyday realities of 
people we address. They don’t construe themselves as brains in a vat, 
or egos in the void. Circumstances are sometimes confounding, but 
people have some degree of freedom when ranking and pursuing their 
aims. Frustration doesn’t hurt as much if one can imagine tasting the 
flavors one prefers, but should we lose the difference between reality 
and fantasy, between making a difference or enjoying a dream? There is 
always a tension between facts known to inquiry and the meanings dear 
to significance-bestowing stories. But did we intend to alter the balance 
at cost to reality and our place within it? Bold staring eyes were once 
philosophy’s signature; truth was our motive. Was that a mistake?

Afterword
Agency is fundamental to all we are and do, whether its context 
is thought, feeling, or action. But philosophy has no coherent view of 
agency because Descartes inverted the idea of it before Kant and Hegel 
transformed his version of the cogito into the transcendental ego and 
the Absolute. The idea was further distorted by three issues considered 
here: Subjectivists reduce agency to the circle of conscious experience 
while believing that mind thinking itself is its principal or only activity. 
Behaviorists restrict the evidence for intention to the data available to 
observers: seeing me cross the street, they tell what they’ve seen and 
how they construe it. Hard determinists affirm that agency is only a 
vehicle for energy that flows from an ancient past to a distant future. 
Nothing, they say, is up to us. These are not the three postulates of 
anyone’s unified theory, though their convergence deters commentary 
that would deepen and extend our self-understanding. Where no topic 
is more fundamental to human reality, we purge these muddles, then 
emphasize autonomy, control, collaboration, and appraisal. This is 
agency responsive to others and itself.
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Moral Identity and Free Will
There is agency in all we do: thinking, doing, or making. We invent a tune, play, or 
use it to celebrate an occasion.  Or we make a conceptual leap and ask more ab-
stract ques� ons about the condi� ons for agency. They include autonomy and self-
appraisal, each contested by arguments immersing us in circumstances we don’t 
control.  But can it be true we that have no personal responsibility for all we think 
and do?    
Agency: Moral Identi ty and Free Will proposes that delibera� on, choice, and free 
will emerged within the evolu� onary history of animals with a physical advantage: 
organisms having cell walls or exoskeletons had an internal space within which to 
protect themselves from external threats or encounters.  This defense was both 
structural and ac� ve: such organisms could ignore intrusions or inhibit risky behav-
ior.  Their capaci� es evolved with � me: inhibi� on became the power to deliberate 
and choose the manner of one’s responses.  Hence the ability of humans and some 
other animals to determine their reac� ons to problema� c situa� ons or to informa-
� on that alters values and choices.  This is free will as a material power, not as the 
conclusion to a conceptual argument.  Having it makes us morally responsible for 
much we do. It prefi gures moral iden� ty.  
Closely argued but plainly wri� en, Agency: Moral Identi ty and Free Will speaks for 
autonomy and responsibility when both are eclipsed by ideas that embed us in his-
tory or tradi� on.  Our sense of moral choice and freedom is accurate. We are not 
altogether the creatures of our circumstances.
As with all Open Book publica� ons, this en� re book is available to read for free on 
the publisher’s website. Printed and digital edi� ons, together with supplementary 
digital material, can also be found at www.openbookpublishers.com
Cover Image: Photo by Carlos de Toro on Unsplash at h� ps://unsplash.com/pho-
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